1/ @BarryMeier's exemplar Steele dossier incident - both in book and Isikoff interview - was the Michael Cohen in Prague incident, rather than the memos attributed to "Millian" that were relied on in ICA and Page FISA.
2/ it prompted me to reflect a little on Steele reports on Cohen incident, which I haven't thought much about, since Cohen visit to Prague was disproved early on, tho McClatchy later published allegation of Cohen phone being pinged in Prague. mcclatchydc.com/news/investiga…
3/ Cohen's name is first mentioned in Steele memos on three consecutive days in October (18, 19, 20), then again in the non-DNC memo on Dec 13.
4/ I think that there's an important point about Cohen-related content, as compared to the earlier memos that we've focused on. The reports on Cohen contained non-public information that could be disproven (and was disproven). In earlier memos, there was open source information
5/ that (for example) Carter Page was in Moscow on July 7-8. Or was information that pertained to private conversations that could not be disproven in any obvious way e.g. what Ivanov might have said to a subordinate.
6/ Danchenko's normal modus operandi was the creation of fictional conversations and meetings in a context where the parties could have been in the same room. @RealSLokhova long ago explained that frauds by Halper and his cousins tried to begin with people in same room.
7/ Danchenko generally adhered to what we might call Halper's Rules for Fraud. But the Cohen incident was a departure from this modus operandi: the claim that Cohen was in Prague in Aug/Sept wasnt open source and was disprovable.
8/ so what led to this mistake? Both Meier and Isikoff project "Russian" disinformation onto incident. But the overwhelming evidence in all other Steele/Danchenko memos is that the content wasn't "raw intelligence" from an actual network, but fiction by Danchenko and/or Steele.
9/ my initial impression was that Steele had embellished Danchenko information to Steele (that's what Danchenko told FBI), but I'm increasingly of the view that Danchenko fabricated most, if not all, of the content, based on topics assigned by Steele/Perkins Coie/maybe Fusion.
10/ we KNOW that the content attributed to "Millian" was totally fabricated by Steele and/or Danchenko. Vorontsov, Podobedova, Abyshev and Galkina have all publicly denied being sources of information attributed to them. Obviously, that's what they would say, but some points in
11/ in their denials add credence: e.g. Abyshev said that he didn't meet Trubnikov until 2017; Vorontsov saying that he was wary of Russian expatriates working for sketchy foreign companies.
2/ in any event, from the perspective that Danchenko wasn't actually getting ANY information for his supposed Russian network, it would be implausible that he would suddenly get blockbuster disinformation (about Cohen in Prague) from Galkina, then in Cyprus.
13/ so let's look at dates and chronologies. Danchenko was at a conference in Moscow from ~Oct 3-8. Supposedly unrelated to Orbis. Steele was in US with Perkins Coie, reporters on ~Sep 22-23; then in Rome with FBI on Oct 4. Danchenko and Steele in London from ~Oct 9-12.
14/ seems to me it's far more likely someone in US (Perkins Coie, Fusion, reporters, FBI) fed Steele the story about Cohen in Prague - the story that re-emerged much later with McClatchy; that Steele assigned Danchenko to look into it; and Danchenko duly composed usual fiction
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@shipwreckedcrew the person most responsible for burying the Danchenko information was SIA Brian Auten. He appears to have disseminated 2-page summary memo, which concealed inconsistencies arising from Danchenko interview, while not distributing
the 57-page memorandum on Danchenko, other than
@shipwreckedcrew 2/ placing it in the Crossfire case file, where it appears to have remained unread until re-discovered by Horowitz. At least, all FBI officials senior to Auten profess ignorance of the document and that they know nothing except what was in 2-page memorandum.
@shipwreckedcrew 3/ this seems surprisingly incurious to me, but not impossible. From a professional perspective, how plausible is it that information in Auten's 57 page memo did in fact remain unknown to FBI officials?
@mtaibbi the ICA is the key. Focus on Carter Page FISA has been Look Squirrel distraction. Steele info did not meet IC quality standards but included anyway because Obama (orally) said to include "everything", which McCabe used as authorization/instruction to include Steele fabrications
@mtaibbi 2/ many questions about ICA remain unanswered and even unasked. There does not appear to be any purpose for including Steele "information" other than to leak it. (as I recall) Strzok/Page speculated in early Jan on leaks from senior WH.
@mtaibbi 3/ was there any purpose in such a rushed ICA other than to boobytrap and undermine the incoming administration? Everyone involved is smart and cunning, so each step undoubtedly has a color of right, but net result of ICA was to commence resistance against Trump.
@ReginaMourad@BarryMeier@HansMahncke@MonsieursGhost Meier talked to me. He discusses our Twitter work in a section of his book, but manages to get almost every nuance wrong. He's a good journalist but misunderstood our perspective almost totally.
@ReginaMourad@BarryMeier@HansMahncke@MonsieursGhost my initial reaction to @BarryMeier was over-focused on frustration with some unfairness to our twitter corner. To be balanced, I should also have pointed out that his critique of Steele et al (and I intend to read book) appears to be very severe in MSM terms.
@ReginaMourad@BarryMeier@HansMahncke@MonsieursGhost 2/ Meier pointed out that Steele's supposed role in Litvinenko affair had much inflated (just as his role in FIFA was.) The Litvinenko affair was a long-standing interest of his.
as Mark Twain and Satchell Paige said, “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.“ Following what we were told was "the science" on droplets was a bad mistake. Precautions for droplets didn't work against aerosols.
here is fascinating story of how one scientist disentangled the role of aerosols in spread of COVID. wired.com/story/the-teen…
there's an important moral to the distinction between aerosols and droplets in how to effectively forestall spread. Spending money on improved ventilation systems in a Hong Kong university as opposed to spending same amount of money on mass testing.
three weeks ago, when Ontario Science Table was in full volume doomcasting stratospheric exponential COVID, I surmised that a Gompertz top was forming and that there were grounds for optimism, becoming increasingly optimistic as doomsters became gloomier
my surmise that mid-April was Gompertz top seems to have been prescient. Ontario cases are now less than 50% of top of Gompertz curve, declining rapidly against all expectations of Ontario Science Table. Hospitalizations following with lag.
3/ in mid-Apr, Ontario govt @fordnation mostly resisted demands of public sector privileged academics for more draconian lockdowns and/or additional burdens on the local businesses upon whom entire economic burden of lockdown has been imposed, though they
imagine a citizenry which places a "high premium on data analysis and empiricism". Or which believes that "science is a process, and not an institution". Or which expects data used by policy-makers to be analysable.
Such citizens have long been hated by climate "community",
2/ the appropriate response of institutions should be to make the data available, improve their analytic and statistical skills, acknowledge errors graciously.
More or less the opposite strategy to the climate "community".
3/ we've also learned over past few years that institutions expect citizens to set aside their expectations of a "high premium on data analysis and empiricism" when it comes to diktats ("assessments") by intelligence community.