As Belarus sanctions will be high on everyone radar tomorrow and the weeks to come, perhaps it would be helpful to recall where we are today. (thread)
The principal EU act on Belarus sanctions is Council Decision 2012/642, which lays out the scheme of EU sanctions on Belarus. These sanctions had their ups and downs, but after recent presidential elections are a hot topic again and given today's events may become red hot. /1
As Council Decision provides for both EU-level measures and Member State measures, it is implemented at both EU and national level. At the EU level, it is implemented by Council Regulation 765/2006. Some of Annexes w/ listed persons are amended by Council Implementing Regs. /2
Member state measures, like ban on entry ("visa ban") and arms embargo are implemented mostly by national measures. /3
EU Belarus sanctions consist of 4 main measures:
1 arms embargo & ban on related assistance
2 ban on sales of equipment used for internal repression & related assistance
3 ban on entry of listed persons
4 asset freeze of listed person & entities

(More on listed persons later)/4
First, EU imposed an arms embargo, which bans sales, supply, transfer or export of any arms or related material on the EU Common Military List, as well as providing any technical or financial assistance or brokering or financing to such transactions. /5
Common EU Military list is here : EU Military List is here:
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/… /6
Second, EU banned sales, supply, transfer or export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, as well as related technical or financial assistance, brokering or financing. /7
The list is in Annex III to Council Regulation 765/2006, and includes things like guns & ammunition, weapon0-sights, bombs and grenades, water cannons, other crowd-controls vehicles, prisoner transport, crowd-control explosives, body armour, helmets, night vision and others./8
Important trivia item: "biatholon equipment" as defined by International Biathlon Union (specialist rifles, ammunition and sights - listed in Annex IV) is exempted from these bans. Member States may also authorize small sporting rifles and pistols caliber 0.22 - Annex V). /9
Third, EU imposed ban on entry on a number of "listed persons". Ban on entry is a visa/immigration measures - the listed individuals cannot enter the EU. /10
This "entry ban" list had been short, then very long, then short again, but now it appears (to my surprise, to be honest) to still be very short - only four persons, all connected to the disappearance of 4 dissidents in 1999/2000. /10
Fourth, the EU has adopted "an asset freeze" on listed persons, i.e., a measure that on the one hand, freezes all funds and property of listed person and - on the other - bans any transactions with these persons and entities. /11
The "asset freeze" list today encompasses 88 government officials (including Lukashenka, current and former Ministers, military/security forces, KGB, prison staff, police). /12
The "asset freeze" list also includes 7 entities:
- Beltechexport
- Dana Holdings
- GHU (Economic Dept of Lukashenka's Property Management Directorate)
- LLC Synthesis
- AGAT Electromechanical Plant
- Repair Plant
- MZKT.
/13
Beltechexport, Dana Holdings are private companies that benefit from close relationship of their owners with the Lukashenka regime. The last four supply the regime with security equipment. /14
MZKT is interesting: it is part of the military-industrial complex. However, they listed because they fired their employees who protested against Lukashenka after the stolen Presidential elections and hence are listed for "human rights abuses". /15
It is interesting to point out the reasons for listing. EU can sanction:
- persons, entities, bodies responsible for serious violations of human rights, repression of civil society & democratic opposition, or whose activities otherwise undermine democracy or rule of law, /16
- any persons, entities, bodies "associated with" them or "controlled by" them, and
- persons, entities, bodies "benefitting from" or "supporting" the Lukashenka regime, and persons, bodies, entities owned or controlled by them. /17
To conclude, EU sanctions on Belarus have been - in my opinion - DEFENSIVE. They sought to PUNISH & PREVENT FUTURE violations.
- arms embargo,
- ban on equipment for internal repression,
- sanctions on security & govt officials that participated in wrong doing. /18
EU has NOT really employed OFFENSIVE SANCTIONS yet whose purpose is to weaken the regime economically.
- no trade sanctions,
- no financial sanctions on major sectors of economy,
- no attempts to hit state-owned enterprises. /19
Only two businessmen were hit:
- Aliaksandr Shakutsin;
- Mikalai Varabei.

So EU hasn't yet really gone after businessmen benefitting from Lukashenka.

My recommendation:
- go after state-owned enterprises & ban their key exports to EU,
- hit Lukshanka's oligarchs.

/THE END
Just realized I unwittingly merged two separate expressions:
- to be on the radar,
- to be high on the agenda.

Apologies! 🤦

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More from @TomWlost

25 May
I am hearing a lot of doubts whether EU and the West have any economic pressure over Belarus.

Here are some quick & obvious targets for trade sanctions. (thread)
By hitting:
(1) oil & fuels
(2) iron, steel, metallurgy
(3) chemicals & fertilizers
the West would be hitting about a third of BLR trade. /2 Image
First, fuel, oil & minerals. Almost 7 bln USD in exports look sanctionable. Key player is Ukraine, which may not be able to join due to Kyiv's reliance on some energy-related imports from BLR. But below some examples. /3
Read 17 tweets
24 May
Not an entirely bad result (yet) from the European Council on Belarus, here is why. (thread)
As a preliminary matter, remember European Council doesnt impose sanctions. It only sets direction EU will take. Preparation of laws must be done in conformity with EU treaties. This involves (in sanctions) the European Commission, External Action Service and the Council. /2
So first, conclusions call for "additional listings of persons and entities ... on the basis of the relevant sanctions framework". /3
Read 26 tweets
23 May
A few observations on today's reports that Belarus effectively hijacked a civilian plan flying over its territory to kidnap one of its passengers. (thread)
Under Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, hijacking of a plane ("seizure of aircraft") and "kidnapping" may qualify as "terrorist acts". /2
The problem is that - under the Common Position - it seems that 'terrorists acts' are those, the purpose of which is to attack "a country" or "an international organization". /3
Read 17 tweets
2 Jun 20
Thank you for writing about this, @anders_aslund. What is happening in Ukraine with fertilizers is an outrage and we call on @Trade_EU @PhilHoganEU @WeyandSabine to intervene at the highest levels as soon as possible while window of opportunity to impact the proceeding exists!
First point, the dominant local producer of fertilizers - Ostchem Group owned by Firtash - is a MONOPOLIST. This has been unequivocally established by Ukrainian AntiMonopoly Committee that decided that in 2017, Ostchem was a monopolist on the Ukrainian fertilizer market. /1
The key element of that decision finding Ostchem a monopolist was an event from 2017, when Ostchem collected pre-payments from Ukrainian farmers for future deliveries, yet then STOPPED PRODUCTION FOR 4 MONTHS. /2
Read 19 tweets
24 Sep 19
@SamuelMarcLowe @CER_EU Sam - a couple of quick comments. I'll return to this later, but for now. First, very good, timely and necessary piece ! Congratulations!
@SamuelMarcLowe @CER_EU Second, abt relocation of economic activity due to carbon leakage. This doesnt have to be actual moving of factories, or closing one factory in EU, opening another abroad. It's enough that EU producers of same good are less competitive than foreign producers of same good.
@SamuelMarcLowe @CER_EU If EU steel producers lose market share to steel imports, or EU fertilizer producers lose market share to fertilizer imports - that's also carbon leakage, because as a result of ETS, more carbon is emitted abroad, where there are no incentives to limit them.
Read 28 tweets
10 Sep 19
@KeirGiles 1/ I am going to go out on a limb and raise one possibility rarely discussed. Marcon is intelligent, we cannot deny him that. He has also been rather tough on Russia. So I think we need to consider that his plan may be more elaborate than just a dumb "reset".
@KeirGiles 2/ One option is opportunistic attempt to drum up support for FR interests in Russia or abroad. He knows reset won't work, but thinks he can score points (commercial or others) by saying nice things on Russia. Some contracts for French companies? Maybe minor concession elsewhere?
@KeirGiles 3/ so this option would entail Macron knowing very well nothing good will come out of Russia on major issues (Ukraine, Syria, etc), but hoping he can get some (smaller) deliverables for France from RU. That would be a good trade for him.
Read 6 tweets

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