Not an entirely bad result (yet) from the European Council on Belarus, here is why. (thread)
As a preliminary matter, remember European Council doesnt impose sanctions. It only sets direction EU will take. Preparation of laws must be done in conformity with EU treaties. This involves (in sanctions) the European Commission, External Action Service and the Council. /2
So first, conclusions call for "additional listings of persons and entities ... on the basis of the relevant sanctions framework". /3
In pure English, this means adding people and companies under existing programs (no new sanctions programs). /4
Most likely this means general BLR sanctions regulations (Council Decision 2012/642 and Council Regulation 765/2006). /5
If you want to know what this means in detail, you can find it here. 👇/6
Importantly, this legislation allows listing of:
- persons, bodies & entities responsible for serious violations of human rights or repression of civil society and democratic opposition, or whose activities undermine democracy or rule of law in Belarus, /7
- persons, bodies & entities "associated with them" or "controlled by them", /8
- persons, entities and bodies "benefiting from" or "supporting" Lukashenka regime, or
- persons, entities and bodies "owned by" or "controlled by" them. /9
However, in the past, EU has focused mostly on members of the regime and security apparatus.

EU had sanctioned only two businessmen for "benefitting from" Lukashenka regime.

Only seven entities are listed (including for benefitting from the regime). /10
As most of the regime (including Lukashenka) is already subject to sanctions, we can HOPE the next listings will be of businessmen and companies. At least this is how I would like to read this phrase. /11
Under EU Magnitsky regime, another "relevant sanctions framework", EU could list "State actors" for "serious rights violations and abuses", which include arbitrary arrests or detentions, violations and abuses of freedom of assembly, association, opinion and expression./12
This is important, because EU hasn't yet listed any Belarusians under its Magnitsky sanctions legislation, even though clearly human rights are routinely violated there, in particular following the Presidential elections in 2020. /13
The only current subjects listed by EU Magnitsky sanctions are Russian, Chechen, North Korean, Chinese, Libyan and South Sudanese. /14
However, Magnitsky sanctions allow for something that regular Belarus sanctions do not: subjecting "State actors" to sanctions (i.e., asset freeze). The State actor would have to be linked of course to the human rights violations. /15
So, for example, it may still be difficult, not impossible, to sanction under Magnitsky BLR air traffic control, or Ministry of Defence, i.e., govt entities involved in forced landing of Ryanair passenger plane (i.e., persuasive link to human rights violations must be made). /16
The 3rd existing "relevant sanctions framework" under which additional listing may be done is Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on terrorism, but there some legal hurdles would have to be overcome. Given the other two simpler options, unlikely the Council will go down this path. /17
You can read about the legal/technical problems with applying Common Position 2001/931 on terrorism to the Ryanair situation here. 👇 /18
But what gives me some comfort is the second statement on sanctions.

European Council calls on the Council to "adopt further targeted economic sanctions" /19
In light of the separate "additional listings ... under relevant sanctions framework" provision in the Council Conclusions, this can only mean that EU will prepare ENTIRELY NEW ECONOMIC SANCTIONS on Belarus. /20
Who do I know EU will not fold and adopt some meaningless new measures? Quite frankly, I don't. But this is all we could have expected from the European Council, if we want new hard sanctions on Belarus. /21
Remember, naming specific measures requires a lot of preparatory work: analyzing trade flows, value chains, investment patterns. EU was caught off-guard by Ryanair kidnapping, so had no time to prepare anything more meaningful in time for the European Council. /22
How* do I know ...
Third, we also have the best we could have for addressing the unsafe nature of Belarus airspace. EUCO calls on airlines to avoid it (not sure whether Council can "ban" EU airlines from flying there - would welcome any expert chipping in on this!), and .. /23
EUCO instructs the Council to ban Belarus airlines from flying to the EU - so sanctions on Belavia are also moving. /24
Of course I wish the EUCO stated more, mainly talk about trade and financial sanctions on Belarus state-owned enterprises. But this may still happen under "targeted economic sanctions".

To be continued in a few days once more details are clear. /END

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More from @TomWlost

25 May
I am hearing a lot of doubts whether EU and the West have any economic pressure over Belarus.

Here are some quick & obvious targets for trade sanctions. (thread)
By hitting:
(1) oil & fuels
(2) iron, steel, metallurgy
(3) chemicals & fertilizers
the West would be hitting about a third of BLR trade. /2 Image
First, fuel, oil & minerals. Almost 7 bln USD in exports look sanctionable. Key player is Ukraine, which may not be able to join due to Kyiv's reliance on some energy-related imports from BLR. But below some examples. /3
Read 17 tweets
23 May
As Belarus sanctions will be high on everyone radar tomorrow and the weeks to come, perhaps it would be helpful to recall where we are today. (thread)
The principal EU act on Belarus sanctions is Council Decision 2012/642, which lays out the scheme of EU sanctions on Belarus. These sanctions had their ups and downs, but after recent presidential elections are a hot topic again and given today's events may become red hot. /1
As Council Decision provides for both EU-level measures and Member State measures, it is implemented at both EU and national level. At the EU level, it is implemented by Council Regulation 765/2006. Some of Annexes w/ listed persons are amended by Council Implementing Regs. /2
Read 23 tweets
23 May
A few observations on today's reports that Belarus effectively hijacked a civilian plan flying over its territory to kidnap one of its passengers. (thread)
Under Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, hijacking of a plane ("seizure of aircraft") and "kidnapping" may qualify as "terrorist acts". /2
The problem is that - under the Common Position - it seems that 'terrorists acts' are those, the purpose of which is to attack "a country" or "an international organization". /3
Read 17 tweets
2 Jun 20
Thank you for writing about this, @anders_aslund. What is happening in Ukraine with fertilizers is an outrage and we call on @Trade_EU @PhilHoganEU @WeyandSabine to intervene at the highest levels as soon as possible while window of opportunity to impact the proceeding exists!
First point, the dominant local producer of fertilizers - Ostchem Group owned by Firtash - is a MONOPOLIST. This has been unequivocally established by Ukrainian AntiMonopoly Committee that decided that in 2017, Ostchem was a monopolist on the Ukrainian fertilizer market. /1
The key element of that decision finding Ostchem a monopolist was an event from 2017, when Ostchem collected pre-payments from Ukrainian farmers for future deliveries, yet then STOPPED PRODUCTION FOR 4 MONTHS. /2
Read 19 tweets
24 Sep 19
@SamuelMarcLowe @CER_EU Sam - a couple of quick comments. I'll return to this later, but for now. First, very good, timely and necessary piece ! Congratulations!
@SamuelMarcLowe @CER_EU Second, abt relocation of economic activity due to carbon leakage. This doesnt have to be actual moving of factories, or closing one factory in EU, opening another abroad. It's enough that EU producers of same good are less competitive than foreign producers of same good.
@SamuelMarcLowe @CER_EU If EU steel producers lose market share to steel imports, or EU fertilizer producers lose market share to fertilizer imports - that's also carbon leakage, because as a result of ETS, more carbon is emitted abroad, where there are no incentives to limit them.
Read 28 tweets
10 Sep 19
@KeirGiles 1/ I am going to go out on a limb and raise one possibility rarely discussed. Marcon is intelligent, we cannot deny him that. He has also been rather tough on Russia. So I think we need to consider that his plan may be more elaborate than just a dumb "reset".
@KeirGiles 2/ One option is opportunistic attempt to drum up support for FR interests in Russia or abroad. He knows reset won't work, but thinks he can score points (commercial or others) by saying nice things on Russia. Some contracts for French companies? Maybe minor concession elsewhere?
@KeirGiles 3/ so this option would entail Macron knowing very well nothing good will come out of Russia on major issues (Ukraine, Syria, etc), but hoping he can get some (smaller) deliverables for France from RU. That would be a good trade for him.
Read 6 tweets

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