I am hearing a lot of doubts whether EU and the West have any economic pressure over Belarus.
Here are some quick & obvious targets for trade sanctions. (thread)
By hitting: (1) oil & fuels (2) iron, steel, metallurgy (3) chemicals & fertilizers
the West would be hitting about a third of BLR trade. /2
First, fuel, oil & minerals. Almost 7 bln USD in exports look sanctionable. Key player is Ukraine, which may not be able to join due to Kyiv's reliance on some energy-related imports from BLR. But below some examples. /3
Refined petroluem - Belarus' NUMBER 1 EXPORTS. Goes almost exlusively to the West _ Ukraine. Over 5 bln USD in exports. Even if Ukraine doesn't join, very painful to BLR. /4
Crude petroleum - over 700 mln USD in exports. All of them to Germany. /5
Coal tar oil - over 300 mln USD in exports, all to EU. /6
Coal briquets - 250 mln USD in exports, entirely Ukraine & Poland. /7
Petroleum gas - 180 mln USD. Key role of Ukraine again. /8
Second, big group - chemicals. Over 4 bln USD in potentially sanctionable exports. /9
Potassic fertilizers - BLR second biggest export - almost 3 bln USD in global exports, of which abt 20% goes to the West. /10
Compound fertilizers - almost all of the 320 mln USD in exports go to the West + Ukraine. Incidentally, Ukrainian producers would be happy to get rid of these imports as they just had a trade defence case against them. /11
Nitrogen fertilizers - almost 90% of these 200 mln USD exports go to the West. /12
Fertilizers are important, because none of them are going to Russia, which is a big competitor of the Belarus industry. So without Western markets, Belarusian exports have nowhere to go. /13
Another example - antiknock - almost a quarter of these go to the West. /14
Finally, the third group: the steel & metals sector. Mostly state-owned. Some examples of top BLR global steel exports below, with West's share of imports marked. Over 1 bln USD is in sanctionable product groups (i.e., where West's share is significant). /15
More steel & metals products. /16
Of course, this is rudimentary data. No ambition to be complete. In energy & fuel, Ukraine may not join for some categories. There may be other reasons why other groups are difficult. But overall, its clear the West has ability to deliver massive pain to BLR economy. /END
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As a preliminary matter, remember European Council doesnt impose sanctions. It only sets direction EU will take. Preparation of laws must be done in conformity with EU treaties. This involves (in sanctions) the European Commission, External Action Service and the Council. /2
So first, conclusions call for "additional listings of persons and entities ... on the basis of the relevant sanctions framework". /3
As Belarus sanctions will be high on everyone radar tomorrow and the weeks to come, perhaps it would be helpful to recall where we are today. (thread)
The principal EU act on Belarus sanctions is Council Decision 2012/642, which lays out the scheme of EU sanctions on Belarus. These sanctions had their ups and downs, but after recent presidential elections are a hot topic again and given today's events may become red hot. /1
As Council Decision provides for both EU-level measures and Member State measures, it is implemented at both EU and national level. At the EU level, it is implemented by Council Regulation 765/2006. Some of Annexes w/ listed persons are amended by Council Implementing Regs. /2
A few observations on today's reports that Belarus effectively hijacked a civilian plan flying over its territory to kidnap one of its passengers. (thread)
Under Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, hijacking of a plane ("seizure of aircraft") and "kidnapping" may qualify as "terrorist acts". /2
The problem is that - under the Common Position - it seems that 'terrorists acts' are those, the purpose of which is to attack "a country" or "an international organization". /3
Thank you for writing about this, @anders_aslund. What is happening in Ukraine with fertilizers is an outrage and we call on @Trade_EU@PhilHoganEU@WeyandSabine to intervene at the highest levels as soon as possible while window of opportunity to impact the proceeding exists!
First point, the dominant local producer of fertilizers - Ostchem Group owned by Firtash - is a MONOPOLIST. This has been unequivocally established by Ukrainian AntiMonopoly Committee that decided that in 2017, Ostchem was a monopolist on the Ukrainian fertilizer market. /1
The key element of that decision finding Ostchem a monopolist was an event from 2017, when Ostchem collected pre-payments from Ukrainian farmers for future deliveries, yet then STOPPED PRODUCTION FOR 4 MONTHS. /2
@SamuelMarcLowe@CER_EU Sam - a couple of quick comments. I'll return to this later, but for now. First, very good, timely and necessary piece ! Congratulations!
@SamuelMarcLowe@CER_EU Second, abt relocation of economic activity due to carbon leakage. This doesnt have to be actual moving of factories, or closing one factory in EU, opening another abroad. It's enough that EU producers of same good are less competitive than foreign producers of same good.
@SamuelMarcLowe@CER_EU If EU steel producers lose market share to steel imports, or EU fertilizer producers lose market share to fertilizer imports - that's also carbon leakage, because as a result of ETS, more carbon is emitted abroad, where there are no incentives to limit them.
@KeirGiles 1/ I am going to go out on a limb and raise one possibility rarely discussed. Marcon is intelligent, we cannot deny him that. He has also been rather tough on Russia. So I think we need to consider that his plan may be more elaborate than just a dumb "reset".
@KeirGiles 2/ One option is opportunistic attempt to drum up support for FR interests in Russia or abroad. He knows reset won't work, but thinks he can score points (commercial or others) by saying nice things on Russia. Some contracts for French companies? Maybe minor concession elsewhere?
@KeirGiles 3/ so this option would entail Macron knowing very well nothing good will come out of Russia on major issues (Ukraine, Syria, etc), but hoping he can get some (smaller) deliverables for France from RU. That would be a good trade for him.