1. Another #BokoHaram thread, this time about #ISWAP’s Abu Musab al-Barnawi audio about the death of #Shekau (Abu Musab is chatty these days). He says that Shekau was attacked in his markaz and fled, and escaped capture for several days.
2. ISWAP fighters tried to convince Shekau to surrender, but he blew himself up.
3. Abu Musab reiterates his earlier statement that they told Shekau “we didn't come to kill you, come and repent and obey the orders of Amirul mumineen. In his wisdom, he may reappoint you as a leader and we are ready to accept his position”.
4. Barnawi mentions receiving an order from the Caliph about Shekau, two or three days before the Eid ul fitr (13 May). Shekau was dead on 18 or 19 May. That was fast. That must have been not the order for the entry into Sambisa, but for the final attack on Shekau’s markaz.
5. Still no IS pronouncement re: the recent events, from Abu Musab’s return to Shekau’s death. Is this all really sanctioned & ordered by the Caliph, or is Barnawi just using the name?
6. When Abu Musab was replaced in 2019, his successor claimed that the Caliph had decided, but there never was any pronouncement by the Caliph.
7. Barnawi mentions a subsequent attack against ISWAP territory by Shekau loyalists: “Now that we were able to go to their Sambisa and succeeded in killing their leader, they came here and carried out indiscriminate killings of women and children and the weak ones.”
8. This probably refers to the reported Bakura attack on the Lake Chad area. Barnawi mentions a retaliatory operation under way against the raiders – he asks all supporters to pray for that.
9. Barnawi also talks about brothers in Marwa – probably Maroua in the Cameroonian Far North – who have been defenceless viz. Shekau attacks. It is true that Shekau raiders have attacked Nigerian refugees repeatedly. Perhaps some have been indeed ISWAP sympathisers.
10. While reiterating his criticism of Shekau (he once called him a “tumour”), Barnawi spends a lot of time preaching against disobedience to God… it seems like a conciliatory, soft attempt to call people to follow orders. Barnawi trying to be gentle?
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1. Not convinced by this Soufan Center piece on the death of Shekau and the future of #BokoHaram#ISWAP. It includes some good (though by now not original) analysis but also some claims that are disputable to very disputable… A thread.
2. The piece claims that it was al-Baghdadi who “personally ordered Shekau’s ejection from ISWAP”. I wonder about the evidence for this. There has never been a statement from the IS about Shekau’s demise – in August 2016, they only announced Abu Musab as the new wali.
3. The piece mentions Shekau had “Cameroon-based fighters”. As far as I know, JASDJ’s fighters are in the hills on the Nigerian side of the border, not in Cameroon – though of course they do raid into Cameroon.
1. More news from ISWAP – in an audio released some time ago (before the Sambisa blitz against #Shekau, I think), Abu Musab al Barnawi, the ad interim boss (wali?) of #ISWAP#BokoHaram, details a point he had made in a statement that I have commented earlier. A thread.
2. This new audio revolves around Abu Musab's earlier promise to review past injustices committed by ISWAP. He reiterates. He calls all those aggrieved, whether ISWAP members or civilians, to put forth their claims. He confirms a forum will examine these claims.
3. He insists justice applies to leadership, rank and file, and civilians alike. He insists both leaders and followers in ISWAP have done some wrong. He insists that even soldiers of the Caliphate will be punished if they kill without a good reason.
It's not just that... An international or regional organisation has impact only when a (relatively) strong state has a strong interest in a crisis & a solution to push, takes the lead & puts the resources behind & is unopposed by the other states. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
Then that state and the regional organisation work together to legitimise and push a solution. This is what Senegal did in the Gambia. It met only with weak, isolated frontal opposition (Alpha Condé) & some players at the UN prevented Dakar from securing a full-on UN endorsement.
But it worked all the same. Fairly similar case is Guinea-Bissau, where Dakar also worked with and through ECOWAS to push its take (there again, against Condé)
According several Borno sources, with Shekau out of the way, #ISWAP is embarking on a campaign of outreach to civilians in its areas of influence old & new, insisting that Shekau is dead, that they are ruling now, & that (Muslim) civilians will be safe as long as they pay zakat
In the Lake area, they have released civilians detained for a variety of offenses (bush burning, unauthorised grazing, etc). They have opened areas that they used to forbid for security reasons to civilians & removed a few officials known for being harsh on civilians.
And yes, in its areas of control, ISWAP had been detaining and fining herders for grazing on the fields of farmers. And they protect grazing areas from the enchroachment of farmers. And they protect herders from bandits and Shekau raiders.
1. This is #BokoHaram thread-day, it seems… This time about the situation now prevalent in the Sambisa. I indirectly got some feedback from the #JASDJ side… It looks like, with Shekau gone, the incorporation of JAS into ISWAP is well on its way.
2. First, some info about the recent events gets additional verification. Yes, there was fighting in Sambisa (and JAS fighters did not lose it all). Yes, Shekau blew himself up, killing some ISWAP members. Yes, Abu Musab is ISWAP’s leader.
3. JAS now counts 20 subgroups, each presumably under a qaid (did some qaed die during the ISWAP push? Not known. Also, is Bakura counted as one of the 20?)
1. In the long version of the audio released in Hausa before his death on 18 May, Abubakar Shekau, the leader of #JASDJ#BokoHaram, gives interesting bits about the events that were leading to his ultimate defeat. He also sheds light on more long term issues. A thread…
2. Shekau confirms that ISWAP (never named) entered Sambisa, and that some fighting took place. He also insists that ISWAP flipped over a number of JAS members.
3. He notes that ISWAP was pressing him to pledge allegiance to Abu Ibrahim, the current Islamic State Caliph, adding that they promised him he would be acknowledged as wali of “the whole African continent” if he did.