China's nuclear regulator, NNSA (NOT the same organization as @NNSANews), says the reactor contains more than 60,000 fuel rods. Based on the following IAEA doc, I believe the exact number is 63,865. (241 assemblies, each containing 265 rods). (2/n)
Now, the @W_Nuclear_News article linked above cites the @iaeaorg as saying that there are ~14 leaks per 1,000,000 rods. (3/n)
So, using the binomial distribution, we can estimate that the probability of at least five rods leaking is just 0.2%.
In fact, given that not all of the fuel may have fully irradiated, this is just an upper bound. The real number is probably much smaller. (4/n)
In other words, there's *at most* a 0.2% probability that five rods would leak by chance. Which means that there's very likely some kind of common mode failure at play. (5/n)
What that failure is, I have no idea... Could be to do with fuel design, manufacture or handling, or with reactor operation. China's opacity is weak evidence (and only weak evidence, IMO) that it's more likely to do with handling or operations, than design or manufacture. (6/n)
But the big point is this: Given the leakage is almost certainly the result of some kind of abnormal event, it's incredibly important to understand it--both for reactor safety in China and elsewhere. China's opacity is very worrying from that perspective. (7/n)
To be clear, though, I very much doubt that there has been or will be a serious accident.
Now, back to my day job. Was there some kind of a summit going on today? (8/8)
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The idea of using SM-3 IIAs against ICBMs isn't new, though interest has ebbed and flowed over the last decade. By demonstrating at least some capacity in a test, however, this idea is no longer just theoretical.
But is it practical? (2/n)
Given the locations of the target launch (Kwajelain Atoll) and the interceptor (northeast of Hawaii), it's clear that the target missile was intercepted on its way down.
See this helpful picture dug up by my colleagues, @nktpnd. (3/n)
2. Make all intercontinental ground-launched boost-glide missiles and nuclear-powered torpedoes (whether nuclear or conventionally armed) accountable. (3/n)
<THREAD>Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov responded to @USArmsControl in an interview with @ElenaChernenko. Beyond the predictable lack of interest in U.S. proposals, two points caught my eye.
First, the good news. If Biden wins, Ryabkov did not rule out agreeing to a New START extension in the time between Biden's inauguration (Jan 20) and the treaty's expiry (Feb 5).
Previously, Russian officials and experts had said that time would be too short. (2/n)
Second, in his interview, @USArmsControl explicitly threatened that, if New START is not extended, the U.S. will "unconvert" converted delivery systems so they can be used to deliver nuclear warheads. (3/n)
1. Overall, @USArmsControl is laying out a position for the extension for New START that Russia could never accept. It's clear, as it has been for months, that the United States is trying to kill New START. (3/n)
<THREAD>Concern about China's nuclear build-up (see below) is partly premised on the fear that Beijing seeks to challenge the United States numerically.
This misses a key point: China lacks the fissile material to do so. (1/n)
First off, here's a *worst-case* scenario, i.e. Let's make assumptions tend to underestimate the amount used in each weapon and overestimate the amount available. (3/n)