As of about June 14, Iran had reportedly produced 6.5 kg 60% enriched (hexafluoride mass) or 4.4 kg uranium mass only. reuters.com/world/middle-e… 1/
Iran’s IR-6 production-scale cascade has produced 60% enriched uranium at an average daily rate of 0.126 kg/day since May 22, using less than 5% LEU as feed, skipping the intermediate step of producing 20% material. 2/
Of course, the operation of the IR-6 cascade and the production of 60% is banned by the JCPOA. 3/
Returning to the JCPOA requires the destruction of this IR-6 cascade and the removal of the 60%. Failing to do either, such as by mothballing the IR-6’s, would represent in effect a renegotiated JCPOA; one that is weaker than the original. 4/
Iran’s activity must be viewed as practicing breakout to make enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons. It is learning to make such material more quickly and developing valuable experience in doing so. 5/
This experience also complicates returning to the JCPOA, since that experience cannot be destroyed. As a result, some compensating actions are needed or a number of sanctions should be left in place to compensate for this irreversible gain in violation of the JCPOA. 6/
Often lost in the debate is that 60% enriched uranium can be used directly in a nuclear explosive, although 90% is preferred. Iran now has about 10 percent of what it would need for one nuclear explosive fashioned from 60% enriched uranium. 7/
At current rates, Iran would need about 1.3 years to make enough 60% for a nuclear explosive. Two of these IR-6 cascades could make enough in less than 8 months; four could do so in four months. 8/
NEW: The International Inspectors Hold the Key to Truly Bringing Iran into Compliance with the Nuclear Deal’s Key Peaceful Pledge isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… 1/
A major goal of the Biden Administration is to sculpt a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) where Iran comes into full compliance with the deal in exchange for lifting all U.S. nuclear sanctions. 2/
Missing in the discussion so far is Iran’s lack of compliance with its fundamental commitment in the JCPOA, namely “under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” 3/
Highlights:
- Iran started to produce near 20 percent enriched uranium on January 4, 2021, in 1044 IR-1 centrifuges located at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). 2/
- Iran produced 3.6 grams of uranium metal from natural uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) at the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan, testing the process in preparation for a scaled up enriched uranium metal production line at the FPFP. 3/
NEW Institute satellite imagery analysis: Update on Natanz: Construction Progresses Towards Large-scale Tunnel Complex isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… 1/
Since our October 30, 2020, report on the construction of a new centrifuge assembly facility in the mountains near the Natanz enrichment plant, construction has progressed and tunnel entrance locations can now be identified with certainty. 2/
Most importantly, newly available high resolution satellite imagery confirms that construction is progressing rapidly at the largest mountain in the area, the most likely future location for the new underground assembly facility. 3/
A few tweets in response to breakout questions now that Iran is enriching uranium to near 20 %. (Side note: The law does not require the production of 120 kg within two months, it requires an annual production of 120 kg.) 1/
We do not know how many centrifuges at Fordow are currently dedicated to 20 % enrichment, although reports are that its approximately 1000 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades connected as tandem cascades will be used, at least initially. 2/
The law includes a requirement to install one cascade of IR-6 centrifuges, which is reportedly slated for Fordow, followed by the installation of a total of 1000 IR-6's over a year. 3/
IMPORTANT UPDATE: 1. As we are looking further into the reporting of a possible yellowcake production facility near Al Ula, Saudi Arabia, we keep in mind lessons were learned from Syria, both Al Kibar and Marj as Sultan.
2. The former, a nuclear reactor in a nondescript box, with minimum visible security barriers; the latter, a uranium conversion facility with no outward signatures.
3. Two days ago, we identified a suspect site south of Al Ula as a follow-up to a WSJ report. This morning, we discovered an identical site, constructed about the same time, that appears to be associated with bulk waste disposal.
1. US media should not jump on the recent, false claims by Iranian news agencies on Iran's Nour-1 satellite imaging capabilities. The images circulating in Iranian media provide no basis to claim that Nour-1 has the capability to take high resolution electro-optical spy images.
2. The electro-optical images as published by Tasnim News and others were not taken by the Nour-1 satellite, but are commercially available satellite images as shown in our own analysis and others, @AuroraIntel, @inbarspace.
2 (cont'd) In fact, at least some of the electro-optical images claimed to be Nour-1 satellite imagery is datable to PRIOR the Nour-1 launch of 22 April 2020.