1. Habib Yusuf (aka Abu Musab al Barnawi), the new ad interim boss of #ISWAP responds in a 50-minute audio in Hausa to “the one who calls himself Imam al Shekawi”. A thread…
2. Most of it is a response to Shekau’s criticism of ISWAP's doctrine in the audio testament in Kanuri & Hausa that he put out on 18 May, shortly before blowing himself up (discussed in a previous thread). There are also interesting bits about Shekau’s pledge to the IS in 2015.
3. Why Habib does that while Shekau is dead is clear at the end of the audio: he addresses Shekau’s followers. He mentions Sambisa and Lake Chad… but also, interestingly Zamfara and Niger… does that mean they consider that there are indeed Shekau affiliates there?).
4. Habib calls Shekau's followers to obey the IS Khalifa and join ISWAP, since Shekau himself said he had never rebelled against the Khalifa.
5. And so, he is giving doctrinal explanations, answering Shekau’s criticisms. “O you people of Sambisa, o you, people of Shekau, this is what we brought to you, basing our argument on facts and reasons. (…)"
6. Habib rejects Shekau’s notion that Muslims who do not live under his control are unbelievers (kafir). Habib insists most Muslims in government-controlled areas are apostates (murtad), because they condone abominations (notably elections). Some are good Muslims, though.
7. He insists that is why the jihadi should not launch blanket attacks against civilians of the sort Shekau was doing. And he also insists that the murtad who repent must be accepted, not killed.
8. Habib points out that Shekau himself has not been consistent: if indeed everyone else is an unbeliever, they must be offered a choice before being killed - conversion, payment of jizya tax or death. Shekau has not done that.
9. Habib also discusses the enslavement of women, which Shekau claims ISWAP condemns. Habib insists that slavery is indeed licit, but that the IS Caliph has decided that it was not right to take murtad (ie apostate Muslim) women as slaves and that Shekau should have obeyed.
10. Habib makes use of Shekau’s mention of an Al Qaeda envoy as a good Muslim to say that AQ associates are not good Muslims (he even calls them kafir, a strange choice given the rest of his talk). He insists ISWAP opposes “the Taliban” (mentioned here as an equivalent of AQ).
11. Habib denies ISWAP endorses Western education. He insists Western ed. is bad “because all their curriculum is designed by UNESCO”. He is probably embarrassed here, & does not enter into details, because the IS does have a more nuanced take on Western education than Shekau.
12. For the patient ones, here comes the juicy bits… When al-Baghdadi proclaimed the restoration of the Caliphate (end June 2014), Habib and others pressed Shekau to pledge.
13. Shekau put conditions, asking “an audio containing the voice of the Khalifa or that of Adnani [the IS top external ops guy] explaining fully why and how this allegiance and loyalty could be declared”
14. Comms with the IS were not easy… “we continued exploring for a period of one year, from 1435 to 1436, ways to make contacts with the Khalifa."
15. "We were not able to make it until the month of Jumada [February 2015] when some Arabs came to us as muhajir. It was through them that we got the way to get to the Khalifa”.
16. Interestingly, later in the audio, Habib insists that these Arabs were not envoys of the IS, that they came of their own accord, not as representatives of Baghdadi.
17. They were the ones who established the link nonetheless: “they heard us looking for a way to access the Dawla and they said they have it, and they gave it to us.” This probably gave Habib, who was clearly close to these guys, an edge: he owned the link to the IS.
18. So here I stand seriously corrected: these Arabs are certainly the Abu Obeidah team which I discussed in an earlier piece crisisgroup.org/africa/west-af…
19. They were not sent by the IS: they came on their own. I should have known: I was told they had tried going to the Levant but were blocked on the way. And they arrived before the pledge, not after. So, the IS did not have a strong top-down outreach strategy towards Boko Haram.
20. Habib continues: “We brought [to Shekau] an audio containing the voice of Adnani, and everybody who was present at that time heard how Adnani was praising him [Shekau]”… “he [Shekau] made his own audio making his own declaration of allegiance and loyalty to the Khalifa.”
21. Shekau then gave a letter to Habib to convey to the Khalifa – in his testament, Shekau accuses Habib of having dumped the letter in Lake Chad. Habib denies, insisting that they sent an electronic copy to the Khalifa.
22. Habib also mentions the killing of “Aliyu”. He means Aliyu Qaid aka Aliyu al Gombewi aka Abu Hanissa, which other sources describe as a very important figure. Veteran jihadi. Trained with the Algerian GSPC. Top military commander (amir ul jaysh) of JASDJ.
23. Aliyu was close to Habib and they were the ones running the Arab visitors and the connection with the IS. Aliyu was the one who organised the flight of the Abu Obeidah team when Shekau decided to arrest them.
24. Eventually, Aliyu fled along with Habib and his brother Abba, and they were caught. Shekau had Aliyu executed but spared Habib and Abba, young men of prestigious lineage whom he deemed not too dangerous. Big mistake!
25. But let’s go back to the audio. After killing Aliyu, Shekau took over “all our computers and other electronics we used for communication” and then had his own direct link to the Dawla. I am amazed that Shekau had not ensured direct control over comms before, I must say.
26. So where does this leave us? Some interesting pieces for the jigsaw that is the history of Nigerian jihad, I find… And indications of #ISWAP's continued outreach towards the pieces of Shekau's #JASDJ.
27. The prestige of the Caliphate, too, is quite fascinating: it was difficult for Shekau, suspicious as he was, to refuse to pledge and to drop his pledge after his removal as wali. And it is still in the name of the Caliphate that Habib calls #JASDJ remnants to join him.

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More from @VincentFoucher

14 Jun
0. OK, so now I have a readout on the video by Bakura Sahalaba of #JASDJ I discussed earlier today... This is thread time... and then I have a Moscow Mule to close the day.
1. Bakura Sahalaba begins by saying that Islam did not die after the death of Muhammad - a good way to say Shekau's way maintains even after his death.
2. While he never mentions Shekau's name, he mentions his title ("imam"), saying notably that the imam did not leave behind girls/women behind, but men who will defend the religion - an admission of Shekau's death... (no brownie points for gender awareness here)
Read 14 tweets
10 Jun
1. Not convinced by this Soufan Center piece on the death of Shekau and the future of #BokoHaram #ISWAP. It includes some good (though by now not original) analysis but also some claims that are disputable to very disputable… A thread.
2. The piece claims that it was al-Baghdadi who “personally ordered Shekau’s ejection from ISWAP”. I wonder about the evidence for this. There has never been a statement from the IS about Shekau’s demise – in August 2016, they only announced Abu Musab as the new wali.
3. The piece mentions Shekau had “Cameroon-based fighters”. As far as I know, JASDJ’s fighters are in the hills on the Nigerian side of the border, not in Cameroon – though of course they do raid into Cameroon.
Read 9 tweets
10 Jun
1. Another #BokoHaram thread, this time about #ISWAP’s Abu Musab al-Barnawi audio about the death of #Shekau (Abu Musab is chatty these days). He says that Shekau was attacked in his markaz and fled, and escaped capture for several days.
2. ISWAP fighters tried to convince Shekau to surrender, but he blew himself up.
3. Abu Musab reiterates his earlier statement that they told Shekau “we didn't come to kill you, come and repent and obey the orders of Amirul mumineen. In his wisdom, he may reappoint you as a leader and we are ready to accept his position”.
Read 10 tweets
2 Jun
1. More news from ISWAP – in an audio released some time ago (before the Sambisa blitz against #Shekau, I think), Abu Musab al Barnawi, the ad interim boss (wali?) of #ISWAP #BokoHaram, details a point he had made in a statement that I have commented earlier. A thread.
2. This new audio revolves around Abu Musab's earlier promise to review past injustices committed by ISWAP. He reiterates. He calls all those aggrieved, whether ISWAP members or civilians, to put forth their claims. He confirms a forum will examine these claims.
3. He insists justice applies to leadership, rank and file, and civilians alike. He insists both leaders and followers in ISWAP have done some wrong. He insists that even soldiers of the Caliphate will be punished if they kill without a good reason.
Read 19 tweets
31 May
It's not just that... An international or regional organisation has impact only when a (relatively) strong state has a strong interest in a crisis & a solution to push, takes the lead & puts the resources behind & is unopposed by the other states. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
Then that state and the regional organisation work together to legitimise and push a solution. This is what Senegal did in the Gambia. It met only with weak, isolated frontal opposition (Alpha Condé) & some players at the UN prevented Dakar from securing a full-on UN endorsement.
But it worked all the same. Fairly similar case is Guinea-Bissau, where Dakar also worked with and through ECOWAS to push its take (there again, against Condé)
Read 4 tweets
31 May
According several Borno sources, with Shekau out of the way, #ISWAP is embarking on a campaign of outreach to civilians in its areas of influence old & new, insisting that Shekau is dead, that they are ruling now, & that (Muslim) civilians will be safe as long as they pay zakat
In the Lake area, they have released civilians detained for a variety of offenses (bush burning, unauthorised grazing, etc). They have opened areas that they used to forbid for security reasons to civilians & removed a few officials known for being harsh on civilians.
And yes, in its areas of control, ISWAP had been detaining and fining herders for grazing on the fields of farmers. And they protect grazing areas from the enchroachment of farmers. And they protect herders from bandits and Shekau raiders.
Read 5 tweets

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