krakek Profile picture
4 Jul, 22 tweets, 14 min read
On Ramenki site, a thread.

Many have seen the existing sources on the topic, such as the CIA reports (map related) or the books by Bruce Blair&Yarunuch.

Fortunately today we can also rely on recently de-classified archival materials.

1/20
Those materials adequately cover 1930s-1960s (and you can read more in Yurkov's book here: amazon.com/gp/product/560…) however even they are imperfect, information towards the end becomes sparse, especially for military sites and the intended uses of sites.

2/20
I would be using his and the broader #bunker703 comunity work from here onwards, all credit to archival materials goes to them.

I would be covering both the core Ramenki site (order 10-A), as well as related ones as they are recorded in archival materials up to late 1960s.
3/20
Ramenki project began in 1954-1955 with design work by Metrogiprotrans on behalf of 9th directorate of the MoD, with later transfer of this project, order 10-A, to the purpose formed US 10-A in 1955.

4/20
At the same time the red line of Moscow metro was being expanded beyond the river. In 1956 the option combining a bridge with a shallow extension backed up by a deep single track tunnel has been selected.

5/20
This deep single track tunnel was to act as both a civil defence shelter (30k people) and as a connector between the two parts of the red line, broken up by a vulnerable bridge.

To this end it was connected to the line extension above by high speed elevators.

6/20
Such use of tunnels as shelters was a common concept at the time, below you could see some proposed air supply stations for the Moscow ring line.

7/20
Between mirror imaging and such use I believe we can adequately explain inflated personel capacity figures that we often see in western sources, as shelters use much less floor space per person (<1m2) than protected work spaces (<3m2).

8/20
Order 10-A had two sites - 54&54a built at the depth of 189m (in tweet #5), with the 54a being better covered by available documents.

54a had:
- main block
- shafts with 6m access tunnels (2&3)
- shafts with 4,56m access tunnels (1&5)
- supporting structures

9/20
As with any new complex projects there were some changes being made to the design on the fly, for example only access tunnels 2&5 received reinforcement with rebar concrete to their pig iron tubing liner, to get their hardening to the same level as the main block.

10/20
Same type of reinforcement happened to the filtering/ventilation stations within the site 54a as well, in general it is similar to site 1-A in Kremlin which despite modest depth (55m) offered 100 bar (equivalent static overpressure) hardening (similar to a modern silo).

11/20
However with the 9,5m tunnels, made out of the steel tubings, it appears drainage was considered enough to get to this hardening level.

Drainage in general has been considered important due to high (4 bar) hydrostatic pressure.

12/20
To reduce the costs the water was to be drained into the local pools and not the sewer.

Moreover instead of building a separate expansion for the requested 10 living quarters the internal space in main block of site 54a has been re-distributed.
13/20
From this re-distribution we can hypothesise, based on a number of assumptions, the capacity of this site 54a main block's protected work spaces:
- 5 floors
- ~500 personel
- ~2000m2

14/20
It would appear that the order 10-A not only had on site supporting systems, but was to provide electric power to the complex above in emergency as well as possibly to house a key governmental telephone exchange.

Ofcourse that complex of admin buildings never happened.

15/20
We also know that order 10-A became operational before 1963, as then one of the shafts (#6) began it's transfer to Metrostroi for the construction of the remote air intake #1.
Such structures were to supply Metro from outskirts of the city with filtered air.

16/20
The other use was for evacaution of the Metro - this air intake at Matveevskaya railroad station had an escalator.

There were also support powerplants etc.

Later the KGB took over this infrastructure and a hardened APC garrage has been added, possibly for VIP transport.

17/20
This air intake was connected to the deep single track tunnel via an air transportation tunnel that also got it's track and other rail transport infrastructure, with additional follow up structures built for KGB use.

18/20
So up to late 1960s we could say that this is about it, that said US 10-A didn't go anywhere and existing to this day, as Transinzhstroi.

As such it is possible that his has been modernised, expanded and so on.

19/20
However, still, Ramenki area construction history is interesting for example due to it's overlap with the Cuban missile crisis, where unlike the inner city site 103 and site "Vetka" it appears that 10-A may have been operational during the crisis.

20/20
@steffanwatkins btw would it be possible to geo locate those 4 shafts from the photo above?

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More from @krakek1

21 Mar
I think in addition to the inertial scenario (ie modest improvements to modest Moscow BMD) there may be concerns about a grander push for BMD.

Now which elements may form this greater BMD set up?

A thread:

1/10
First lets talk sensors.

Over the recent past Russian system has nearly completed two complimenting above horizon radar layers for EW (Voronezh-M/VP and DM) as well as pushed the EW space based sensors (and comms) through IOC, with beyond horizon EW radar layer underway. 2/10
In addition to this there are some programs that appear to be BMD related in terms of sensors, those are:
Voronezh-SM (L-band)
MRIK-VKO/80P6 (S-band)
Volga modernisation
Multiband Yakhroma radar set (Crimea, possibly Chukotka) 3/10
Read 10 tweets
20 Mar
An interesting blog entry, with the caveat that it begins with questionable reporting (as @steffanwatkins mentions) on the GPS systems.

Makes one wonder about the extend the security discourse and actions are affected by the internal influence operations.
Otherwise a decent take on the challenges in optimising the security posture.

My 50 cents would be that scale matters, being able to deploy an Army Group (or atleast strong Corps) is different to the ability to deploy a mass of brigades such force would be composed out of.
And this devolution in scale can also lead to a dangerous devolution in training and skills of military leaders and staffs.
Read 4 tweets
16 Feb
A short thread.

If Yahroma is a meter band radar on the lines of Voronezh-M/VP it would make sense for it to be built in Sevastopol as well as in Chukotka (KMZ courtesy of @russianforces) as the coverage there for that band is nonexistant. 1/
Same would apply to the "high potential dm-band" site announced for Murmansk area - that is where the gap in Voronezh-DM radar coverage happens to be.

As such those two new sites (M/VP-like in Sevastopol and DM in Murmansk) would complete dual band EW coverage. 2/
So far Yahroma appears to be an improved stand alone Voronezh-M/VP based on the recent interview (tass.ru/interviews/106… courtesy of @KomissarWhipla) rather than a missile defence specific radar as previously speculated. 3/
Read 6 tweets
12 Jan
Some context on the earlier discussion.

Below you could see polygon formed by the Alaskan missile defence site and the two relevant Russian EW radars.

(sorry for the quality, middle part of this horrible polygon is ~200km high above sea level)
As you could see missile defence interceptors from Alaska are unlikely to enter the radar coverage even if they fly optimal ballistic trajectories.

So the only sensor capable of detecting them would be EKS/Kupol or possible future radar at Chukotka.
Read 5 tweets
12 Jan
tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/1…

TASS source allege that Yakhroma radar to be planned for deployement in Chukotka.

Previously radar of this type was reported to be planned for construction in Crimea and speculated to be related to missile defence.
Such a radar forward deployed in Chukotka, with 270 degree sector may be there to provide coverage for the region, possibly for US BMD interceptors as other radars are deployed to south-west.

Or for some BMD function.

That is if TASS did not make this up.
Read 5 tweets
10 Nov 20
A short refresher thread on the legacy Russian NC3.

First, there was a supporting system for the NCA, which allowed the President (and the MoD) to communicate with the military and to release the unlocker codes for the launches.

Unlocker codes are then pushed down to launchers.
Proprietary ownership by civilians was/is important because it ensured that only the relevant civilian authorities can order the launches, military authority would not have the unlocker codes.

My understanding is that Perimeter also receives them as a part of pre-delegation.
Then the orders would go through the service specific NC3 systems, Signal-A and Vyuga for the SMFs, the former was a hierarchical system to support the standard chain of command from the Central CP of SMFs onwards mainly.
Read 9 tweets

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