His main argument? Well, it's in the subtitle: a return to "instability in Europe".
If both the United States and Soviet Union retrench from Europe, dissolving both NATO and the Warsaw pact, then 👇
To start, I think we can acknowledge that Mearsheimer was somewhat right about the increase in violence on the continent following the end of the Cold War. Consider...
...the Wars of the Former Yugoslavia (Croatian Independence, Bosnia, Kosovo)...
...which also witnessed the Srebenica genocide.
Consider the annexation of Crimea...
...and the ongoing war in Ukraine.
And in terms of general "instability" and fracturing in Europe, let's not forget Brexit.
While it seems that Mearsheimer's overall prediction had merit to it, one needs to look again at the logic underpinning his pessimistic view.
He argued that, with the Cold War ending, Europe was heading back to a system of multipolarity...*IF* the US and Soviet Union withdrew.
Let's break down the argument.
Why is multipolarity more unstable? His view is basically that bipolarity (i.e. USA v USSR) -> equal local balance of power in Europe - > deterrence -> no fighting.
Here's the thing. Mearsheimer recognized that @NATO might stick around, perhaps even expand. This acknowledgement is found in footnote 1
But Mearsheimer, in the second part of the footnote, thought that Germany would oppose this move.
In my view, that's what Mearsheimer misjudged: the interest within Germany (and among the NATO allies in general, particularly the US) to keep and expand NATO.
Given the violence that DID erupt in Europe following the Cold War and the dissolving of the Warsaw pact, one could only imagine what might have happened if, as Mearsheimer predicted, NATO had also dissolved.
That's why I think he was more right than wrong.
This is also why I've always been a bit perplexed by the "End of the Cold War undermines Realism" claims. I mean, were they really that wrong? cambridge.org/core/journals/…
As will be discussed in subsequent threads, this piece was the start of an actual "Great Debate" among IR theorists, particularly between Mearsheimer and Bob Keohane.
For now, I'll just say that Mearsheimer's predictions, as found in this piece, hold up well.
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The American Civil War was not solely an "internal affair".
Throughout the early years of the war, Lincoln's administration feared intervention by the Europeans, notably the British. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
As Lincoln remarked in his first State of the Union: "[A nation] which endures factious domestic divisions is exposed to disrespect abroad, and one party, if not both is sure sooner or later to invoke foreign intervention.”
Pundit Paul: "I agree with Biden. Foreign policy IS an extension of personal relationships!"
Pedantic Paul: "Foreign policy is an extension of personal relationships....except differences in regime types also matter. Oh, the global distribution of power too. Actually,...."
Seriously though, lot's of great work showing that something at the center of international politics -- diplomacy -- does actually matter.
And the question "do personal relationships matter in international politics" is a great one to pose to students: I do so by having them consider the Boris-Bill relationship (h/t to @e_sarotte)
@IntOrgJournal's 75th anniversary special issue on "The Liberal International Order" largely omits international security affairs.
This leads me to ask: What Would Hedley Bull Think? 🤔
[THREAD]
To be fair, the special issue covers a range of important topics facing the world (e.g. climate change) and the editors fully acknowledge the omission of security affairs.
But they justify the omission by saying that security institutions, namely @NATO, seem to be just fine.
One could take issue with the claim that security institutions are presently "alive and kicking" (moreover, the editors even acknowledge that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is "under siege") politico.com/news/2021/06/1…