Thread: German static divisions in Normandy supposedly had very poor personnel. While true to some extend but as always it's a bit more complicated. Cross-Channel Attack (1951) made a serious attempt for a balanced view. Arguably better than much what has been written since!
The book seems to be key in spreading the message that 'the average age of the 709ID was 36'. This is commonly presented as fact when in fact it was based on anecdotal evidence: An officer explaining the failure of his division.
His claim made it into German records as well 🙄
Fact: the maximum average age of the combat elements in static divisions was set at 36.
And yes, support elements could raise that to over 36. But that’s just theory…
Are there reasons to believe that actually happened in the 709ID? Not really. 🧐
In Oct. 1943 78% of the combat troops had been born in 1906-24 (NCO/men). Their av. age? 30,8.
Another 9% born in 1925. 7% was born in 1905 or earlier. Ages of 6% are unknown.
And don’t blame the officers: small numbers and average age of 35
All of this is in line with the other static divisions in the west with an average age of 30-31 (NCO/men).
So 8 months before the invasion we are short 5-6 years to reach the 36 average. You need an influx of older men to make up that deficit.
Instead much of the influx was young: towards the end of 1943 the goal for static divisions became an average of 20% men born in 1925. (1926 may have filled part of that number).
With that amount of youngsters it becomes mathematically difficult to raise the average age to 36 🧐
Let’s throw in some (not very scientific) statistics everyone can understand. We don’t have much detail for 1944, but we do have PW statistics which provide an interesting glimpse. Let's work from those
These are the PWs captured up to 30 June (when the Cotentin had been cleared by US forces). The most obvious is the massive presence of men born in 1925-26, making them 17-19 yo. This group amounts to about 19% of all PWs.
A problem is that we don’t know what units these men belonged to. To what extend were they in the static divisions? Where they Heer? Luftwaffe? RAD? SS? So how do we interpret this? Difficult!
At least we know the age groups of the Feldheer around this time and this provides an idea of what to expect if the forces in Normandy matched the average
Also, we do know that the *British* forces and Americans faced different units. Except for the 17SS (about 60% 1925+) and 3FJD the Americans did not face supposed *elite* divisions. So does that make a difference for the PWs in the sectors? Not really:
A few things stick out:
-1925-1926 is greatly overrepresented. In both sectors
-a lot of years are close to the Feldheer numbers
-the main deficit is the 1910-1920 period, but the WW1 generations (esp. 1915-1918) are small to begin with
If we remove the 1925+ and 1906- age groups as outliers and calculate the differences between the expected and actual values things become a bit clearer: there is a clear drop in the 1912-1921 group and some older groups are over overrepresented.
However, a , say, 30% difference between actual and expected does not mean much if we are talking about a group with a low expected percentage to begin with. If we also weigh the categories, things become more balanced:
This gives a better idea of where the most serious differences were
Yet, when we add the 1906- and 1925+ back into the mix and again weigh the relative importance of each group, it becomes clear that nearly all groups are underrepresented among PWs. Even most of the older ones! Only 1925-1926 are really far away from what can be expected.
Now these numbers are just PW numbers. We don’t know how the different branches are represented, let alone individual units. Men KIA, WIA (evac) and survivors are not included of course.
The Feldheer numbers also do not tell us how age groups were divided over various units. 🧐
Still, it is interesting that the numbers for the US and Br sector are still close, especially since the capture of Cherbourg involved rear area troops which might be expected to have been older.
Ultimately it is not far fetched to argue that instead of overly old, the troops captured in the first weeks were actually rather young compared to the Feldheer average. If only we knew exactly which units they belonged to....
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Thread: German orbats
German document can be very interesting, even if you don’t speak German.
Their visual OOBs are prob the best example of that, if you know what the symbols mean.
Yes, you can look those up online, but how about a crash course in several threads?
Modern publications typically use NATO symbols. Useful, but also boring.
(Examples from Zetterling’s ‘Normandy 1944’ and Zaloga’s ‘Cherbourg 1944’)
German OOB charts are great, and a little confusing
Regard them as a unit assembled on an inspection ground: that they're seen from the perspective of a commander looking at his troops. So left on paper is actually right and right is left: So 4-3-2-1. Applies to all subunits!
Let's continue examining Cross-Channel Attack's (CCA) take on the German troops. For 1950/1951 it was admirable, but as we have seen yesterday not all of it holds up.
Now look at this sentence. The German use of stomach units has become (in)famous, but CCA correctly states that was just one division: the 70ID
The existence of ear and stomach units is a popular story, but it is seldom explored for what it really was.
On D-Day the 70ID did not really exist yet...
In the bigger picture it was very much an emergency formation in the summer (crisis) of 1944.
The number of horses for the artillery as show here is actually too low because it included some batteries with just 3 guns, instead of the actual 4
For Normandy such 'standard' divisions included the 271ID, 272ID, 275ID, 276ID, 277ID, 331ID, 352ID, 353ID, 363ID. Of course these were not identical in strength for various reasons
There seem to be two options in talks about German MGs on the D-Day beaches: 1) All guns MG42s (especially at Omaha) 2) Just old and captured MGs
Neither are true. Let’s take a quick look at the available numbers for the 716ID and 352ID. [I’ll ignore the Osttruppen for now]
The 716ID was a static division, so poorly equipped with just old and captured MGs. Right? Not quite.
So why the confusion? For one people confuse organic and static weapons. Big no no.
On 1 Dec. 43 the division itself had:
349 x MG34
3 x 08/15
11 x 116(f)
13 x 08
It received 9 MG42 before D-Day.
You can expect the MG34 and MG42s in frontline units.