As news of the Taliban’s first military takeover of a provincial capital after 20 years of fighting is breaking, here’s a thread [I hope to evolve] about what Washington is thinking about Afghanistan.
There are two schools in Washington for Afghanistan: the first thinks that the Taliban are doing whatever they’re doing to gain leverage in the peace process; that if Ashraf Ghani relents, then the talks will lead to a some kind of power sharing agreement.
This school believes that the Taliban are more savvy than they seem; that they will not gun for a total military takeover & risk pariah status; that current military gains are actually brinksmanship & that Ghani must relent. This school thinks that, ultimately, talking will work.
A second school is emerging; this school is more skeptical, more conservative; it thinks that the Taliban are worse than they were before; that they’re hell bent on a military victory, which will be converted into a political victory. This school thinks the peace talks are dead.
This school also thinks that hitting the Taliban with air strikes, aiding Afghan forces, especially the Air Force, will help stop the Taliban advance; it also thinks that pressuring, even sanctioning Taliban abettors will work. This school is adopting an anti-Biden theme.
Both schools are playing with fire; the first one is betting on the talks to restart. But why would the talks restart when the Taliban are winning? Only if Ghani offers them something big to stop the fighting. Like Zalmay Khalilzad has said: the Taliban want the “lion’s share.”
The other side is betting on their criticism, the voices of Afghan civil society, international media and diplomacy etc to develop enough momentum to a) increase skepticism against the Taliban & b) convert that skepticism into isolation or sanctions against them & their backers.
But short of critiquing the Taliban or their “backers” (using that term broadly) in Islamabad or Tehran or Moscow or Beijing (more on them soon); or the pro-talk Biden/Blinken/Khalilzad gang, this school doesn’t have any solutions except more fighting or more pressure /sanctions.
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THREAD: Is China heading towards CT/COIN in Afghanistan?
Early July, FM Wang Yi [before attack on Chinese engineers in Pak] said Beijing wants to:
"effectively contain spillover of Afghanistan's security risks, and ensure overall stability in the region." fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_6…
Late July, post Dasu attack, Beijing started hyphenating Afghanistan with Pak attack. Asked "all parties concerned in Afghanistan to fully observe the ceasefire" but also vowed to "severely punish the perpetrators [of the attack on Chinese engineers]."
Over the weekend, promoting itself as lead proponent of peace, Beijing indicated that it has successfully signed on Pakistan as a helper in Afghan peace process:
"Pakistan is willing to work closely with China to push forward Afghanistan's peace"
In an unexpected electoral setback which is shocking, even by #Pakistan's turbulent standards, cricketer-turned-prime minister #ImranKhan faces a crucial #VoteOfConfidence.
Here's a look at @ImranKhanPTI's political career, spanning over two decades.
Propelled by his celebrity & supported by his (now former) wife @Jemima_Khan, Khan's early political career saw him adopt the role of international activist. Here, in 1997, he's on a tour of South Africa with then-President Nelson Mandela.
Philanthropy would form the basis of his politics. The Shaukat Khanum, Pakistan's first cancer research hospital, would be inspired by his mother's demise & become his showcase for organizational change. Months before her own death in 1997, Princess Diana would help raise funds.
Compulsions: The Lawyers' Movement, NRO, Musharraf's uniform, Memogate (some of Kayani's productions or co-productions, backed by foreign supporters). Then, post-Osama/Raymond Davis, Kayani was deployed to stabilize rudder by an atrophied Zardari. Not much of a choice for PPP.
That Kayani's personal interests & connections compromised his standing within & without the institution he was once revered by was clear by the middle of his 2nd term.
Soon after he was done, even junior officers weren't refraining for calling him 'agent' & 'mixed up'
Pakistan’s leadership is building up a serious case against India, but so far, most of its been for domestic audiences.
Internationally, @ImranKhanPTI hasn’t been able to really sell his cause for #Kashmir. The UNSC consultation today is a test case of Pak’s diplomatic muscle.
Failure in New York by @MOFAPakistan will further build up frustration at home - especially in the rank & file of the military - and increasingly validate the hawks to position Pakistan to launch an asymmetric war, if not conventional operations against India.
The last time Pakistanis needed such existential validation was after their fall in 1971.
Consequently, nukes & Islamization were experimented with by civ & military governments alike. A Constitution was birthed & prolifically amended to support national security & identity.