THREAD: New #Ukraine NatSec Council sanctions against blogger Anatoliy Shariy + editor Igor Guzhva lop off most of remaining #Russia-leaning, Maidan-skeptical end of media spectrum. Brings up same troubling questions as earlier sanctions against Viktor MedvedchukTV stations.1/
Primary question: is this countering disinformation and Russian info-warfare, silencing of dissident voices or some of both? 2/
I’ll focus on Guzhva, a figure I’ve researched, written on before. He was editor of Vesti media group, journal linked to Oleksandr Klymenko, oligarch and minister-on-the-lam who fled Ukraine after ouster of yanukovich.3/
Vesti media group was mixed bag: some thoughtful long read journalism from Maidan revolution/early stages of Donbas war, radio station w/diverse takes. Core asset was free newspaper Vesti, which was reliably strident against post-Maidan gov’t and got “pro-Russian” reputation. 4/
I wrote about long string of fuzzy criminal cases against Guzhva and Vesti group by UA authorities, which fell apart after noisy announcements. Strongly resembles a pressure campaign. Accompanied by civil society attacks (verbal and physical) with participation of far right. 5/
One of biggest criticisms of Vesti was alleged coverage of Donbas war thru RU propaganda lens. I would never direct anyone to learn about the war just by reading Vesti, but it covered horrific cost of war for civilians at time not all media were willing to do so. 6/
(There was some excellent coverage of civilian cost during intense 2014-2015 fighting in mainstream UA media as well, see Lesia Hanzha’s reporting for Ukrainska Pravda or much of Hromadske’s coverage. But many media adopted patriotic narrative w/little room for these details). 7/
Vesti survived those fuzzy court cases but Guzhva left in 2017 over conflict w/owners. It became absolutely clear group belonged to Klymenko, odious figure wanted in UA + hiding out in Moscow. Was Kremlin indeed using Klymenko to channel its narrative to Ukrainians thru Vesti? 8/
Guzhva also figured in “Surkov leaks,” the alleged hacked emails of Kremlin’s coordinator of Donbas affairs. Authenticity of the dump was partially confirmed, but not yet in entirety. In several emails Guzhva appears to be openly coordinating info warfare against UA w/ Surkov. 9/
Naturally, Guzhva said the emails were fake. Strangely, despite large number of cases brought against him on questionable evidence these emails didn’t figure in legal proceedings. Leaving Vesti he started highly popular website strana.ua (strana = “country”). 10/
Strana is even more strident that Vesti was. IMO can be read only in triangulation w/pro-western media like Ukrainska Pravda or Novoye Vremya. Strana is sure to cover in depth anything that shades UA’s post-Maidan trajectory in negative light. If story changes - crickets. 11/
New court cases followed Guzhva to Strana, and they were as fuzzy as earlier Vesti cases. Last case involved alleged blackmail and *might have legs, but Guzhva fled to Austria and got political asylum. From there has run Strana in same partisan vein. 12/
But wearing ideology on sleeve is common in Ukraine (everywhere?) media. I would also caution readers to get their view of Ukraine from a source like Novoye Vremya alone. Strana ardently represents a major swathe of UA’s ideological spectrum. That’s why sanctions trouble me. 13/
If Medvedchuk’s channels are guide, then sanctions lead to massive loss of viewership and marginalization. Between Medvedchuk and Guzhva, Natl Sec Council has shut off most popular UA media for millions of citizens unreconciled to country’s political direction since 2014. 14/
If those media were funded by Kremlin and taking part in orchestrated infowarfare against UA state, then that decision is justified. But many in UA think judgement NEEDS to come through court system. Stakes too high to be shutting down popular media by Security Council fiat. 15/
I don’t want to make out press freedom issues in UA to be simple. RU has waged war for seven years accompanied by mass deception and it would be naïve to think Kremlin wouldn’t try to use sympathetic UA media towards this goal. 16/
But cases of Guzhva, Medvedchuk show that while Nat Sec Council remains mum on the evidence of Kremlin collusion justifying sanctions, opponents of these media make arguments that boil down to “they say wrong things about reforms, war, geopolitics.” Two strains get tangled. 17/
And that’s dangerous! Because seems to suggest that such media shouldn’t be allowed to operate even if there isn’t Kremlin collusion, but just because they publish things millions of Ukrainians agree with but which jar our pro-western ears. 18/
I live in eastern UA. It’s no ideological monolith, but Strana.ua and Medvedchuk channels spoke to organic political culture of many, many residents. As evidenced in majority of elections, where Medvedchuk party regularly thumps opponents (albeit less of late). 19/
If UA has evidence Guzhva, Medvedchuk are coordinating disinformation with Kremlin, taking $, then should air it in court. Multiple leaks show enough smoke in Medvedchuk case to suggest real fire. Case against Guzhva (especially Surkov leaks) needs a rigorous investigation. 20/
What UA must avoid for sake of its press freedoms is impression that such media deserve shutdown even w/out public evidence and trial. That crime is the content, not the Kremlin collusion or financing. Stakes too high to use fiat in place of judicial system and transparency. END
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