China is building more than 100 new ICBM silos--a major discovery by @ArmsControlWonk and @dex_eve and reported by @JobyWarrick.

My working hypothesis (as mentioned in article) is that China will deploy much fewer than 100 new missiles. (1/n)

washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
Essentially, I suspect that China will seek to hide a relatively small number of real ICBMs in a much larger number of silos and dummy ICBMs--a form of "shell game" intended to complicate U.S. efforts to destroy China's nuclear forces. (2/n)
This scheme was originally developed in the Carter administration for the MX missile. The US planned to build 4,600 (not a typo!) shelters to hide 200 ICBMs. Ultimately, the Reagan administration changed plans, largely for reasons of domestic politics. (3/n)
The Chinese system is still under construction so it's difficult to say for sure whether it's another shell game (the final road network should give us a big clue). But there's a few reasons to think it is. (4/n)
First off, the layout of China's new silos is totally different from its silos elsewhere. Compare one of these other silo clusters (left, kindly provided by @dex_eve) to the newly discovered cluster (right).
The hexagonal lattice (thanks undergraduate minerals course!) of the new site would facilitate the rapid shuffling of ICBMs and decoys. (6/n)
Second, the terrain is totally different from China's other silo clusters--much flatter--which would again help with shuffling missiles and decoys (and would forfeit whatever terrain protection mountains provided against ballistic missile attack. (7/n)
Third, and this is key for me, is the spacing between the silos. As you can see from the images, China's other silos are 10s of kms apart. The new silos are about 3 km apart. The Carter admin's plan called for silos 1 mile apart. (8/n)

In general, you want silos as widely spaced as possible (not least because it increases the difficulty an adversary would face in attacking your silos nearly simultaneously). So the smaller spacing doesn't make much sense, except as part of a shell game. (9/n)
(BTW If you're wondering about dense-pack, the spacing is too big for that and layout all wrong. If you're wondering what dense-pack is, consider yourself lucky.) (10/n)
Finally, I'd also point out that the Pentagon doubts China has enough fissile material to build more than 200 or so additional warheads--which could become an issue depending on how many the DF-41 can carry.

media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/20…, p. 87. (11/n)
Anyway, if you want to know more about the US shell game here's the seminal OTA study: ota.fas.org/reports/8116.p…

It contains schematic of the U.S. plan--which is on a different lattice arrangement but otherwise fairly similar to China's layout. (12/n)
As you probably guessed by now, I got a sneak peek of the data from @ArmsControlWonk so want to say thank you to him. And also congratulations to him and @dex_eve on a remarkable discovery. (13/13)

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More from @james_acton32

16 Jun
Let's do math on the Taishan fuel leak!

Chinese authorities estimate that around five fuel rods have leaked, but basically says this is unremarkable. No biggie.

But, actually, this many rods leaking is very unusual. Let's work out how unusual. (1/n)

world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Fuel-…
China's nuclear regulator, NNSA (NOT the same organization as @NNSANews), says the reactor contains more than 60,000 fuel rods. Based on the following IAEA doc, I believe the exact number is 63,865. (241 assemblies, each containing 265 rods). (2/n)

aris.iaea.org/PDF/EPR.pdf
Now, the @W_Nuclear_News article linked above cites the @iaeaorg as saying that there are ~14 leaks per 1,000,000 rods. (3/n)
Read 8 tweets
17 Nov 20
<THREAD>Thoughts on the successful test of an SM-3 IIA interceptor against an ICBM.

BLUF: For technical & operational reasons, SM-IIAs aren't much use for homeland defense, especially against Russia or China.

Politically this test is a BIG deal. (1/n)

The idea of using SM-3 IIAs against ICBMs isn't new, though interest has ebbed and flowed over the last decade. By demonstrating at least some capacity in a test, however, this idea is no longer just theoretical.

But is it practical? (2/n)
Given the locations of the target launch (Kwajelain Atoll) and the interceptor (northeast of Hawaii), it's clear that the target missile was intercepted on its way down.

See this helpful picture dug up by my colleagues, @nktpnd. (3/n)

Read 17 tweets
16 Nov 20
<THREAD>The @DeptofDefense is ignoring the danger of inadvertent nuclear war.

Thanks to @RepRickLarsen, other @HASCDemocrats, and their staff, DoD has issued a report on inadvertent escalation.

It's very revealing... but not in a good way. (1/n)
My concern is that this report is really about maintaining effective deterrence, not preventing inadvertent escalation.

Of course, maintaining effective deterrent is important! But, even if deterrence is effective, a nuclear war could still break out.

I'll explain. (2/n)
The report rightly recognizes the need to “clearly communicate U.S. intentions” [p. 1].

Yet, it only identifies one message: don’t underestimate our resolve or ability to defend our interests.

That's an important message, but insufficient to protect U.S. interests. (3/n)
Read 11 tweets
2 Oct 20
<THREAD>And here it is..

"A ReSTART for U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control" by @pranayrvaddi and me.

It's our proposal for a follow-on to New START. Here are the big ideas. (1/N)

carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/02/res…
1. Extend New START. (2/n)
2. Make all intercontinental ground-launched boost-glide missiles and nuclear-powered torpedoes (whether nuclear or conventionally armed) accountable. (3/n)
Read 12 tweets
23 Sep 20
<THREAD>Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov responded to @USArmsControl in an interview with @ElenaChernenko. Beyond the predictable lack of interest in U.S. proposals, two points caught my eye.

**ONE IS ACTUALLY GOOD NEWS!!**

(1/n)

mid.ru/en/foreign_pol…
First, the good news. If Biden wins, Ryabkov did not rule out agreeing to a New START extension in the time between Biden's inauguration (Jan 20) and the treaty's expiry (Feb 5).

Previously, Russian officials and experts had said that time would be too short. (2/n)
Second, in his interview, @USArmsControl explicitly threatened that, if New START is not extended, the U.S. will "unconvert" converted delivery systems so they can be used to deliver nuclear warheads. (3/n)

Read 4 tweets
21 Sep 20
THREAD. @USArmsControl just gave an interview to @ElenaChernenko on the U.S. position re future arms control.

@baklitskiy has a useful summary thread. I want to highlight four things that caught my eye. (1/n)

NB The interview is in Russian and I'm using Google translate, so caveat reader. (2/n)

translate.google.com/translate?sl=r…
1. Overall, @USArmsControl is laying out a position for the extension for New START that Russia could never accept. It's clear, as it has been for months, that the United States is trying to kill New START. (3/n)
Read 8 tweets

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