Rediscovered what I think is the biggest on-chain arb of all time: a 1200+ ETH arb

etherscan.io/tx/0xb72689042…
Transaction fee of ~$130 too. Insane.
Would love if someone could prove me wrong and has a bigger arb to share
Wonder how it feels to look at your pc/phone and realize that you've just made millions of dollars. Must be unreal.

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More from @bertcmiller

27 Sep
Today Flashbots is releasing v0.4 and introducing mega bundles to the Flashbots Network

Mega bundles will let us innovate faster, support more bundles and will lead to new searcher strategies and more miner revenue

A thread on mega bundles 🧵👇🏻
Flashbots is an open MEV marketplace. On 1 side of the market users submit "bundles" of txs. On the other miners run an auction & place the highest gas price bundles at the top of blocks.

This allows miners of any size to extract MEV, which is important for economic security.
In the early days of Flashbots only 1 bundle could be included in a block. That greatly limited our impact.

Our v0.2 release introduced multiple bundles per block through a merging process & gave miners control the number bundles they wanted to include

Read 16 tweets
8 Sep
Let’s get a few things straight.

Eden's lead investor - @multicoincap - is lying about Flashbots and Eden.

🧵
Contrary to Multicoin's claims, minimizing MEV is core to Flashbots' mission & products.

That shows from our funding of fairness and ethics research, work on MEV aware dApps, & 100s of users that have used Flashbots to skip the mempool & protect themselves from frontrunning.
More importantly, Multicoin is lying about Eden: it is not permissionless OR transparent.

Eden is a permissioned system with a multisig that has exclusive control over MEV payouts to miners. The Eden team alone decides whether miners are mining "Eden blocks" and should be paid.
Read 10 tweets
6 Sep
Dropping what is probably the most alpha packed thing I've written so far: an in-depth writeup of my strategy for a highly competitive MEV opportunity, the Synthetix Ether Collateral Liquidations, along with code

Blog post:
bertcmiller.com/2021/09/05/mev…

Repo:
github.com/bertmiller/sMEV
Blog post contains:
- My process from start the finish
- Explanation of why I made the design decisions I did
- How I sped up data collection
- A few gas optimizations
- Explanation of my economic strategy
- My novel bundle submission strategy
- Code snippets
- Many links
Repo contains:
- The only (I think?) open source example of how to backrun transactions
- Monitoring tools I made
- Contracts used for execution, including dydx flashloan
- Contract for data collection
- my somewhat embarrassing messy Hardhat testing env
Read 7 tweets
24 Aug
Alright, let's go

A thread on leveraged (!) sandwiching using flashswaps
Let's review what a normal 🥪looks like.

A victim attempts to trade on a DEX, buying asset X with ETH

1. A bot gets in front of them, buying X & raising the price of X

2. The victim's tx lands, further raising the price of X.

3. The bot sells X at this higher price for profit ImageImageImage
Two things to note here.

First, the bot starts and ends with WETH. That's because the victim was trading from WETH to another asset.

If victims are trading from a token to WETH it is harder to sandwich because bots don't hold random tokens.
Read 14 tweets
4 Aug
The beating heart of every blockchain is how space is allocated within a block.

With major changes to how Ethereum's blockspace market works in the near and medium term we'd like to share how Flashbots thinks about designing MEV marketplaces.

medium.com/flashbots/on-t…
Mining today consists of 2 jobs.

1st: create the most profitable block.

2nd: attest to this with a proof-of-work and propagate it to the network.

Prior to widespread MEV extraction, the 1st job was mainly ordering txs by their gas price, with optimization at the network lvl.
However, since MEV extraction is widespread now, the the job of miners has changed. Now to produce the most profitable block miners must find the optimal ordering of transactions within a block.

This is exponentially more difficult than sorting by gas price.
Read 12 tweets
31 Jul
Fatal flaws in a bot, a sort of on-chain virus, a trojan horse token, and arbitrage gone wrong

Join me in looking at the latest MEV bot exploit in this thread 👇🏻
The victim today tried to arbitrage the CHUM token (!) for ~0.01 ETH in profit, but in the process had 30 WETH transferred out of their wallet.

They only interacted with Uniswap v2 pools, how did this happen!?
Searchers optimize their contracts to the extreme to do very specific things very efficiently.

However, occasionally they have a need to do random things & add in functions that can be used for to execute basically any arbitrary transaction in a contract

Read 19 tweets

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