Join #ESETresearch at #vblocalhost! Starting today, you can watch @RighardZw in a live presentation looking at internal attack scenarios and highlighting issues that have remained “foolishly ignored” for years (Thu 20:00 - 20:30 UTC). 1/4
On Friday, @zuzana_hromcova will walk the audience through the current landscape of IIS threats – ranging from traffic redirectors to backdoors – and share the essentials of reverse-engineering native IIS malware (Fri 17:45 - 18:15 UTC). 2/4
Modules are under development and provide #remoteaccess to the operators, collect credentials + serve as a proxy server. To do this, #FontOnLake uses modified legitimate binaries adjusted to load further components, its presence is always accompanied by a #rootkit. 2/6
The sneaky nature of #FontOnLake tools, along with advanced design and low prevalence suggest usage in targeted attacks. #ESETresearch believes its operators are extra cautious as almost all samples seen use unique C&C servers with varying non-standard ports. 3/6
#ESETresearch has recently discovered a new undocumented modular backdoor, SideWalk, that was used by an APT group we named SparklingGoblin during one of its recent campaigns targeting a US-based computer retail company 🇺🇸. welivesecurity.com/2021/08/24/sid…@passil_t@mathieutartare 1/6
SideWalk is a modular backdoor that can dynamically load additional modules sent from the C&C server, makes use of Google Docs as a dead drop resolver, and @Cloudflare workers as a C&C server. It can also properly handle communication behind a proxy. 2/6
This backdoor shares multiple similarities with another backdoor used by the group: CROSSWALK, which FireEye was first to attribute to #APT41. This backdoor is referenced as ScrambleCross by Trend Micro 3/6
#ESETresearch confirms that malicious digitally signed AnyDesk installers are distributed from anydesk.s3-us-west-1.amazonaws[.]com. Our telemetry shows that victims are redirected there from three attacker-controlled domains: zgnuo[.]com, clamspit[.]com and domohop[.]com. 1/4
The three domains resolve to 176.111.174[.]127, 176.111.174[.]129 and 176.111.174[.]130, in the same IP range as the C&C server, 176.111.174[.]125. It seems victims, mainly located in North America, are redirected through malicious ads from different legitimate websites. 2/4
The fake installers are malicious downloaders that download a PowerShell script b.ps1 leading, in a few cases, to Cobalt Strike, as mentioned in the analysis of a past campaign: inde.nz/blog/different…. We also observed further recon activity using BloodHound and AdFind. 3/4
We have received a lot questions about the Silver Sparrow malware for macOS after a publication by @redcanary. #ESETresearch has investigated and found that, far from speculations about nation-state malware, it is likely related to adware and pay-per-install schemes. 1/10
We have first seen Silver Sparrow in the wild early September. Our telemetry (although limited) showed under 50 instances of this threat, spread all around the globe. We have monitored the configuration file and never seen any actual payload delivered. 2/10
The fact that the configuration file is hosted in AWS S3 bucket means there is no way for the attackers to send different configuration to specific targets. S3 only supports serving static content and cannot generate a dynamic response based on IP or any request parameters. 3/10
WIZVERA VeraPort software is often used on internet banking and government websites in 🇰🇷 South Korea. The purpose of this software is to install additional security software required by some of these websites. 2/7
The attackers abused a combination of WIZVERA VeraPort software and compromised South Korean websites with VeraPort support, to deploy Lazarus malware. 3/7
#InvisiMole#APT group resurfaced in targeted attacks against high-profile organizations in Eastern Europe, targeting military sector and diplomatic missions. We previously documented their two feature-rich backdoors RC2CL and RC2FM; now we reveal the rest of their TTPs. 2/9
We discovered that the most interesting targets of #Gamaredon are upgraded to far stealthier #InvisiMole spyware, with Gamaredon’s .NET downloader delivering InvisiMole’s TCP downloader. This cooperation allows InvisiMole to devise creative ways to operate under the radar. 3/9