An important voice in the debate about #CBAM and its compliance with WTO rules. Here, major critique from a leading expert on WTO law, James Bacchus. /Thread
First, let me just note that nothing I write below should be taken as my attempt to question Mr. Bacchus' interpretation of WTO law. He is a legend of WTO. Twice the chairman of WTO Appellate Body. An expert and authority like no other. Hats off. /1
To make a long story short, Mr. Bacchus notes four potential problems with CBAM. He sees potential violations of the following clauses of the GATT:
- art. I (Most Favored Nation);
- art. II (bound tariffs);
- art. III (national treatment); and
- art. XX (exceptions).
/2
On MFN, Mr. Bacchus simply notes that imposing #CBAM on imports may violate the WTO duty not to treat less favorably like products imported from different countries. /3
The idea would be that a coil of the same grade of hot-rolled steel from Russia and Brazil could face a different CBAM, even though it appears to be the same product. /4
However, Mr. Bacchus side-steps the key issue here: are two coils of steel, with the same grade, same physical characteristics, really "like products", if they were produced through different methods leading to completely different emissions? /5
Those with good understanding of WTO law know there is a long debate and some GATT/WTO jurisprudence on whether the so-called PPMs (Process and Production Methods) can be taken into account when analyzing if two products are really "like products". /6
I won't attempt to summarize the jurisprudence here, but I think its fair to say that in general, PPMs have been until now largely rejected when assessing "likeness". /7
For CBAM purposes this would mean that two products appearing the same should be treated the same, even if one was manufactured in a horribly polluting fashion, while another was completely "green." /8
That said, the cases leave room for arguing that PPMs could be considered. That is particularly the case, if consumer perception justifies treating the products differently. In prior cases, this was not proven. Perhaps it could be proven now. /9
In general, some experts argue the world & climate/environmental protection has moved on since old WTO cases. There's reater understanding sth must be done abt climate. Changing the interpretation of "likeness" could open the door for WTO-compliant environmental measures. /10
Mr. Bacchus knows all of this much more than I do, so I assume he omitted this discussion for a reason. Probably not to get bogged down in it (as I just have). /11
My main point here is only that the issue of art. I (and III) violation really hinges on how we define "likeness". So the jury may be out on this one. /12
Moving on: art. II & bound tariffs. In a nutshell, each WTO member has committed to a maximum customs duty on imports of each product. Bacchus notes that to the degree that CBAM charges, when added on top of customs duties, exceed that maximum, this clause would be violated. /13
He also notes that EU will defend CBAM as not really a "border measure", since it is paid after importation, so it is an internal regulation. /14
Just to recall: CBAM will be paid not by foreign exporters, but by EU importers, who will submit an annual declaration listing all of their imports in the past year & associated emissions, together with a calculation of how many CBAM certificates should be surrendered. /15
Bacchus questions this defence noting that the payment of CBAM "would be triggered by the act of importing". This is only partially true. Imports of CBAM covered goods will be subject to payment of CBAM only if other conditions are met. /16
For example, CBAM would not be due 1) for imports from countries exempted as having an ETS equivalent; 2) if emissions were zero or lower than EU benchmark, 3) if carbon has already been paid for in the country of export. /17
This may, or may not, have WTO significance. I am just pointing this out to highlight that it takes more than just importation of a CBAM-covered product to trigger the duty to actually pay. /18
To be fair, there is automaticity in applying the CBAM regulations (i.e., bureaucratic burden) to all CBAM imports. But the CBAM itself would not automatically have to be PAID for all imports. /19
It is also a good observation by Bacchus that the duty to pay CBAM "would not accrue due to an [EU] internal event - such as distribution, sale, use or transportation of the imported product." He is correct that in this sense, the act of importation triggers CBAM./20
Perhaps this is something that the EU legislator can take a look at and consider whether moving the CBAM obligation one step further down the line would make sense from a legal perspective. /21
Third, and this is where Mr. Bacchus has omitted a key element of the CBAM structure, he claims that CBAM - by continuing to envision the provision of free ETS allowances to CBAM sectors - provides "double-protection" and hence violates art. III GATT/national treatment. /22
However, the CBAM proposal makes clear that CBAM on imports would be charged only after subtraction from the CBAM bill of free allowances granted to the domestic industry. /23
Perhaps the provision above can be improved ("adjusted" does not specify how; although sec.2 talks about "reduction").

That said, EU industry will not get double-protection. For practical purposes, it will be as if foreign exporters were getting free allowances as well. /24
An EU producer and a foreign producer with identical emissions will pay for exactly the same share of emissions above the benchmark: an EU producer because of his free allowances; a foreign exporter because free allowances of EU industry will be deducted from his CBAM bill. /25
Fourth, prof. Bacchus seems to doubt whether CBAM will really fit as neatly into the art. XX exemption for "protection of human & animal life" and for "conservation of exhaustible natural resource" as the EU would like.

Here, four of Prof. Bacchus' points should be noted. /26
He recalls that for art. XX to apply, EU must prove CBAM is "necessary" to achieve the objective (protection of climate) as there is no "reasonably available alternative". /27
Prof. Bacchus suggests that there is an alternative: a carbon tax!

That is a very novel claim.

If this alternative is so readily available why hasn't the US adopted it yet? 😉 /28
Prof. Bacchus strongest point from WTO perspective is about EU refusing to accept that other countries can achieve their own climate-targets in their own way and CBAM should provide for that. /29
He asks who gave the EU the right to demand that everyone have an ETS system that is exactly like the EU system (the only one exempted from CBAM). There is no mechanism for CBAM to consider the adequacy of other (non-ETS) measures and this indeed is a fact. /30
To be fair, CBAM considers carbon pricing in other countries and this can be deducted from the CBAM bill. But Bacchus is right that with CBAM, EU assumes that ETS is the only way to achieve the climate objective. This may run into WTO problems. /31
This is where Bacchus doesnt do CBAM full justice, noting that since WTO concerns itself w/ treatment of products, not countries, EU shouldnt focus all of its attention exclusively on whether exporting countries have an ETS-like system, but should look at products themselves. /32
But this is exactly what CBAM does. First, it has an elaborate system for analyzing the emissions from the product itself. It may rely on country-specific default values, but only as a last resort; the primary focus is on the exporter. /33
It allows the importer to deduct from CBAM bill price paid for emissions from imported product in a 3rd country.

The CBAM system is actually quite good in analyzing the v specific situation of imported product. Of course how this will work in practice, we will only find out. /34
Lastly, v interesting observations on whether art. XX exemption has a jurisdictional element, i.e., whether EU can use art XX to fight climate change in 3rd countries.
Given the nature of his paper (only 7 pages), he only touches on the topic. But a fascinating topic indeed./35
That said, I strongly encourage everyone interested in #CBAM to read prof. Bacchus paper. It is excellently written, narrows in on most important/hard issues. A true joy to read. 36/36 @CatoTrade

cato.org/sites/cato.org…

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Tomasz Wlostowski

Tomasz Wlostowski Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @TomWlost

10 Oct
The #CBAM proposal was released almost 3 months ago. Various aspects of the proposal have been already discussed: impact on economy, int'l trade patterns, compatibility w/ WTO & Paris Agreement.

I’d like to highlight here a number of less discussed issues. (thread)
At the outset, let me point out that two main issues that in my view will determine the future of #CBAM in the Council and the Parliament have been somewhat discussed in the media, but in an insufficient and highly distorted way: free ETS allowances and export competitiveness. /1
Free allowances are an emotional issue. I won't focus on them here: I will address them separately in a few days. But I would like to emphasize that these two issues are insufficiently analyzed and the public discussion on them is distorted, so expect major surprises. /2
Read 83 tweets
23 Jul
The main damage from this is deal lies somewhere else & I'm not sure Americans realize it.

In having to make tough choices, US ultimately decided to side w/ Germany, throwing CEE under the bus. From US short-term perspective that choice may have been obvious. 1/n
But it will have DESTRUCTIVE implications in CEE foreign policy. These countries always looked to America as a beacon of hope. A trustworthy ally. Guarantor of security. All these countries have been betrayed in the past. But not by America. America was reliable. 2/n
There are ongoing discussions in CEE. Should we really by so US oriented? Hasn't Trump shown us that one stupid election can change everything? Maybe we should actually reassess the relationship with Russia? Or bet on China, the 3rd power? 3/n
Read 19 tweets
24 Jun
Today, EU finally imposed further economic #sanctions on #Belarus, perhaps finalizing EU's multi-prong reaction to the hijacking of RyanAir flight on May 23rd.
This (long) thread will analyze where we are today and what actually has been achieved. (thread)
The previous situation is described here. 👇

Prior to RyanAir incident, EU had (1) asset freezes, (2) visa/entry bans; (3) arms embargo, (4) ban on exports of equipment used for internal repression. /1
Following the RyanAir incident, the EU reacted in three steps:
- June 4: banning of Belarusian air flights from EU airspace;
- June 21: massive expansion of asset freezes & visa bans; and
- June 24: significant expansion of economic sanctions. /2
Read 50 tweets
3 Jun
As the cat seems to be out of the bag, and most people following EU #CBAM discussions have seen some draft of the proposal, let me share with those out of the loop some info on the structure of the proposal. /Thread
First, CBAM will first apply to 4 pre-selected sectors., listed in Annex I These are - for the time being - electricity, fertilizer inputs plus some selected fertilizers, cement, many iron & steel products, plus aluminum 1/n
Cant speak for other products, but for fertilizers, the list is clearly too short. Main inputs (ammonia + nitric acid) and only two finished products: urea and some ammonium nitrate. 2/n
Read 37 tweets
2 Jun
Od dłuższego czasu postuluję, abyśmy - zamiast biadolić, jak to Niemcy z Rosjanami budują projekty uderzające w bezpieczeństwo naszego państwa, lub jak to niemieccy urzędnicy zajmują miejsca w organach państwowych firm rosyjskich - zaczęli to jawnie zwalczać za pomocą sankcji. /1
Pytanie oczywiście brzmi - jakich konkretnie sankcji? Sankcje to luźne hasło, pod którym kryć się mogą różne środki, od zakazu wjazdu, przez zamrożenie aktywów, zakaz transakcji, wykluczenie z przetargów, zakaz finansowania, zakaz inwestycji, embargo handlowe i inne. /2
Ideą przewodnią sankcji jest to, że atakujemy interesy i prawa podmiotu objętego sankcjami, w jakimś sensie ograniczamy ich prawa lub swobody. Ale jedynym ogranicznikiem typu sankcji jest nasza własna pomysłowość. /3
Read 29 tweets
25 May
I am hearing a lot of doubts whether EU and the West have any economic pressure over Belarus.

Here are some quick & obvious targets for trade sanctions. (thread)
By hitting:
(1) oil & fuels
(2) iron, steel, metallurgy
(3) chemicals & fertilizers
the West would be hitting about a third of BLR trade. /2
First, fuel, oil & minerals. Almost 7 bln USD in exports look sanctionable. Key player is Ukraine, which may not be able to join due to Kyiv's reliance on some energy-related imports from BLR. But below some examples. /3
Read 17 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(