The 5-year contract which was signed in 2019 foresees the transit volumes of 40 bcm in 2021, which amounts to 109 mcm/day.
It is deeply alarming 🚨 and quite informative to note that Gazprom is now paying for capacity and not using it!
Since the beginning of the month, Gazprom is shipping 86 mcm/day which is ~25% less than what it's paying for. There is a great disconnect between the words and the actions when it comes to the role of the Russian Federation in the European gas crunch. #EnergyCrisis#GasPrice
Ukraine stands ready to transport as much gas as Europe needs and our spare capacity, available at this very time, is nearly twice that of #NordStream2
[THREAD]: The #EnergyCrisis and #gasprice 📈is a consequence of deliberate choices by a dominant gas supplier to Europe not to use the existing gas transmission infrastructure
Russia talks of increased gas "supplies" to Europe but not “exports”
The difference seems subtle🤔 the consequences are not 🚨
To boost “supplies,” Gazprom is emptying its EU storage facilities (stoking fears ➠ pushing up prices 📈) and hides behind "delivering on obligations"
Gazprom increased production by 18% this year, which allowed Russia to triple its exports to China and Turkey, but not Europe 🤔 #gascrisis#energycrunch
🤔 it is possible for Russia to "increase supplies" of #natgas to Europe and create market fear 😱 that contributed to the quadrupling of prices since June?
💡 A few hints below 👇👇👇
Hint 1: gas "supplies" is a loaded word. Many automatically equate "increased supplies" with more gas exports from 🇷🇺 to 🇪🇺.
That's not the case. Gazprom is emptying its EU storage (stoking fears ➠ pushing up prices 📈) and hides behind "delivering on obligations"
Hint 2: the post-pandemic gas demand in Europe is on par with 2019, so that's the reference year to look at for meaningful analysis.
Any comparison to 2020, used by those who prefer not to notice Gazprom’s role in the #gascrisis, is unhelpful and misleading. #energycrisis