IG Design #IGR was a ten bagger in the 5 years leading up to Covid. An update a fortnight ago dropped the shares by half and erased all the gains in the most recent five years. Knife catching and broken growth this soon is almost always a mistake but IG may be an exception here. ImageImageImage
My basic premise with it is that the accounts are a complicated nightmare (CTRL+f for "adjust" is 232 hits in the last FY report) but most immediately, that this is right now a gross margin story - I think there are grounds to at least consider whether IG can be given a pass here
Unfortunately, it does mean walking through it so grab a.. (just no) so anyway, here's the rough idea: Pre-covid in white, M&A growth darling, 20% gross margins. Forget the op margin for now - I'm stripping out the adjustments that made adjusted whatever go up and to the right Image
In the doghouse, it's cold, hard, unadjusted statutory.

Let's look at covid - the first grey period: company closed a massive US acquisition (called CSS) 1 month before period end, the Trump tariffs came in, Covid began. Gross margins 9.9%. H2/20 explained. Image
Now, here's the first of 2 datapoints that I think are worth a look: H1/21 covering the height of the first wave of Covid produces a 19.3% margin. What do they have to say about it? Image
Q1 of H1 down -28% in core IGR, CSS down -12%

Q2 of H1 down -3% in core IGR, CSS up 2%

Gross margins impacted by mix and manufacturing decrementals

Not a sunny situation yet despite all that, gross margins are at 19.3% - in the circumstances, for me it's very creditable Image
Post period, they got hacked and they'll lose some sales and incur costs. Fine, if this is cheap there's going to be problems. Image
So now here's H2/21: 16% margins, let's look at the explanations. Image
LfLs down -5% overall in the year, CSS down -1%,

Hacking incurs costs, reduces sales as expected

Further mention of mix: self manufactured in core IGR vs bought in is down disproportionally so lower absorption. ImageImageImage
Here's my point: despite it going nowhere fast - ex growth, weak LfLs, core IGR maybe festering, manufacturing side (and therefore GM relevant) hit most, during Covid, costs increasing - we're *still* at 16% GMs. Sure, it's crap and I don't want to own it but see what comes next.
Late August update 2021, covering the first 4 months of H1/22: "challenging cost headwinds" - but the growth has picked up: +25% on the LfLs, +10% proforma for CSS. Sure, not stellar but much better, absent the costs I'd expect an improvement on that 16% but we'll never know.. Image
..because 8 weeks later, in late October, a further update - and this is the full house: costs up, logistics screwed, sales down so sharply the H1 numbers are less than half of what they were due to be just 2 months ago and the whole year's a write-off. Pure, unmitigated disaster Image
Now, here's the period covered by those two updates on a generic chart of China - US shipping costs.

Light grey, cost headwinds but growth coming back (and absent those costs, you assume at least some margin); dark grey final cost spike, backlogs now impacting sales? Perhaps Image
Covid margin performance: creditable in H1, reasonable in H2 given the circumstances? Maybe Image
Can we look through this all? What happens if we do and assume a situation sometime into 2022 just with 21/H2's revenue and 21/H2's opex but we flex the gross margins around? We get £10-17M per half in operating income. Image
Perhaps more likely, rather than cost pressures just dissipating alone we might expect to see a bit of that update 1 growth come back to help improve those margins - below is +10% on H2 revenues with a flat expense base. £15-23M per half. I know.. it's just generalising Image
Suppose even, we went back to before those shipping costs spiked and went by management's new target of $1.5B in medium-term sales and $150M in EBITDA? Could we risk the wait? Ex-M&A the company is running with 0 net debt, balance sheet suggests to me no financial distress at all Image
Midpoint of that first scenario is £28M operating annualised, second is £39M, the company target in EBITDA (and recently changed into USD...) before the shipping chart is £110M - against a market cap of £230M
I've banged on about the 2nd derivative before; what would shock more than those last 8 weeks? The year is over already and next year is already guided to be rocky. The rose-tinted glasses are on here but it's a turnaround idea - strap them on, grin and bear it.
In an expensive market, this is what I'm reduced to - the excuses I make on behalf of IGR may or may not be justified but stabilise at this price, with ¼ off the low end of the base scenario - it's an 11 PE. With synergies, growth, the upside could be far more than substantial.

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More from @hareng_rouge

5 Oct
Saw a one-line tweet the other day mentioning McColls #MCLS as one of 2 highest conviction names.

I think I see why: there's a metamorphosis happening underneath and reasonable path to PE and FCF multiples between 2-3 plus a growth narrative, all under that lovely grim exterior
Story is that they're shrinking. 1500+ stores 2 years back, to 1050 by the end of FY21

Also changing: culling small newsagent shops to focus towards larger, more profitable grocery-heavy stores. So far, so worthy - but the real interest is the transformation into Morrisons Daily
Company raised recently to accelerate a programme converting 350 stores into these Mini Morrisons. They're at 56 today, will be 350 by end FY22

Cost is £90K per shop, what they call "cash payback" is 2-3 years and so far they're providing pretty immediate LFL sales growth of 25%
Read 12 tweets
23 Sep
What does Sneller see to get such sudden FOMO for the old zombie that is Iofina #IOF? If you recall the name, it should produce revulsion but a few things have changed and there's a chance it may be about to make some money. ImageImage
IOF produces Iodine in the US via O&G brine. Iodine is a beneficiary of industrial recovery generally and covid specifically - the largest use is used as x-ray contrast which may benefit demand from catch up on delayed hospital treatment.

And because it's 2021, inevitably: Image
Production is trapped on the wrong side of the Pacific: the two major production centres are Japan and Chile - so you have the obvious logistics issues for both and potentially politics for the latter.
Read 12 tweets
20 Aug
I think it's worth revisiting Aquis #AQX here in light of a couple of data points that have since come out.

There are three main parts to the co: a stock exchange (AQSE); a tech licencing biz and their multilateral trading facility (AQXE) - it's this last one I want to look at.
First is the RNS from earlier this month announcing their MTF (investopedia.com/terms/m/multil…) had achieved 6.2% market share. Across the €53.6B traded on AQXE in July, this came out to €1.7B a day.

Those 6.2% and €1.7B are quite significant numbers and I'll come back to them later Image
In the period since the beginning of 2018 market share has risen from 1.72% to that 6.2% above. Here's how that value traded looks. Image
Read 15 tweets
10 Jun
Someone else has also since mentioned $JAKK to me - it's a (shitco) toy maker, similar to Character Group #CCT in the UK. CC's tweet mentions the refi, he has a point - I think there may be something here to play for, perhaps towards a double or so before the end of the year.
Company has cash of $80M + new debt of $99M (pink) repays difference on prior debt of $129M with cash on hand (green) so $50M cash + debt $99M

6,395 shares at $10.6, converts at $5.65 (purple) into $18.9M (blue) so + 3,345 shares = 9,740 / $103 cap & $20M prefs (grey) $172M EV
As you can see it's highly seasonal into Q3. Mgmt mentioned in the last (Q1) call that inventories are low. Typically they would be about $20M higher than here in Q2, so if we penalise the cash in the EV by that amount to account for inventory build we're at $192M
Read 12 tweets
5 May
The effects of Covid at $IDN are becoming harder to ignore.

Q4/2019 - Q2/2020: figures to hand, exact responses Image
Q3/2020: a bit of waffling but eventually a rough number Image
Q1/2021: only a vague awareness of trends, forgetfulness and cognitive confusion Image
Read 5 tweets
4 Mar
Over the next decade or so, Transense #TRT will receive royalties on 6000+ of $GE's military helicopter engines and on many Bridgestone mining tires

Simple order of magnitude numbers suggest that the current cap of £12M may be undervaluing these cashflows quite substantially
It's not a complicated co but there are four parts to this. To help keep track, I'll deal with them in the following order:

1. Bridgestone (discounted 0.5x-1.5x+ cap)
2. Helis (anywhere from undiscounted 1x-10x cap)
3. Free optionalities
4. Tire probes (modest percentage of cap)
TRT makes advanced sensors.

On the Bridgestone side of things, the sensors monitor all aspects of super-large mining trucks' tire condition and provide geofencing and advanced capabilities for. Beyond likely cashflows the optionality here is to expand within the B'Stone range.
Read 25 tweets

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