[THREAD] The Islamic State of Iraq released a new video entitled "So await; we are awaiting with you.", a reference to a line in Surah at Tawbah (Verse 52). A better title for it is "more of the same" as it is a showcase of typical IS tactics in 2020 & 21.
The video covers various attacks across Iraq from early 2020 until just last month. They're in all of IS' usual areas of operations; Diyala, Anbar, Salahuddin, North Baghdad, Kirkuk, etc. There is no major tactical shifts although I do note some interesting aspects.
In terms of small arms, it's all standard stuff- M16A4 & A2, along with M4 variants, are the favourites as ever, along with AK variants, PK(M), RPG-7/Type 69 (Uusually with PG-7VM, OG-7V, PG-7V, T69-1, etc), and a couple of bigger pieces. Mortars too, usually 60mm.
A good example of the "highest grade" IS unit seen in the video is an Anbar cell seen preparing for a raid. It's rather rare to see HMG (Here it's a Type 54) plus a 23mm 2A14 autocannon. These cells are considered "Elite" internally, are well armed w/ M4/M16A4/MG-1M/T69 & PG-7M.
There is a few M4geries seen in the video, along with some probably real M4 variants, VHS-K2, AKS-74U (That cell actually got blotted out by Tribal forces a while later), etc. Now to TTPs and related observations.
As I alluded to in the first tweet; the attacks seen are to be expected, including:
- Serious quantities of IEDs
- Close range rural ambushes
- Semi-urban assassinations & raids
- Simple mortar attacks
- A few complex raids (Such as Rashad) involving "come on" tactics, TWS, etc.
Again, IS make heavy use of their traditional suppressed M16s (Pic 1: Hit, July 31st 2021), suppressed Glock 19 Gen3, TWS (Pulsar Apex XD75 juust about spotted), suppressed Beretta 70-series pistols. All of these are effective in the hands of what I term "semi-urban" raid cells.
Not to say small rural cells can't be effective; the close range RPG (PG-7VM, OG-7V) use in the dense vegetation of Salahuddin is startling both in simplicity & probable effectiveness. Really showcases the difficult job that the ISF have on their "sweeps" even w/ coalition cover.
Other rural attacks include simple car spraydowns in Tigris, more IEDs, and so on. This has been the bread and butter of the insurgency for not all that far off 20 years now; long before dramatic events like the town takeovers in the 2000-10s.
We get some more media of a less common tactic, the use of 122mm "Grad" rockets too. This really seems to me to be a status action to a degree; single rockets are unlikely to be seriously damaging but are a reminder of present danger. Some crop/equipment burnings, too.
Video has less of a desperate air than the one in May & if I was to try to separate the carefully selected footage from reality, likely does show a more emboldened and capable organisation overall since the beginning of 2020. The successful penetration into cities is celebrated.
That said, there is nothing that indicates a serious qualitative (or quantitative) leap forward. This is a complex and dangerous organisation that must be kept under constant pressure; hopefully recent CT successes can keep that so. I suspect escalation is coming.
It is clear that the group cannot operate as openly as it would like. I do suspect that IS' ability to penetrate into secure areas will be both limited but very much trumpeted by the group when they occasionally manage it. The warning signs are there.
[THREAD] As a idiot and not as an Analyst™ I think that whilst it's important that emphasising that current IS activity in Afghanistan doesn't represent a sudden increase in capability; it's more important to consider a possible trajectory of the insurgency.
If what we see at present is the activation (and rejuvenation via hundreds of escapees) of preexisting Islamic State networks across the country; then it is obviously right to be fearful for the people of Afghanistan. That does not translate into a wider danger (yet).
If the question is just how sophisticated their insurgency can be, then we don't have to look far. These are the same people that carried out complex operations such as the Jalalabad Jailbreak in 2019, the PBIED in the Taliban funeral a few days ago, etc.
#Afghanistan: Whilst I still think that the TTP is more important than IS-K when it comes to discussion of the situation in/around Afg. in coming months, I think it's reasonable to consider what the group (may be) looking to do. A few notes of mine:
1: The Islamic State was totally aware that the Afghan Govt. was going to fall, as was everyone else except Biden and his sycophants. This is no obstacle to their operations, as the new Taliban state inherits the same structural liabilities.
2: The Taliban's "CT" abilities shouldn't be assumed to be superior to NDS & USG, and IS has been engaging in a slow burn asasssination campaign against Taliban commanders, particularly those responsible for the demolition of IS in 2019.
[THREAD] #Balochistan: The BLA released 2 long videos on their attack in Marwaar, #Bolan, on May 31st 2021. This was against a large Pakistani Frontier Corps post and involved an attack team of around 30+ insurgents. Although the attack was typical, it was larger than usual.
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BLA fighters went through detailed planning including using a model to plan movements, point out guard towers, local terrain, etc. Seems that the planning took place fairly far away from FC post, with the fighters then travelling. Note AKs, Zastava M84, PG-7V, PSL, SVD, etc.
2/
We're given GPS co-ords (29.96225530387559, 67.4549640088277 (I think)) so if anyone has any nice sat pics pre and prior to the raid I'd be interested. Note they're aware of the proximity to air assets, and hence possible length of time for support to arrive (it doesn't)
#Lebanon Really good image of a covert Hezbollah 122mm MRL used to fire rockets from #Hasbaya into Israel. It's a rather compact 32-tube launcher hidden in a civilian truck, w/ cloth cover. Probably hydraulically raised. Hezb a step above militia factions in Iraq, though similar.
Some video from the scene; seems the vehicle was found/intercepted after the rockets (10-15 apparently) were fired into the Golan. You can see that 11 rockets remained unfired, Hezb possibly intending to fire again after relocation.
Much of the video focuses on two main themes. First, the urban/semi-urban attacks against the ANA, ANP and others in Jalalabad and Kabul. To this end we see a lot of close in attacks with small arms, IEDs, 107mm etc. They're pretty operationally effective, but nothing new.
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Needless to say, IS K is rather operationally capable in said areas, as well as more broadly across Afghanistan (Kunar, etc). Quite interesting to see attacks carried out from Tuktuks, which I have read of being used by urban cells. Standard small arms (AKs, handguns etc)
#Idlib: Ansar al Tawhid released a new video about their use of artillery, repurposed tank guns, mortars, IRAMs and more against the SAA.
The video is pretty large and combines a lot of different systems, so I will go over them part by part.
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The group is heavily leaning into it's role as artillery specialists. First sup, we get a really good view at their use of truck-mounted 115m U-5TS main guns, which have been extracted from T-62 tanks. They only have a few of these trucks, and only 2 different ones are seen.
2/
They show multiple strikes on target, usually with HE-FRAG projectiles. The "Ansar-1" usually seem to be used in direct fire mode- although they do appear to be used like a conventional howitzer occasionally.