The requirements of practice makes antitrust laws converge toward rebuttable presumptions, quasi rules, and structured standards 2/n
Use of per se rules moves away discussion from economic analytics => legal classification issues, as seen in early Sherman Act cases. Equally facts intensive, and costly for plaintiffs 3/n
Let’s be honest w/ ourselves abt categorical prohibitions => it’s not that simple. There are tradeoffs everywhere. It’s bad policy to leave them hidden 4/n
The (c) is to Prof Pablo Ibanez who once said/wrote sthing likeplay the ball not the (wo)man 5/n
And real history matters, not funky history. Go read the cases yourselves /End
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Quick thread on the Opinion of the AG in Deutsche Telekom and Slovak Telekom (DT & ST) v Commission (C-152 and 165/19 P) curia.europa.eu/juris/document… For antitrust geeks only 1/n
The Opinion asks whether a firm w/o an indispensable infrastructure can nonetheless abuse a dominant position by way of margin squeeze. 2/n
To this normative question, the AG answers positively. I beg to differ. Note: my disagreement is with the AG’s reasoning, not about the outcome of this case or others. 3/n
@randypicker discussion of static monopolization in #Fortnite v Apple displays substantial parallels with the problems faced by antitrust towards tacit collusion 1/n
That is: should antitrust law deem unlawful business coordination without an explicit act of collusion? 2/n
Or put differently, should antitrust law affirm liability towards firms that have not sinned by commission, but which occupy a market that has evolved into a monopoly or tight oligopoly? 3/n