Sharing my prelim analysis of the main points of law raised by last week's Google Shopping judgment of @EUCourtPress Not my final word.
The General Court approached the case as in Intel v EC, trying to clarify the law
The Court buried to the ground the theory of a transversal Bronner threshold in abuse cases.
A legal rule against self preferencing can be effective in cases where full integration makes no economic sense.The Court he court falls short of explaining why a. My take, it makes sense
Evidence of leveraging alone is not sufficient to affirm antitrust liability against a dominant firm. A 'plus conduct' element is required. Like unequal treatment. Special tests apply.
What the test of illegality for unequal treatment remains unclear => 1/ abnormality; 2/ discrimination?
Platform specificity of the Google ruling?
And the constitutional law controversy!
Less prominent gems.
The Court implicitly treated Google as a public utility, common carrier, natural monopoly, you name it. /END
Sorry abt typos. Pls disregard 2 last sentences, that I thought I had deleted.
A legal rule against self preferencing makes sense in cases where full integration makes no economic sense.
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The requirements of practice makes antitrust laws converge toward rebuttable presumptions, quasi rules, and structured standards 2/n
Use of per se rules moves away discussion from economic analytics => legal classification issues, as seen in early Sherman Act cases. Equally facts intensive, and costly for plaintiffs 3/n
Quick thread on the Opinion of the AG in Deutsche Telekom and Slovak Telekom (DT & ST) v Commission (C-152 and 165/19 P) curia.europa.eu/juris/document… For antitrust geeks only 1/n
The Opinion asks whether a firm w/o an indispensable infrastructure can nonetheless abuse a dominant position by way of margin squeeze. 2/n
To this normative question, the AG answers positively. I beg to differ. Note: my disagreement is with the AG’s reasoning, not about the outcome of this case or others. 3/n
@randypicker discussion of static monopolization in #Fortnite v Apple displays substantial parallels with the problems faced by antitrust towards tacit collusion 1/n
That is: should antitrust law deem unlawful business coordination without an explicit act of collusion? 2/n
Or put differently, should antitrust law affirm liability towards firms that have not sinned by commission, but which occupy a market that has evolved into a monopoly or tight oligopoly? 3/n