1/ Iran has begun commemorating the 1st anniversary of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh's killing.
I think there's a strong argument to be made that after Trump's 2018 JCPOA withdrawal, this is the single most important and consequential event in the current nuclear crisis [thread]
2/ @ronenbergman & @farnazfassihi did a deep dive into the assassination of Iran's top nuclear scientist earlier this year that gets into the why/how of what happened that Fri in Absard. 👇 Long in Israeli crosshairs for his work on Iran's nuclear program.
3/ The Trump admin and Netanyahu government had for several months been discussing the revival of sabotage operations and killing nuclear experts. The then-director of Mossad proposed killing Fakhriazdeh as one option, and Trump admin officials briefed on the idea backed it.
4/ By mid-2020, with U.S. elections on the horizon, time was running short. Per the NYT report, "in Mr Netanyahu's best-case scenario, the assassination would detail any change of resurrecting the nuclear agreement even if Mr Biden won".
5/ Ronen & Farnaz's piece goes on to tell the "straight-out-science-fiction story" of the assassination itself. But where the story ends is where its implications begin.
For months, Iranian conservatives have been agitating for the Rouhani admin to expand nuclear activity.
6/ After the assassination, those calls - manifested in a parliamentary bill rapidly greenlit despite the Rouhani admin arguing it was "detrimental to the process of diplomatic activities" - were adopted. It's a blueprint for nearly everything Tehran has done since.
7/ As a European non-proliferation official told us a few months back, Tehran's "told us what they're going to do, done it, then told us they'd done it". Case in point: Iran was enriching at 4.5% this time last year, per the Majlis law that was raised to 20% at start of Jan.
8/ Incidentally, the cycle of sabotage and escalation was also on display in April when Iran announced it was raising enrichment levels again just 48 hours after an attack at the Natanz facility - to an unprecedented 60%.
9/ As @nytimes reported last week, debates ongoing re benefits of sabotage & killing: Attacks yielding limited returns on stopping nuclear advances, and in fact may backfire. In Fakhrizadeh's case, loss of research knowledge could be long-term setback for weapon development.
10/10 In the recent past and near present, however, it should be clear that the covert campaign is a mirror image of the Trump sanctions campaign: Tactically effective, yet strategically delivering the exact opposite of what its stated goals.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
162 days after they last recessed, JCPOA negotiations resume in Vienna tomorrow.
It's fair to say they are not burdened by the weight of excessive optimism.
A breakdown of what's changed since June, what hasn't, and what to watch [Thread]
2/ Let's start with one big thing that's changed: Iran's government.
Raisi administration is far more conservative in nature, and far less convinced of the merits of engaging the West, than its predecessor. The views of its negotiating team range from JCPOA sceptics to critics.
3/ Iran's nuclear program has continued expanding: Breakout is now estimated at a month, stockpiles at 20 and 60% growing, concern over irreversible knowledge gains deepening and international monitoring/verification hampered by lack of cooperation with IAEA.
On the JCPOA, guarantees, and political realities: A thread 🧵👇
Let's start with one thing Tehran and many pro-JCPOA voices agree on - the Trump administration's unilateral withdrawal raises real & reasonable concerns regarding Washington's long-term commitment to an agreement.
2/ These concerns are made all the more credible when anti-JCPOA voices in DC are loudly and repeatedly threatening that in the event power changes hands under the next admin, they will work to renege on U.S. commitments just as Trump did.
آنچه که امروز حیات برجام را بیش از پیش به خطر انداخته توقف مذاکرات وین است. به عنوان کسی که پرونده هستهای ایران را بیش از یک دهه دنبال کرده و از زمان آقای احمدی نژاد-جلیلی در چندین دور از مذاکرات حضور داشته، در این رشته توییت به تحلیل وضعیت کنونی پرداختم. 👇🧵
دلیل اصلی تعلیق مذاکرات این است که: به زعم تهران ایالات متحده نمیخواهد/نمیتواند به تعهدات خود در زمینه رفع تحریمها عمل کند؛ ادامه تنش باعث عقبنشینی طرف مقابل خواهد شد؛ کشور اوج فشار اقتصادی را پشت سر گذاشته و میتواند بدون رفع تحریمها هم به حیات خود ادامه دهد. ۲/
در مقابل، آمریکا نمیخواهد به صورت یکجانبه امتیازی بدهد تا تهران را برای بازگشت به میز مذاکره قانع کند؛ اتحادش با کشورهای اروپایی دوباره برقرار شده؛ در آژانس و سازمان ملل نفوذ قابل توجهی دارد؛ همچنان ابزار تحریم در دستانش است. ۳/
I've followed the nuclear negotiations across 3 US & 3 Iranian administrations, been on the ground at multiple negotiation rounds, and written more reports pre- and post-JCPOA than I care to tally.
Based on that, some modest thoughts on where we stand. [Thread]
The deal's demise was predicted or pronounced from the day it was reached: It wouldn't survive because Iranians would cheat. It couldn't survive because Trump's withdrawal would doom it. And now, it won't survive - or is already dead - because negotiations have stalled. 2/
Why? Tehran believes the U.S. won't/can't deliver on the sanctions relief the deal envisions. That continued escalation could leverage greater concessions. And that having survived the worst of max pressure, their economy can muddle through even without those benefits. 3/
هرچقدر پیروزی ابراهیم رئیسی در انتخابات کمرونق ۱۴۰۰ بیچالش بود، دوران ریاست جمهوری وی احتمالاً پر فراز و نشیب خواهد بود. گروه بحران در گزارش «معمای رئیسی» نگاهی انداخته به روند انتخابات و مشکلات عدیده پیش روی رئیسی در داخل و خارج. #رشتو crisisgroup.org/fa/middle-east…
۲/ پیروزی رئیسی حاصل انتخاباتی غیرآزاد و به شکل بیسابقهای غیررقابتی، نرخ مشارکت کمتر از ۵۰٪ و آرا باطله ۳.۷ میلیونی بود. برای نظام نه مشروعیت ناشی از مشارکت بالا، بلکه نتیجه انتخابات اولویت داشت تا حضور اصولگرایان در تمام مراکز اصلی انتصابی و انتخابی قدرت مقدر شود.
۳/ اشتغال، تورم، همهگیری کرونا، تظاهراتهای مردمی و صنفی صرفاً بخشی از مسائلی است که دولت رئیسی با آن روبروست. هنوز معلوم نیست که آیا حاکمیت یک دست، با پایگاه اجتماعی ۳۰ درصدی، قادر به رفع مشکلات کشور خواهد بود یا خیر.