Thread by @CalibreObscura

[THREAD] on IS-K related developments in #Afghanistan👇

It's got intense. In the past ~week only we've seen (likely&confirmed)IS-K kinetic actions in J'bad, Kabul, Parwan, Kandahar City, Kapisa, Dand, Kandahar, Logar, Warsaj [Takhar], Deh Salah [Baghlan] &
Lashkargah [Helmand].

It is clear to anyone with a few brain cells to rub together that the #Taliban have a serious ISIS problem.

Unfortunately, much recent commentary has gone with 1 of 2 extremes; "nothing to see here" and "ISIS is going to take over Afghanistan". 𝗡𝗲𝗶𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿 𝗶𝘀 𝘁𝗿𝘂𝗲.

A key oft-missed aspect is that IS-K does not act in a vaccum. This is obviously the case when it comes to the org operating within constraints of local operational conditions; but less clear when it comes to the complex global connections that sustain IS.

https://twitter.com/Valle_Riccardo_/status/1431977519083819010

It is unsensible to compare 2 groups (who did emerge from the same milieus) as if the situ is the same as it was pre Takeover.

Taliban are the Govt now.

Their manpower is stretched, bored & factionalism is apparently bubbling under an effective facade.

https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1463807218084687874

Not to say that TB are incompetent; far from it. Their security ops (in some locales) have been reasonably effective in their most basic goals. But they've been thrown into a situ that they are unused to & IS is using a network build along Islamic State of Iraq lines over 2+ yrs.

When the TB launched CT ops in Kandahar earlier this month, by all accounts they removed IS cells that apparently felt confident enough to broadcast their presence loudly on Facebook.

What does this tell you about the security situ in the TB's home base?

https://twitter.com/paykhar/status/1464545969211682818

It seems that the Taliban's semi-regular sectarian killings in J'Bad have slowed down after local Salafi leaders made direct appeals to TB leaders to stop driving their sons to IS, but the key point is that *they didn't work*. TB simply are in a very challenging position.

The TB have also apparently driven former ANA into the hands of IS-K. I am suspicious of these claims but there does seem to be some validity. These would be added to the pre-existing IS-K networks, or perhaps simply left for non-kinetic assistance.

https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1454835469468975107

On the topic of non-kinetic assistance, by my research there has been IS recruitment activity in as far afield as Kunduz, Kandahar, Logar, Zabul & Wardak (and the traditional home base of Nangahar where IS do maintain shadow control in some areas).

I am just trying to give a very broad overview of where IS is and what some of the TB responses have been. We know what IS activities have been; claimed and unclaimed killings, complex attacks incl. w/ VBIED, IED. Most particularly in the places IS wants you to look; Jbad, Kabul.

So what next?

If you were to ask me, this is still just more of the same, as I noted ~2 mo ago. But it's wider than I thought & IS is taking advantage of perilous humanitarian situation in Afg. to likely accelerate a plan formed in September/even earlier.

https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1446481127561117707

I think what happens in the next few months also must not be confined to Afghanistan. IS-K in #Pakistan has apparently increased it's efforts, and IS-P (Pakistan Wilayah) has apparently (re)started concerning urban operations. Naturally IS-K & P are linked.

https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1463206742699950093

If I were IS Central, I would have 2 main goals for IS-K.

1) Maintain/expand the current covert network of (mostly) urban attack cells, ensure they have solid rural support structures; that any trained new recruits can be used to hit both TB power structures & sectarian targets.

This would include actions v. much following mid-2000s ISI template (Overt sectarian hits, complex "come on" attacks against large targets that can remove key security personel, regular low level killings [We have seen all of these]). But to slowly prep for a larger re-emergence.

2) To use IS-K and the current weakness of the TB when it comes to Governance to supply know-how, weapons, etc to IS-K and IS-P networks both in the fmr. Tribal areas and to hit the entity that IS percieves to really be behind the TB- Pakistan proper.

India after that.

Note these are my (an idiot) predictions of *goals*; there is plenty to spoil them actually operationalising them in 2021-22; I suspect that TB may gradually improve it's security arrangements although it will be very inconsistent. US/Pak also have plans.

https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1464497302433845256

There you have it; just my view of what the apparently very capable Dr Shahab al-Muhajir, a local despite his kunya who managed deep infiltration of the former govt's secruty apparatus, may be thinking about and carrying out now and in the future.

One last note: A TB fighter with long experience mentioned months ago that their internal amni was weak & TB mid-rank networks were penetrated by IS.

Take careful note of weird TB decisions that don't fit even factionalism, because there is more going on in TB ranks than we see.

If you like this kind of not-analysis™ with a broad view and a skeptical attitude, please consider a few $$$ to ko-fi.com/CalibreObscura.

Hopefully I can get some of these thoughts onto a better medium soon. 😅

[END]

cc @Jihad_Analytics @AlexAlmeida2020 @Ayei_Eloheichem @APHClarkson @ThreshedThought @DanieleRaineri @Natsecjeff @AbraxasSpa etc.