4. Another important news report (also relying on @AdvDemocracy's exquisite research in this space) was this article in the Washington Post in April (by @craigtimberg).
5. FBI’s Norfolk report – sent to law enforcement agencies on Jan. 5 – warning of users' calling for "war," "get violent," “Congress needs to hear glass breaking, doors being kicked in,” and sharing a map of Capitol’s underground tunnels.
7. As we explain, FBI/DOJ may have tactical reasons for not including references to communications on The Donald.
Regardless of the reason, it comes with potentially significant costs in prosecuting cases and identifying actors most responsible for Jan 6th. We explain at length.
8. More screen shots from FBI's Jan 5 Norfolk Report based on user communications on thedonald.win and
Tweet from @DevlinBarrett 👇 who has been on forefront of reporting in this space.
Bannon "in deep legal trouble…executive privilege would at best allow him to refuse to answer specific questions. The claim of executive privilege in no way shape or form allows a witness to refuse to show up at all" msn.com/en-us/news/pol…
2. In addition to criminal contempt, Congress could directly pursue escalating fines against Bannon.
Key passages of testimony in Senate Judiciary report — showing the scheme to threaten acting Attorney General to pitch in with effort to overturn the election or be replaced.
3. Senate Judiciary Committee investigation also uncovers New Year's Eve meeting in Oval Office.
Trump directly threatens acting AG Rosen and Donoghue: threatens to fire and replace them with Clark for failing to help overturn the election.
2. The internal memo breaks down for policy clients the ways in which the current Trump-Biden policy raises profound legal problems both in terms of US international legal obligations and domestic law.
3. The Koh memo also outlines for administration officials several options to avoid or minimize these legal problems, including fundamentally changing the policy course.
As @ICRC explains, the presumption of civilian status is a part of binding laws of war. Isn’t it true that @DeptofDefense has highly anomalous view that considers this rule NOT part of binding laws of war? Does the US government as a whole agree with DoD’s position?
3. Who were the most senior DoD officials who authorized or signed off on the strike?
Before taking the strike, what did DoD estimate would be total number of civilian casualties killed?
What did DoD consider would have been acceptable level of civilian casualties?
2. On the list of things that needed to be said is the use of the “legally available" standard in Executive Branch lawyering to get to yes on contentious policies.
An issue that @charlie_savage spotlighted in his book Power Wars.