I broadly agree with this, though I'd add one additional twist on how to think about redistricting by seat: whether we're comparing to the actual outcome in 2020 or a hypothetical expected outcome on the old map in 2022
Take VA, for instance.
Dave treats this as an R+1 shift, since Dems aren't favored to hold VA-2 (which is true).
But they probably would have won VA-2 in 2020 (this is still a Biden CD). So I'm not sure I'd call this a loss due to redistricting
And on the other hand, Democrats might have been underdogs in both VA-2/7 on the old map in '22. By that forward looking measure, one could say the Democrats might be favored to gain a seat due to redistricting
In a lot of cases, the Democrats fare a little better on the seat count when you're really careful to make sure you're not adding in expectations of a 2022 rout into the cost of redistricting.
Given the extremely high relationship between presidential and congressional vote in '20, the easiest way to see that, to my mind, is to look at two measures: the number of Biden CDs and the number of CDs that are left of, say, Virginia (a hypothetical wave)
Across the 265 completed CDs, there are 5 more Biden CDs than before and there are also 4 more CDs where Dems would survive in a rout.
The GOP, OTOH, has really sured itself up against a Dem wave. There are 15 more CDs where Trump won by at least 15! In practice, that's less about playing defense against a wave and more about playing defense against highly unfavorable trends in formerly red, GOP-held suburbs
If, hypothetically, the Democrats make another big round of gains in the once red suburbs of Texas, IND, STL, etc., the value of GOP gerrymanders will soar. For now, it's the Democrats who might make slight gains
IE: if Texas turns blue, the GOP is still going to have a two-to-one seat edge and this gerrymander will look incredible. But it's entirely possible the Dems do better in '22 in TX than they would have on the old map
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
This is a state Biden won by 30. I'm not saying Republicans should be grateful that they get districts, but no one should have any illusions about what a real gerrymander would mean for the CA GOP
There are lots of angry people insisting that California is a gerrymander. They don't even feel the need to argue it, because they think it's so obvious. (i think it's obvious the other way)
So before I explain my case, let me ask: why do you think California is a gerrymander?
Take the 'mean-median gap', maybe the very simplest measure of whether a party will struggle to translate their popular majority into a congressional majority.
Across the 241 districts drawn so far, the mean-median gap is 0.00, down from R+2.4 in these same states in 2020 pres.
So, to this point, the map is not simply 'not as bad' for Democrats as feared. The first 241 districts so far are basically fair, thanks to a mix of both Democratic and Republican gerrymandering cancelling the other out
I think this piece is broadly right, but a lot of what looks like a huge surprise in redistricting comes from two separate measures of the effect of redistricting: change in party control v. change in PVI nymag.com/intelligencer/…
Take NV. It had a 3-1 Dem delegation in '20; it will have a 3-1 map in '21. No change, as expected before redistricting.
But the districts got quite a bit stronger for Democrats.
In '20, it was 3-1 to the right of the national vote, now it's 3-1 to the left.
Before redistricting, most of the analysis was done in terms of that former measure--expected seat flips.
Now that we have actual districts, most of the analysis is being done with the latter.
I think there's a lot to agree with here, especially if you're still optimistic about BBB's prospects.
The better question is why it feels that Biden's accomplished so little theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
The rescue package really stands out for me in that regard. Doesn't really feel like Biden/Democrats already spent $2tn in party line spending this year, does it?
I don't remember the backstory on why the CTC wasn't made permanent at that point, but that's an example of how it could have done more. Or maybe they could have gotten paid leave in there (framed as making sure people can take off work if they test positive)
Obviously we'll see soon enough, but are we 100.0% convinced Manchin just killed BBB? His statement led with "cannot vote to continue," which sounds like whether to start debate on the current bill (which he was against).
Now, he used some really strong "can't get there" language--so maybe it's the whole thing, not just the House blueprint. But you can also construe his comments to still allow for, say, 1.7bn over 10 years with fully funded programs, as he's implied before. Worth clarifying
After all, he later leveled his long-standing critique of the House bill: it didn't fully fund programs, but instead partially funded a bunch of things.
Perhaps it still leaves the door open for fully funded/prioritized bill, as he's argued over and over
From a political standpoint, it seems increasingly likely that the main consequence of omicron will be to accelerate the end of the coronavirus crisis/state of emergency
Yes, the short-term effect is a wave of cases, which may or may not increase in hospitalization/deaths (depending on how the lower severity x higher transmissibility equation sorts out).
But even assuming there is a wave of hospitalizations/death, this will be a changed pandemic.
There won't be a fantasy of crushing a highly transmissible variant with the ability to evade vaccines. And at the same time, the risks may seem more acceptable, due to diminished severity, growing immunity and improved treatment options