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The UN monitoring team has published its 29th report on al-Qaida and the Islamic State. Over the past years, the monitoring team's analytical reports have developed into key sources on militant groups. This edition is no exception. Here's a summary of the report.
On Central Africa:
The report concludes that member states still don’t see a direct command line between the IS leadership and the group in #Mozambique. Although the group in Mozambique has experienced setbacks, the report says it appears to be “displaced rather than defeated”
The report estimates that ISCAP has between 600-1200 fighters in #Mozambique mainly consisting of locals and foreigners from #Tanzania and the #Comorros
In #DRCongo, the report informs that the local IS group in growing stronger and spreading its activities. It also noted stronger communication with the IS leadership in the Levant.
The report says that senior ISCAP members in #DRCongo “are connected to the ISIL core command through the general directorate of provinces and its Al-Karrar office in Somalia, although this relationship is not strong”.
Since early 2021, the UN has reported that the general directorate of provinces has grown stronger. This is the same office that is responsible for ExOps according to the UN.
On East Africa:
Regarding the numerous bombings in Uganda over the Fall 2021, there are “evidence that instructions for the construction of improvised explosive devices were sent via Telegram by Ugandan ADF bombmaker Meddie Nkalubo from Madina Camp” in #DRCongo
In “Somalia, the UN assesses that IS has between 260 and 300 fighters while the much stronger al-Qaida affiliate al-Shabaab has between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters. On al-Shabaab, it says that the group is capable of collecting between $2 million and $10 million monthly.
On West Africa:
Militants affiliated with al-Qaida are growing stronger. In central #Mali, they have a presence representing an emirate with territorial control and implementing its own jurisprudence.
ISGS numbers between 400 and 1,000 members. In October 2021, the amir met with representatives from IS in the Levant indicating close coordination and command from the IS leadership.
ISWA consists of 4,000 to 5,000 fighters and is divided in four branches: Lake Chad, Tunbuna, Sambisa Forest and Timbuktu. Its shura council was dissolved in in June 2021 with the prior approval of the IS leadership. Again, says lots about command lines.
On the Levant: #Syria and #Iraq remains IS core territory. The group has between 6,000 and 10,000 fighters in the two countries, mainly residing in rural areas. The report highlights that the situation in Deraa is unstable and that IS has “at least 300 fighters there...
..., in addition to sleeper cells located around the Hawran mountains.” In Idlib, the strength of HTS is assessed to be between 6,000 to 15,000 fighters and the group has decimated rivals in Idlib, especially Hurras al-Deen which is assessed to be between 1,000 and 3,000.
On #Yemen:
AQAP is suffering but it is not on the verge of defeat. The group has approximately 3,000 fighters. The group is reported to be establishing new training camps. Amir al-Batarfi is currently engaged in making the group more cohesive.
On Afghanistan:
The report notes that there are no indications that the “Taliban has taken steps to limit the activities of foreign terrorist fighters in the country.”
Terrorist groups enjoy more freedom in #Afghanistan now, but there have not been noted new waves of foreign fighters migrating to the country
The report assesses that it remains AQ’s long term goal to plan and execute attacks in the West. But it also notes that the group is currently too weak. AQIS is active in Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Paktika and Zabul and has between 200 and 400 fighters.
ISKP is nearing 4000 members after the release of fighters from Afghan prisons. The group is assessed to be on the rise.
Illustrative of the complexity of the Jihadi movement: Katiba Imam al-Bukhari and Katiba al-Tawhid wal-Jihad operate both in Afghanistan, allied with the Taliban, and in Idlib, allied with HTS. AQ is allied with the Taliban, while HTS is actively fighting the local AQ group
On South-East Asia:
Security forces have made significant progress in countering militants, especially by killing leading figures like Salahuddin Hassan and Ali Kalora. However, the threat from lone actor persists.
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A really interesting message from an al-Qaida supporter from #India. He asks for support from al-Qaida's regional branch AQIS to help militants like himself in 'mainland' India who are otherwise left 'disillusioned /thread
Discussing the situation in India, he says the country's mushrikeen are planning a genocide against the Muslims. Taking inspiration from AQ and the Taliban's fight in Afghanistan, they want to fight in India as well.
There is an organised AQ group in Kashmir, but not in 'mainland' India and this is a problem, the author of the message argues. Not least because there are many like him in India who would like to fight under the banner of AQ.
With the Taliban's imminent announcement of a new government to rule its Islamic emirate and the prediction that its amir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada will lead the emirate, I thought it was fitting with a little bio of the future leader of #Afghanistan.
While I'm no expert on Haibatullah, I managed to gather some information over the years.
A Pashtun born in 1961 in Panjwai district in Kandahar Province, Haibatullah grew up in a very religious family with his father occupying the position of imam in the local village mosque.
The young Haibatullah initially studied under his father, but after the Soviet invasion the family fled to Quetta where Haibatullah continued his religious studies in a seminary. No surprise that he later would turn into one of the Taliban's foremost religious authorities.
One of my primary interests for a while has been online pro-Islamic State supporter networks. Why? Because I believe they're important and gives unique insight into what resonates among supporters. The Islamic State agrees. This week's editorial in al-Naba is about these networks
The editorial explains how the military battle against the Islamic State is accompanied by a digital battle to destroy its virtual component. No surpriser here, the Islamic State claims to have won this digital battle.
[My comment] This is partly true, partly wrong. Online supporter networks still exist and they perform an increasingly importante duty of the Islamic State's online battle. Yet, operationally the environment is much more restricted than just a few years back.
On Monday, 1 July 2019 Kenyan national Cholo Abdi Abdullah was in his room in the Rasaca Hotel in the city of Iba, northwest of Manila, when he was arrested. In his possession, police found a pistol, a homemade bomb and a hand grenade. Yet Abdullah's primary aim involved a plane
Reminiscent of 9/11, Abdullah's plan was to hijack an airplane and crash it into a skyscraper, prosecutors speculate. In preparation he had been training for years in the Philippines and already obtained his pilot license. The attack was to be carried out on behalf of.. Al-Shabab
Abdullah's trajectory to become a terrorist started already back in 2012 when he pledged allegiance to the Somali group al-Shabab. At the time, the group had just been accepted into the fold of al-Qaida.
After 5 years and 3 months of work I finally defended my PhD thesis earlier this week. It was an extremely emotional experience and I am overly happy and proud with the result.
The thesis tells the much neglected story of Jihadis' internal conflict and here's what it is about.
First about the defence. Defending in front of a committee comprised of all my academic idols Olivier Roy, Stéphane Lacroix, Thomas @Hegghammer and Virginie Collombier was in itself rather frightening but also the most incredible way to conclude the research. Thank you!
During these 5 years I have learned a lot and I got to know a great group of people and I am truly grateful for all the help I received along the way. Not least from all the Jihadis that were willing to speak to me and with some I established a relationship.
The idea that led to 9/11 as narrated by al-Qaida: The original idea came from an Egyptian pilot who migrated to Peshawar and stayed at one of the Jihadi guest houses. In an informal sitting, he would first air his idea to hijack airplanes to strike iconic building in the US
This idea was shared with AQ's military leader at the time Abu Ubaydah al-Banshiri (also Egyptian) and later recounted by senior AQ figures Abu Hafs al-Masri and Abu al-Khayr. When in Sudan, UBL arranged for two AQ members to attend flight training.
However, plans speeded up after Khalid Sheikh Muhammed approached AQ to air his own idea of hijacking airplanes. AQ was located in Sudan at the time and the country was not considered an appropriated launching pad for such a major attack.