I'll leave the causal analysis for another moment, but the outcome is clear enough: (1) Recognition of DPR/LPR; (2) Formal insertion of Russian troops; (3) Likely attempt to expand borders.
Immediate unanswered questions: (1) How far will they push beyond the current line of control? (2) Will Ukraine fight along the current LoC, or at some distance from it? (3) Will Biden push the full package of sanctions immediately?
While nationalists and communists are pushing for regime change in Kyiv, the establishment consensus seems to be for an expanded DPR/LPR -- something like at the borders of the Donetsk & Luhansk oblasts.
The best-case scenario -- from a human life standpoint -- is that it all ends at the current line of control: if Russian troops go in and Ukrainian troops fortify but don't try to push the LoC forward.
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I'm seeing a good deal of ire and snark about UK sanctions, and while I'm usually up for a good deal of ire and snark, I'm not sure it's entirely deserved in this case.
If you missed it, here it is, targeting the assets and operations of key banks and billionaires.
Yes, it feels like small beans, compared to what the EU and the US are doing. But then the UK _is_ small beans compared to the EU and the US, which can, if they want, entirely upend the Russian economy. London can't.
If you believe he’s after Ukraine in whole or in part, then expect Putin to wait and see how Kyiv reacts viz military posture, and how US and EU react viz sanctions, and then re-calibrate his risk-reward model before deciding how far and how hard to press on.
If you believe he’s just after DNR/LNR and has written off the rest of Ukraine, then expect gradual creep to secure key infrastructure (see Georgia’s ever-shrinking borders), but probably avoiding major war (and major sanctions).
So, a couple of thoughts on this: (1) Don't worry to much; (2) Worry a little. axios.com/putin-ukraine-…
Here's why not to worry:
The sanctions against DPR/LPR are mostly meaningless, but they're just a placeholder for the moment. There will more to come, which I would expect to be significantly expanded sanctions against against key Russian individuals and corporations.
Here's why to worry a bit, from Psaki: "To be clear: these measures are separate from and would be in addition to the swift and severe economic measures we have been preparing in coordination with Allies and partners should Russia further invade Ukraine."
Note the word "further".
Putin's Donbas address is unbelievably dark and aggressive.
I've watched a lot of Putin speeches, and I don't think I've ever seen one quite like this.
"Contemporary Ukraine should be called The Vladimir I. Lenin Republic of Ukraine. And then they tore down his statues and called it de-communization. You want decommunization? We're prepared to show you what that really means for Ukraine."
This speech has none of the euphoria -- none of the high moral notes -- of Putin's 2014 Crimea address. It doesn't even have the rallying cries of his Feb. 23 2012 campaign speech.
(1) Recognizing DPR/LPR means a loss of leverage for Moscow over Kyiv. It kills the Minsk process and allows Kyiv to draw a (temporary) line under the conflict and move on.
(2) War means a loss of control. Up until this moment, Putin has had maximal control: he could turn up or down the temperature as he saw fit. Once the shooting starts, he loses that control -- at least in part.
(3) Given (1) and (2) above, I my best guess is that Putin will stop at the current line of control and try to hold things there, in order to avoid escalation -- but he'll leave open the possibility of pushing further, in order to keep the pressure on.
What we’re seeing now in Eastern Ukraine — suspicious explosions, organized evacuation of residents to Russia — does not have to mean war.
But war now feels a lot closer at hand than it did yesterday.
I’m not going to get into the business of parsing out the likelihood of possible scenarios. Not my skill set.
And I stand by my longstanding analysis that the institutions and incentives of Putin’s power augur against war. But as with any analysis, there’s a margin of error.
Errors of analysis happen. When they do, it’s important to be honest about them, and to figure out where the analysis went wrong.