Thread by @samagreene

Ok, a bit of analysis:

(1) Recognizing DPR/LPR means a loss of leverage for Moscow over Kyiv. It kills the Minsk process and allows Kyiv to draw a (temporary) line under the conflict and move on.

https://twitter.com/samagreene/status/1495786062781763584

(2) War means a loss of control. Up until this moment, Putin has had maximal control: he could turn up or down the temperature as he saw fit. Once the shooting starts, he loses that control -- at least in part.

(3) Given (1) and (2) above, I my best guess is that Putin will stop at the current line of control and try to hold things there, in order to avoid escalation -- but he'll leave open the possibility of pushing further, in order to keep the pressure on.

(4) Sanctions likely won't change any of these logics, regardless of whether they are targeted at the Kremlin or the economy as a whole. Staying within the current LoC will remain the least-cost option for Putin in any scenario -- nor would harsher sanctions urge him on, IMO.

(5) What gives me pause is this: none of this makes sense. However you look at it, Russia as a whole and Putin in particular is _worse_ off as a result of recognizing DPR/LPR (if that's what he does in the end).

Let's look at the hypotheses for what Putin was after:

(a) Keeping Ukraine out of NATO: recognizing DPR/LPR strengthens Ukrainian demands for NATO membership and support, and strengthens NATO resolve;

(b) Keeping Ukraine out of the EU: recognizing DPR/LPR frees up Kyiv to focus on domestic reforms, and strengthens EU resolve;

(c) Reviving the USSR: by adding a sliver of Ukraine? Не смешите мои носки.

(d) Supporting Putin's ratings: there is no evidence that taking indirect control of DPR/LPR will appreciably help Putin's political fortunes (though it won't be vociferously opposed).

I'll admit -- as I've admitted before -- that I didn't think it would come to this. As a result, while I still don't think a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and an attack on Kyiv or other large cities is likely, can I rule it out? No.

Putin is in the process of doing something that my analytical approach didn't predict. The breakdown could be in Putin's head, or it could be in mine, but either way, it could happen again.

But assuming I'm right and Putin stops at the current LoC, then I have two possible explanations. One is mundane: Putin painted himself into a corner, and the need to "do something" -- rather than just send his troops back to base -- was too strong.

A number of military and security analysts have been making this point for weeks -- that you can't move that many men and materiel without using them. Maybe they're right. It's possible I've underestimated the power of credibility and path-dependency here.

The less mundane explanation is that Putin may be setting things up for the protracted strategic confrontation I've written about before.
tldrussia.substack.com/p/the-long-hau…

This will be the third time since 2008 that Putin has used Russian armed forces to draw and defend new lines on the map of Europe.

Taken together with the extended basing of 30k troops in Belarus, this is effectively a re-militarization of European security (though Putin will argue that NATO started it in 1999).

Why Putin might want to re-militarize Europe is a question for another thread. In the meantime, I would invite *respectful* differences of opinion.

/END