As #Putin maneuvers into position for serious hostilities in #Ukraine, let's bear in mind the recent record of the Russian military. As a baseline is one factoid:
- Russian 'actions' in #Syria since 2015 have killed 23,000+ civilians.
In private meetings & bilateral dialogues in which I've been present, influential #Russia figures (both military & diplomatic) have repeatedly described #Grozny as *the* archetypal example of military success.
That 5 week siege & urban assault killed 8,000 civilians.
As a military actor in #Syria, the UN provided #Russia with coordinates of "deconflicted" hospitals -- to keep them safe.
=> #Russia used them to launch a campaign of dozens of precision strikes **on hospitals.**
Once it was done, #Moscow pulled out of the UN arrangement.
More recently, #Russia has been providing #Assad's regime with limited quantities of laser-guided 'Krasnopol' artillery rounds -- which have been directed to their targets by #Russian-operated drones.
Their targets?
Schools, health clinics, water towers, farms & IDP camps.
And that's not to mention #Russia's diplomatic protection of #Assad's chemical weapons program -- responsible for 340+ attacks since 2012.
It almost certainly goes further than that too -- Russia has had a significant presence at Syrian airbases used to launch CW attacks.
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According to local reporting, ~25,000 Syrians have fled #Lebanon & sought refugee in opposition-held NW #Syria, via the Aoun al-Dadat crossing in #Jarablus.
Getting to Aoun al-Dadat from #Lebanon's border with #Syria costs ~$500 per person in "fees." 🧵
That $500 of "fees" goes to a network of #Assad regime militias & the 4th Division -- to (1) enter #Syria & (2) pass through a web of checkpoints into #SDF-held territory northeast of #Aleppo.
For 25,000 people? That's $12.5 million of extortion revenue.
Once at Aoun al-Dadat crossing, refugees were initially preyed upon by a criminal gang demanding $20-$50 per person for expedited entry into opposition-held northern #Aleppo.
That criminality has since been squashed; the formal crossing fee is ~$15.
An #Israel ground incursion -- while predictable & understandable -- is the first time that #Hezbollah will perceive a potential opportunity to level the playing field.
While the group can't defend against precision strikes, it can fight on the ground.
#Hezbollah will hope to respond asymmetrically -- relying on tunnels & other covert infrastructure to target #IDF troops with ATGMs, snipers & potentially attempts to 'snatch & grab' hostages.
#Israel's intel will need to be solid.
By launching at night, #Israel has the advantage -- but #Hezbollah brought effective night-vision use into the #Syria theater as early as 2013. It's not incapable of operating at night, and the territory is its backyard.
Interesting -- #Russia says U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones have been flying over [#Assad-held] al-Sukhna in #Homs in recent days & on July 27, they nearly collided with Russian jets.
Treat the latter with skepticism, but ISR over Sukhna is significant -- a 🧵.
#Syria's airspace is delineated by deconfliction lines (i.e. defined areas of responsibility), agreed upon by #Russia & U.S.
CENTCOM has been increasingly concerned about #ISIS's recovery in the #Assad-held central desert & al-Sukhna has been key to that.
It's an open secret that subtle US ISR & occasional unacknowledged night-time SOF actions take place in the #Assad-held badiya -- but for #Russia to highlight MQ-9s being an issue is illustrative of (a) an increase amid (b) a failed regime "clearance operation."
Gathering from media reports, statements & leaks, #Israel's response to #Hezbollah's deadly attack on #MajdalShams is coming & it'll be bigger than anything we've seen in #Lebanon since October 2023.
It's a matter of time; a brief 🧵:
#Israel has already gone after key #Hezbollah operational 'HVTs' -- but not *the* leadership. #Beirut remains untouched (as does airport) & #Hezbollah's network of military bases, facilities & missile depots further north. Such strategic targets seem likely.
The key will be hitting #Hezbollah where it hurts, without triggering an existential response & a cycle of uncontrollable escalation -- a hard balance to strike.
Neither side wants all-out war, yes -- but domestically, #Israel has to & will escalate next.
#Israel's strike in #Damascus today is a huge development & a major escalation.
3 #IRGC-QF Generals:
- Brig. Gen. Mohammed Zahedi (Commander, #Syria & #Lebanon)
- Gen. Hossein Aminullah (Chief of General Staff, #Syria & #Lebanon)
- Maj. Gen. Haj Rahimi (Commander, Palestine)
Since the Feb 7 U.S. strike in #Baghdad, we've had zero confirmed #Iran proxy attacks on U.S. bases in #Iraq & #Syria.
It's quite likely that freeze could now end. The #IRGC has often used U.S. "soft targets" in #Iraq & #Syria as one form of retaliation for #Israel's actions.
For months, Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles & suicide drones have targeted Israeli & U.S. targets in #Iraq, #Syria, the Gulf & #Israel itself -- but all launched from outside #Iran's territory.
There's not nearly enough appreciation of how #ISIS's branches have increased & enhanced their interconnectivity over the past ~18 months.
From #Africa, through the #MiddleEast & into South & SE Asia, lines of logistics, recruitment, financing & plotting overlap more than ever.
Multiple #ISIS wilayat in #Africa have recruitment & logistics lines running into #Europe & #ISIS finance bodies in #Africa have been supporting operatives as far as #Afghanistan.
Recent #ISIS plots in #Europe have been tied back to #Africa, the #MiddleEast & #Afghanistan.
In 2023, multiple #ISIS-related attack plots were foiled in northern #Europe -- most unreported, almost all linked to #ISKP.
BUT, those #ISKP plots were 1st detected *outside* #Afghanistan, underlining the group's transnational reach -- as I wrote here: