Short THREAD 1/6 The Russian parliament has passed a law that essentially bans any discussion of Russia’s military and political actions, as well as the discussion of other countries’ actions with regard to Russia.
2/6 It’s always fascinating when parliaments adopt emergency laws that deprive parliamentarians themselves of any real power (eg to discuss issues & consult the executive based on their own expertise rather than the executive’s whims) & then repress those same parliamentarians.
3/6 The mechanism at work is very simple. The thinking is: “if I vote against it, I will be repressed immediately. If I vote for it, I might be repressed in the future, but then again, I might not.
4/6 This window between “immediately” and “maybe later, but perhaps not” is the passage through which state institutions drag themselves into a regime whose laws turn people into victims and the nomenklatura among them.
5/6 Repressions against individual members of the nomenklatura don’t scare away the rest. On the contrary, they only make the others move closer to the center of power in the (irrational) hope that those on the edges will be picked off first, and that it will end there.
6/6 This is why emergencies and legislative crackdowns don’t cause the elite divide so often spoken of in regard to autocracies. Rather, they cause a shock among the elites. Far from weakening the regime, this shock only consolidates it. This is the situation right now in Russia.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
THREAD 1/12 Recognizing the independence of the Donbas republics was unexpected because it was seen as an overly simple and therefore unlikely outcome that doesn’t reflect the scale of the arsenal of tools at Russia’s disposal.
2/12 The recognition is a chance for Russia to climb down from the peak of escalation with a concrete result, because retreating empty-handed would have been a ruinous outcome for the Kremlin’s prestige, and for the country’s military and diplomatic apparatus.
3/12 Russia had three options: pressing Kyiv to federalize through the implementation of the Minsk agreements, pushing the West to end NATO’s expansion, and recognizing the Donbas republics. Having failed to achieve the two main goals, Russia resorted to the third option.
THREAD 1/6 Given that Putin doesn’t like to be predictable or follow anyone else’s timetable, and that his actions are governed by the logic of special ops, there is some confusion over current events.
2/6 Was the buildup of troops and threat of invasion of Ukraine a cover operation for Russia recognizing the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk? Or will recognition of the territories be a cover operation for invading Ukraine and toppling its current regime?
3/6 Or is all of this together a cover operation for Russia’s main diplomatic goal: forcing Kyiv to implement the Minsk agreements and to federalize, and forcing the West to give Russia security guarantees and halt NATO expansion?
THREAD 1/10 During the frantic diplomatic contacts of the recent days, Putin has given the appearance of someone who would be satisfied with any of the possible outcomes.
2/10 Either this hard diplomacy will result in convincing victories, or it will pave the way for Russia to guarantee its security using whatever means it considers necessary. It’s possible that those means may include actions relating to Ukraine bit.ly/3GXOUnN
3/10 In all their recent public statements, Russian officials have stubbornly come back to two points: that at the foundation of the current Ukrainian regime lies a coup d’etat, and that Ukraine is not implementing the Minsk agreements.
THREAD 1/13 Moscow’s goal is clear: it wants the world to listen to it and to realize that the country speaking is not the same as the one that once lost the Cold War. Russia has a new confidence that has inspired it to revert to the language of the Soviet superpower.
2/13 That confidence springs from several sources. The first is Russia’s modernized army and new weapons. Judging by some of Putin’s statements, he is confident that Russia has a temporary technological advantage in some types of weapons, and that the West knows it.
3/13 Secondly, modern Russia is not the Soviet Union, and as for now did not lose anything to anyone. bit.ly/3gkhMLT
1/8 THREAD While an English version of my latest piece about Russia-Ukraine-the West is getting ready, here are several points from there. The Russian version was published here carnegie.ru/commentary/862…
2/8 The many months of speculation of an imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine are in sharp contrast to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s usual method of a swift, covert, and unexpected special operation.
3/8 It looks, therefore, as though Russia wanted to use Western fears over Ukraine’s security to achieve its broader aims.
1/4 In trying to understand who the organized, hardened young people are who took part in protests, rioting & takeover of buildings, we’re forgetting about the unofficial security services well known in the 1990-s in Russia itself: those who enforce order in giant markets.
2/4 These are organized crews of tough guys. They collect tribute payments from traders & deliver them to their beneficiaries. They block access to outsiders, protect traders from rival crews & resolve issues. They are the partners, rivals, & enemies of official security services
3/4 The markets in Almaty and other Kazakh cities are enormous and important places. The country is a trading hub for Russia, Europe, and China. A lot of the goods that pass through these markets are contraband.