1/4 In trying to understand who the organized, hardened young people are who took part in protests, rioting & takeover of buildings, we’re forgetting about the unofficial security services well known in the 1990-s in Russia itself: those who enforce order in giant markets.
2/4 These are organized crews of tough guys. They collect tribute payments from traders & deliver them to their beneficiaries. They block access to outsiders, protect traders from rival crews & resolve issues. They are the partners, rivals, & enemies of official security services
3/4 The markets in Almaty and other Kazakh cities are enormous and important places. The country is a trading hub for Russia, Europe, and China. A lot of the goods that pass through these markets are contraband.
4/4 Now if we imagine that the real owners—the beneficiaries of these markets—are high-ranking officials or their relatives (like Nazarbayev relatives in Almaty), the merging of social protests with the politics and these informal detachments does not seem so surprising.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
THREAD 1/6 Karim #Masimov, the head of the main security service in #Kazakhstan and a close ally of former president #Nazarbayev, has not just been fired, but arrested too. Masimov was largely seen as Nazarbayev’s main overseer in the team of his successor, President #Tokayev.
2/6 It looks increasingly likely that Masimov & his men will be accused of inciting—or even organizing—riots, & that along with a government crackdown on protesters, an internal coup is underway, liberating Tokayev from the guardianship of Nazarbayev, his family & associates.
3/6 The model of power transition used in Kazakhstan—appointing a successor while retaining enormous influence—was always under consideration in the Kremlin as an option for how Vladimir Putin could hand over the reins when the time comes. Now it has failed before Putin’s eyes.
1/4 When thinking why the decision to send Russian (CSTO) troops has been sent so fast to Kazakhstan we should remember, beyond the obvious political reasons, a blunt security fact. Russia has 7600 kilometers (4722 miles) long land border with Kazakhstan.
2/4 This is under strict control only on the roads. Russia just fears a collapsed state across this uncontrollable border when people in Kazakhstan seize weapons and law and order is falling apart.
3/4 That’s why when choosing between acting now and facing the complications in the future they have chosen the first option. Not the main reason, but one that speeded up the action.
THREAD 1/13 Just as Russia seemed to be poised to invade Ukraine, protests broke out all over #Kazakhstan, so the Kremlin needs to divide attention between the two and manage strategic instability on two fronts.
2/13 Looks like Ukraine and NATO are no longer the only main focus of the future Russia-US talks, there is a new hot-button issue for negotiations with Biden, plus it’s harder for Putin to make a concerted effort on his key diplomatic front.
3/13 3/ If you have great power ambitions, please show what you can do on several fronts. Many others failed to that. Kazakhstan will test Russia’s actual capabilities. It will be both distracting and sobering.
1/7 The Russian authorities do acknowledge some victims of past repression… The real issue is the rivalry over memory, which the Kremlin would like to monopolize.
My piece about trial of the Memorial foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/20/rus…
2/7 Memorial’s problem is not that commemorating these crimes is taboo, but that it is competing with the Kremlin in an area of history that the Kremlin considers its own. Even Putin has written several articles about this part of Soviet history. bit.ly/33NhzOu
3/7 And while Memorial exposes the perpetrators, today’s Russian state prefers silence, lest ordinary people think the Soviet security services’ successor agencies are capable of similar injustices. bit.ly/33NhzOu
THREAD 1/15 #Russia’s Foreign Ministry has taken the unusual step of publicly releasing a draft treaty it has sent to #Washington outlining its demands for deescalating tensions, including over Ukraine. The ministry says it wants to begin negotiations without delay.
2/15 The agreement outlines the concessions to be made by Washington, but does not indicate what concessions Russia is prepared to make. Yet the difference between diplomacy and a military victory is that in diplomacy, everyone makes concessions.
3/15 With rare exceptions, diplomacy is not a rushed affair. If tight deadlines are issued, it means one side wants to take action; if tough conditions are laid down — even more so. Or it means that one side is certain that the other has no other options.
1/16 THREAD: The goal of #Putin at today’s virtual summit with #Biden on #Ukraine is to transfer responsibility for implementing the Minsk agreements from the Europeans and Ukraine to the US.
2/16 To make Biden accept this responsibility, military drills are taking place close to Ukraine’s borders, and Russian troops are massing there enough to launch an offensive. The signal is clear: if the Minsk agreements aren’t being implemented, the alternative is military force
3/16 Peskov’s comments that the Normandy format for talks (Ukraine, Russia, France & Germany) is sufficient & doesn’t require a US presence actually mean Moscow doesn’t see the need for Europe in any serious conversation on Ukraine, & would like to deal directly with Washington.