Share this page!

Dr Phil Weir Profile picture
Twitter logo
Mar 8 • 33 tweets • 16 min read
1) An excellent #thread🧵 by @WarintheFuture on the oft neglected southern front in the #UkraineWar & its importance, covering many aspects ashore, so here's a little additional #thread🧵 looking into some of the naval & maritime aspects that hopefully further enrich the picture.
2) As @WarintheFuture points out Ukraine's maritime south is economically vital to the country, handling 60% of its exports & 50% of its imports while containing a number of very large & important industrial centres, not least its 3rd largest city - Odesa.
3) So what has happened to this vital, maritime trade since the start of the #UkraineWar? Well, put bluntly - as @MarineTraffic demonstrates here - it has stopped. Nothing is coming out to help Ukraine's economy, & nothing is coming in to aid the fight.
4) This is perhaps unsurprising. @NATO_MARCOM has a rather useful warning page for mariners on its website listing many of the hazards
5) Meanwhile, marine insurers are also acutely aware of the riska & acting accordingly.
6) After all, there have already been vessel seizures by the Russian Navy near Odesa. navyrecognition.com/index.php/nava…
7) Missile (or possibly bomb) strikes on at least one of the neutral vessels still trapped in Ukraine's harbours.
8) Plus, of course, the recent loss to what is likley to have been a Ukrainian mine off Odesa (more on that later) of the Estonian cargo ship Helt. bbc.co.uk/news/world-eur…
9) In short, it needs to be borne in mind Russia does not have to capture Odesa to cause Ukraine a major strategic & logistical problem. Its command of the Black Sea is already denying Ukraine use of that & indeed any other port.
10) To briefly digress, this was, in no small part, the reason behind the now famous action at Snake Island in the early days of the war - the island sits in the approaches to the port of Odesa... bbc.co.uk/news/world-eur…
11) However, for all the improvements to its other armed services the Ukrainian Navy remains in no position to dispute this. Already small, it lost 75% of its strength through seizures, defections & the loss of its main base when Russia took Crimea in 2014 theguardian.com/world/2014/mar…
12) The difference is perhaps well illustrated by the respective fleet flagships - Russia's big, 11,000 ton missile cruiser Moskva (the rest of the fleet is listed below) & Ukraine's sole, large warship, the 3,500 ton frigate Hetman Sahaidachny.
13) This level of overmatch makes it rather tricky for the Ukrainian Navy to operate. Indeed, the Hetman Sahaidachny was apparently scuttled around 27th Feb amid reports of Russian tanks approaching Mykolaiv (seemingly not for use as a gun battery though).
14) The question now, therefore, is what next? Can Russia use this immense naval superiority to affect the situation ashore even more radically? After all, they may need to, as the situation in the Sea of Azov is affecting their own shipping.
15) Inevitably at this point, most thoughts turn to the possibility of an amphibious landing, & there have already been reports of a small one occurring in the Sea of Azov (though this remains unconfirmed & reports of numbers seem at odds with the shipping)
16) With Russia's main amphibious force out to the west, the big rumour of course, is of a potential landing to take Odesa itself, & as @WarintheFuture suggests, these #threads🧵 from @CovertShores provide a solid primer as to the whats & the wheres.
17) However, it must be borne in mind the Russian Black Sea Fleet only has the capacity to deliver a brigade ashore. With the Russian Army still some 300 miles from Odesa, a single brigade cannot take Ukraine's 3rd largest city & hold it until relieved.
18) Therefore (unless Russian Naval Infantry has decided to follow the example of Airborne & ignore everything they know), *if* there is a landing - & it remains a big if - it's more likley to be in support of a land-based offensive, & probably only a few hours away from relief.
19) Ukraine's naval weakness means its ability to hold this amphibious force at a distance if extremely limited. Indeed, Russian warships have repeatedly been approaching to within sight of the coast.
20) The key issue, of course, is sheer size disparity between the two navies & it is unclear the degree to which Russia has been able to destroy the remainder, but it must be said, Ukraine's naval rearmament has suffered from decidedly unfortunate timing.
21) Just last year, aboard @HMSDefender, Ukraine signed a major naval partnership with Britain looking to renew its navy with fast attach craft, Sea Spear (maritime Brimstone) missiles & perhaps even a new frigate, none of which, of course has arrived.
22) Likewise, Ukraine's new R-360 “Neptun”, shore-based anti-ship missiles are in decidedly short supply (& is almost certainly an extremely high priority target).
23) Ukraine's maritime flank is unlikley to be entirely undefended, however, as they appear to have intelligently deployed, in notable secrecy (certainly early on & possibly hidden in amongst that mass exodus of shipping tracked by @MarineTraffic) the venerable, naval mine.
24) Mines are, of course, generally highly classified, not to mention considered somewhat dull, so there is little public information on what Ukraine might have, but given the situation it is almost certain any mines near Odesa are going to be Ukrainian.
25) Russia does, of course, have a group of mine hunters with the Black Sea Fleet (the 150th Minesweeping Force), however, these operations are time consuming & of course, dangerous - not only from the mines themselves, but also from fire from ashore.
26) Lacking specialist weapons for the job, it looks like Ukraine has resorted to deploying unguided Grad Multiple Launch Rocket Systems for the task, which, while inadequate to tackle anything fast, might just be enough to disrupt slow mine hunting.
27) Just to clarify, Vasily Bykov is a patrol boat, not a mine hunter, but assuming it was indeed her, it may have been a scouting mission for the 150th, & in order to be hit by a Grad she would have had to have been either stationary, or moving slowly, much like a minesweeper.
28) This is, of course, all before getting to the defenders ashore. In short, therefore, despite their near supremacy at sea, executing a successful amphbious landing will be a formidably tough job for the Russian Navy, but it's by no means absolutely out of the question.
29) On the other hand, of course, they may not necessarily need to. It is by no means impossible that the threat will simply remain, drawing off & pinning personnel & crucial artillery pieces to coastal defence, while the main Russian force continues to roll up the southern coast
30) If that were to happen we are also likely to see more scenes like this as Ukrainian forces tryo to deny port facilities to the Russians
31) Because, as @WarintheFuture suggests, capturing the southern coast of Ukraine opens up a raft of strategic possibilities for Russia, particularly if the port facilties are captured intact or can be opened quickly, potentially easing supply routes.
32) Not least, incidentally, also via Ukraine's extensive, internal waterways, which the Russian Black Sea Fleet, in possession of a number of fast, shallow draft vessels, might also begin to exploit. jpost.com/international/…
33) To conclude, therefore, while the fight for Kiev in the north & the fate of Ukraine's government seems to remain the political & therefore military heart of the #UkraineWar events in the maritime south are of vital importance to both the country's immediate & long term future

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
　

Keep Current with Dr Phil Weir

Dr Phil Weir Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @navalhistorian

Dr Phil Weir Profile picture
Mar 6
1) Okay, since there seems to be something of an interest Russian military logistics at the moment, to the usual lack of public demand, a little #thread🧵 on why Russia's naval logistics, particularly in the Mediterranean, have always been a critical time limit on the #UkraineWar
2) An absolutely critical part of Russia's military buildup to its current #UkraineWar was & remains a series of very visible signals, from the High North to the Pacific, to @NATO & others, to not interfere.
3) The most visible of these tended to be at sea most notably with the massive reinforcement of the Mediterranean with two Slava Class cruisers - the Pacific Fleet's flagship Varyag & the Northern Fleet's flagship Marshal Ustinov. It is also by far the most logistically exposed.
Read 15 tweets
Dr Phil Weir Profile picture
Mar 5
I must confess, I've been wondering for a while how sustainable Russia's significantly reinforced fleet in the Mediterranean was going to be (niche, I know🙄). The scrapping of the 2015 access agreement with Cyprus would certainly make it harder... knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/cyprus…
This logistical limitation, along with the creation of a defensive bastion for the base itself, may well be one of the reasons behind the concentration of the fleet around the Syrian base at Tartus, rather than following @French_CSG & @USSHARRYSTRUMAN
Interestingly (& entirely coincidentally it must be emphasised!) @French_CSG ran an exercise last year practising operations against just such an overseas naval base at Djibouti
Read 4 tweets
Dr Phil Weir Profile picture
Dec 11, 2021
1) Okay, an interesting proposal that obviously one has to caveat with the obligatory point that the @RoyalNavy & @RoyalMarines particularly, have, in fact, been training annually in the Arctic for years.*
*Okay, one doesn't actually *have* to, but I'm going to do it anyway😂
2) However, it's not just the @RoyalNavy & @RoyalMarines who can & do operate there, indeed the @RoyalAirForce is already busy lifting & shifting @BritishArmy @ArmyAirCorps Apache gunships (among much else), to Norway for the annual Exercise Clockwork 2022.
3) While, earlier this year, the @RoyalAirForce were testing new tactical refuelling capabilities to enable rapid deployment of Typhoon strike fighters to Norway.
Read 12 tweets
Dr Phil Weir Profile picture
Aug 20, 2021
@Phillip_Blond @RoryStewartUK @PatPorter76 Okay, if I may have a go at breaking down @RoryStewartUK's account in the piece there:
1) He is absolutely correct in his assertion that the rapid departure of US air power and technical support has had a catastrophic effect. I don't think anybody sensible is questioning that.
@Phillip_Blond @RoryStewartUK @PatPorter76 2) Likewise I don't think anybody would particularly quibble with the fact that this was a comparatively small commitment with few (as @PatPorter76 correctly points out, injuries do still count) casualties, & under little domestic political pressure *at current levels* (& this...
@Phillip_Blond @RoryStewartUK @PatPorter76 bit is critical).
3) The point at which his account runs into a fatal problem is the following, & that is that the war is considerably wider than the West's current military commitment. He correctly asks "who exactly, who is President Biden asking to fight?" & then unfortunately
Read 16 tweets
Dr Phil Weir Profile picture
Mar 21, 2021
A point from the Integrated Review that seems to have attracted little attention, but *might* be one of the most interesting moves of all is the "strategic hubs", which will be key to being "persistently engaged worldwide through forward deployment" (p. 73)gov.uk/government/pub…
For any talk of agility/mobility/etc., these hubs & whatever they comprise will form the "foundations" - the geography of any overseas strategy. Some of these hubs appear, in some respects, obvious & are based on pre-existing facilities.
For example, although the bulk of British forces left Germany in February 2020, the remnants at @BritishArmyDEU would seem a solid place to start with what is likely to be a predominantly land-based, continued commitment to @NATO & the defence of continental Europe.
Read 15 tweets
Dr Phil Weir Profile picture
Mar 21, 2021
With the announcement in this @BBCNews piece by @bealejonathan, that the @RoyalNavy is to receive a new "Multi Role Ocean Surveillance ship", to be in service by 20204, it's perhaps time for a little speculative #thread🧵(apologies, as always in advance😉) bbc.co.uk/news/uk-564726…
1st up, this isn't the first we've heard of something like this. Elements of the @RoyalNavy's survey squadron are approaching replacement point, most particularly @HMSScottRN which is currently scheduled to go in 2022, but @HMS_Echo & @HMSEnterprise are similarly due around 2028
The form & purpose of this new vessel would appear to be different, however, with a new emphasis on undersea cables. This isn't actually the 1st we've heard of this either as @AdmTonyRadakin raised it at Christmas (4.06 H/T this & much else to @NavyLookout)
Read 15 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!

This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

Like this author's thread?

Get emails when @navalhistorian has new unrolls!

Check out other threads from @navalhistorian!

Read all threads by @navalhistorian

:(