The war in #Ukraine has severed all meaningful U.S.-#Russia diplomatic contact, & the same for #Europe.
#Moscow is more likely than ever to veto cross-border aid at the UNSC in July & #Syria's wheat supplies are lower than ever -- a famine in 2022 is now very much on the cards.
Amid a severing of diplomatic contact w. #Russia (except for #JCPOA talks), x2 officials tell me #Moscow has stopped answering the #Syria deconfliction line -- and x1 U.S. DOD official confirmed #Russia has resumed "unsafe and unprofessional" actions around U.S. forces in the NE.
"#Assad has survived — but he stands atop the ruins of a state," & #Russia's war in #Ukraine looks set to make him "acutely vulnerable."
#Syria's 2022 wheat crop is expected to be 25% of its average; #Russia supplies are off; the SYP is spiraling & even the @WFP can't help.
@WFP To adapt, a "freeze & build" strategy would "pivot away from tactical emergency assistance & toward strategic stabilization and targeted rebuilding across areas of northern #Syria not controlled by #Assad’s regime."
Hard yes, but not impossible.
Status quo = guaranteed failure.
@WFP A "freeze & build" strategy would require north-wide sanctions waivers, close coordination w. #Turkey & a bold shift in mentality -- less tents, blankets & food baskets and more semi-permanent housing, investment for small business/agriculture & sustainable resources like solar."
@WFP "A “freeze and build” strategy would not be a policy of partition & it would not consider UNSCR 2254 dead or weaken international commitment to it. In fact, it would strengthen international resolve & increase leverage to pursue UNSCR 2254’s goals" -- when conditions to so arise.
@WFP With conflict lines already frozen & diplomacy all but dead [for now], the time has come for the US & allies to build credible alternative/s across northern #Syria - to do good for millions of civilians in need & to enhance credibility & leverage over a vulnerable #Assad/#Russia.
@WFP There's *a lot* to unpack, in terms of #Ukraine's impact on #Syria & the opportunities it gives for a strategic pivot to a more meaningful & sustainable policy.
Current policy was unlikely to work before, but it's guaranteed to fail now -- time to adapt:
2 weeks before #Assad fell, I wrote that the US mustn't leave #Syria, as the D-#ISIS mission is far from over & the practical cost of staying is wholly affordable.
It's still *vital* we stay, but conditions have changed -- a 🧵:
In 2024, #ISIS has *tripled* its operational tempo in #Syria compared to 2023, while expanding its geographic reach, increasing recruitment & attack scale & sophistication.
The fall of #Assad has made the U.S operating environment *much* more complicated -- with our #SDF partners facing a potentially existential challenge from #Turkey, the #SNA & the surge in revolutionary sentiment across #Syria.
Seeing #Assad's former cabinet meeting with #HTS's Salvation Government in #Damascus is truly a staggering thing.
For many years, Syrians aligned with the state risked being disappeared merely for exchanging messages with opposition-aligned people. A 🧵:
In years past, I was involved in a large-scale effort to bring Syrians together from across the crisis spectrum -- for days-long meetings abroad, in neutral venues. Getting people from #Assad-held areas was an enormous logistical & security challenge (for them).
To extend an invite would normally mean first meeting in a neighboring country -- exchanging phone messages or emails whilst in #Syria was a potentially life-threatening thing. Travel would need a cover: a vacation, business meeting, or a family visit.
Over the past week, almost all attention on #Syria has been directed at the #HTS/opposition vs. #Assad dynamic -- and the change of power in #Damascus.
Meanwhile, the #SDF in northeast #Syria has been dealt a tough hand of cards -- a 🧵:
As the anti-#Assad advance gained steam in western #Syria, the Arab tribal component of the #SDF sought to take the fight to #Assad in the east. That happened in Deir ez Zour, but it was hard at times, and complex. It frayed some Arab-YPG ties.
The #SDF also found itself assuming control of resource-intensive areas in #Hasakeh & #Raqqa abandoned by #Assad -- good in theory, but it stretched resources while the #Turkey-backed #SNA launched offensive moves into Tel Rifat & then #Manbij.
#HTS's tip-of-the-spear advance across #Syria has presented international actors with a huge legal/policy dilemma -- a 🧵
After 2 days of #Syria diplomatic talks, it's clear most are considering the likelihood that designations may need re-considering.
For several years, the U.S. & Europeans have been aware of #HTS's ideological & behavioral change in #Idlib, and the Salvation Govt too -- but the lack of investment in serious #Syria policy meant there was little need to do more than acknowledge & monitor.
On a simple level: #Jolani has a $10 million reward on his head, but he's spent years operating in the open, with no concern for his safety. US drones continued to operate, meanwhile.
If his designation (& #HTS's) were still rock-solid, he'd be dead by now.
NEW -- since the fall of #Hama yesterday, #Syria is witnessing extraordinary developments.
#Assad's future now looks VERY much in question. A 🧵:
Opposition forces are now at the gates of #Homs, preparing to launch a major push into the city. Elite frontline fighters (incl. from #HTS's Asaib al-Hamra) are prepped on four axes, while #Assad's regime has evacuated its #Homs leadership to #Damascus.
Insurgent factions & former opposition groups in #Daraa have declared their intent to liberate the province from #Assad's regime.
The primary crossing with #Jordan, Nassib, has been captured -- expelling the 4th Division north towards #Damascus.
Having worked on #Syria full-time since the crisis began nearly 14yrs ago, there really is no understating how remarkable the losses imposed on #Assad's regime have been over the past week.
A large reason for this lies with #HTS — a 🧵:
Militarily, #HTS has invested enormously since 2020 in enhancing combat capabilities, improving professionalism, tightening its structure & command/control etc.
From an 'officer' class, to special forces, night-time units & an entire drone force - it's changed the game.
The expansion of units like Asaib al-Hamra & introduction of Saraya al-Harari and Kataib Shaheen -- along with large-scale indigenous rocket & missile production -- has created a force that #Assad's regime has seriously struggled to defend against, let alone outmaneuver.