While a P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft of @Forsvaret_no tracks the Russian Navy Northern Fleet, including the big, nuclear-powered battlecruiser Peter the Great, as it deploys to intercept & observe #ColdResponse22
The @RoyalNavy is also busy on the other side of the Scandinavian Peninsula, incidentally, with Type 23 frigate @HMS_Richmond back operating in the Baltic Sea with @forsvaretdk frigate HDMS Niels Juel
1) An excellent #thread🧵 by @WarintheFuture on the oft neglected southern front in the #UkraineWar & its importance, covering many aspects ashore, so here's a little additional #thread🧵 looking into some of the naval & maritime aspects that hopefully further enrich the picture.
2) As @WarintheFuture points out Ukraine's maritime south is economically vital to the country, handling 60% of its exports & 50% of its imports while containing a number of very large & important industrial centres, not least its 3rd largest city - Odesa.
3) So what has happened to this vital, maritime trade since the start of the #UkraineWar? Well, put bluntly - as @MarineTraffic demonstrates here - it has stopped. Nothing is coming out to help Ukraine's economy, & nothing is coming in to aid the fight.
1) Okay, since there seems to be something of an interest Russian military logistics at the moment, to the usual lack of public demand, a little #thread🧵 on why Russia's naval logistics, particularly in the Mediterranean, have always been a critical time limit on the #UkraineWar
2) An absolutely critical part of Russia's military buildup to its current #UkraineWar was & remains a series of very visible signals, from the High North to the Pacific, to @NATO & others, to not interfere.
3) The most visible of these tended to be at sea most notably with the massive reinforcement of the Mediterranean with two Slava Class cruisers - the Pacific Fleet's flagship Varyag & the Northern Fleet's flagship Marshal Ustinov. It is also by far the most logistically exposed.
I must confess, I've been wondering for a while how sustainable Russia's significantly reinforced fleet in the Mediterranean was going to be (niche, I know🙄). The scrapping of the 2015 access agreement with Cyprus would certainly make it harder... knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/cyprus…
This logistical limitation, along with the creation of a defensive bastion for the base itself, may well be one of the reasons behind the concentration of the fleet around the Syrian base at Tartus, rather than following @French_CSG & @USSHARRYSTRUMAN
Interestingly (& entirely coincidentally it must be emphasised!) @French_CSG ran an exercise last year practising operations against just such an overseas naval base at Djibouti
1) Okay, an interesting proposal that obviously one has to caveat with the obligatory point that the @RoyalNavy & @RoyalMarines particularly, have, in fact, been training annually in the Arctic for years.*
*Okay, one doesn't actually *have* to, but I'm going to do it anyway😂
2) However, it's not just the @RoyalNavy & @RoyalMarines who can & do operate there, indeed the @RoyalAirForce is already busy lifting & shifting @BritishArmy@ArmyAirCorps Apache gunships (among much else), to Norway for the annual Exercise Clockwork 2022.
3) While, earlier this year, the @RoyalAirForce were testing new tactical refuelling capabilities to enable rapid deployment of Typhoon strike fighters to Norway.
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 Okay, if I may have a go at breaking down @RoryStewartUK's account in the piece there: 1) He is absolutely correct in his assertion that the rapid departure of US air power and technical support has had a catastrophic effect. I don't think anybody sensible is questioning that.
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 2) Likewise I don't think anybody would particularly quibble with the fact that this was a comparatively small commitment with few (as @PatPorter76 correctly points out, injuries do still count) casualties, & under little domestic political pressure *at current levels* (& this...
@Phillip_Blond@RoryStewartUK@PatPorter76 bit is critical). 3) The point at which his account runs into a fatal problem is the following, & that is that the war is considerably wider than the West's current military commitment. He correctly asks "who exactly, who is President Biden asking to fight?" & then unfortunately
A point from the Integrated Review that seems to have attracted little attention, but *might* be one of the most interesting moves of all is the "strategic hubs", which will be key to being "persistently engaged worldwide through forward deployment" (p. 73)gov.uk/government/pub…
For any talk of agility/mobility/etc., these hubs & whatever they comprise will form the "foundations" - the geography of any overseas strategy. Some of these hubs appear, in some respects, obvious & are based on pre-existing facilities.
For example, although the bulk of British forces left Germany in February 2020, the remnants at @BritishArmyDEU would seem a solid place to start with what is likely to be a predominantly land-based, continued commitment to @NATO & the defence of continental Europe.