Week 4 of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine what culmination (current or pending) of Russian forces in Ukraine means. 1/25 (Image - @IAPonomarenko) 
2/25 As always, a shout out to those reporting on the Russian invasion. This includes @KofmanMichael @maxseddon @IAPonomarenko @RALee85 @shashj @DanLamothe @ikhurshudyan @IanPannell @ChristopherJM @KyivPost among others. Please follow them.
3/25 Back on 15 March, I wrote that “The Russian campaign, if it has not already, is about to culminate.” In the past 48 hours, there has been a growing consensus that this has either occurred or may occur soon.
4/25 US doctrine defines culmination as “the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause.”
5/25 But this is not the end of the war, just a pause. Think November 1914, not November 1918 if you want to use WW1 as an example. The waste of human life at the Somme and Verdun all came well after 1914.
6/25 Without any substantive breakthroughs in peace negotiations, the war may enter a new phase. Therefore, what does the proposition that the Russians have culminated mean for Russia, Ukraine and the west?
7/25 First, what might it mean for how Russia may rethink their strategic objectives and how they fight the war?
8/25 As I have recently written in @smh, it might force Putin to reset his objectives for Ukraine. At a minimum, he will be gathering his small circle of advisors to ascertain what might be achieved after a pause, and what resources would be required. smh.com.au/national/putin…
9/25 Noting the commitment of over half of Russia’s ground forces so far, this new ‘theory of victory’ may include some form of national mobilisation of personnel and industry. They may also ‘shut down’ one of their fronts in the east or south to reinforce the north.
10/25 This would allow them to fix their collapsing tactical and operational logistics system. When picking which part of the Russian military has performed worst in the last month, the Army, the Air Force and the logistic services are all in a close race!
11/25 An operational pause might also give Putin time to build a domestic constituency for the war. He did not do so before the war. While this would now be a very big task, it is not inconceivable that he could build support for the war among a larger proportion of Russia.
12/25 Russia may choose a strategy of attrition. While this broadly works in Russia’s favour, it is worth noting that it is fighting alone in a tightening sanction framework. The US & other nations are pouring weapons & resources into Ukraine & can do so for a long time to come.
13/25 However, many nations facing worse odds have continued fighting long after it made sense to do so. Just because we think that the resources of the West totally outweigh those available to Russia, it doesn’t mean that this logic is compelling to Putin.
14/25 Russian forces might therefore settle in for long term sieges of Ukrainian cities (think Sarajevo), without ground assaults to capture them. This would be ‘attrition from afar’ for Russian forces.
15/25 This might force the Ukrainians onto the offensive against prepared Russian defences. It would require a change of strategy and tactics from the Ukrainians. They have done very well on the defensive so far – how would they perform on the offensive?
16/25 What if Russia does not choose long-term attrition? They may decide to escalate the war, including attacks beyond Ukraine’s borders on the bases that are supplying Ukraine’s defenders. Or it might target border crossing locations where weapons enter Ukraine.
17/25 What other options does it have? It might seek a breakthrough with a weapon of mass destruction to destroy a portion of the Ukrainian government and military, or to shock it into submission.
18/25 Russia has a range of weapons it could use in this scenario. This includes tactical nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, massive drone swarms, destructive cyber-attacks, chemical or biological weapons or EMP weapons. Or a combination of the above.
19/25 The point is that although Russia has been out fought and out thought by the Ukrainians, this only makes them – and Putin – more dangerous. This argument is well made here by @KoriSchake: washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/0…
20/25 What might a Russian pause mean for Ukraine? It provides breathing space for reorganising its defences, training new recruits & getting its people out of threatened cities. It also allows time for the Ukrainian government and military rethink their strategy.
21/25 It also allows for a build-up of supplies (lethal and non-lethal) by the military for the next series of Russian offensives (they will come) as well as for the Government to stockpile food, fuel and other necessities to keep their society functioning.
22/25 Finally, a Russian operational pause would provide time for President Zelensky to rest, think and consult more widely about war termination, and what kinds of agreements would be acceptable with Russia. Wars only end through political agreements.
23/25 What does it mean for the other nations? It provides time for sanctions to work against Russia. It gives NATO the opportunity to explore a wider range of weapons and supplies to provide to the Ukrainians.
24/25 Finally, any break in the fighting would allow non-government organisations time to expand support to displaced Ukrainians, and potentially, enter besieged cities to provide aid. It would also permit 3rd parties to explore options for peace negotiations. Image: @ICRC
25/25 Any culmination or pause in Russia's Ukraine operations is not cause for celebration. Russia will not give up its aspirations that easily, despite military failures and external pressure. Indeed, the most dangerous phase of the war may be ahead. End.
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