Au contraire, as Finland has built the armed forces around conscripts and reservists, the politicians need to be honest with the fact that if we see a large war where #NATO rush to defend a member, we don't have a second defence force for the defence of others. #turpo=#säkpol
Of course, for situations where Finland's contribution is limited in size and scope, the idea argued by @charlyjsp of having a dedicated high-readiness battalion-sized unit of volunteer reservists on standby is a nice fit, and that answers all situations #NATO has faced so far.
But we still need to be clear that we are preparing for the worst, and in those cases there should be no hesitation among the other members whether Finland will show up or not, just as we expect the full force of the other members to assist our defence if need be.
I am also somewhat surprised about the lack of clear signaling in this case from the political leadership, even if my expectation on *what* the message need to be is different from @charlyjsp. #turpo=#säkpol
"...will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."
*If* Turkey is attacked by Iraq or Iran, and *if* it is deemed necessary to send a large Finnish force over there, it should be obvious that that might include wartime units mobilised from the reserve. Is that a likely scenario? No, but it is a scenario.
If we aren't prepared to sign that paper, perhaps then we shouldn't, but then we are looking really hypocritical if we expect Italian sons and daughters to come here and die for our freedom.
The bottom line is that the common strength of the alliance makes it unlikely that any of our soldiers - volunteers or otherwise - will have to fight (and die) in either a foreign land or at home, but that paradox rests on us being ready to do so if need be.
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With so much happening in #Ukraine, I decided to take on three shorter topics in a blog post, namely the deep #helicopter strike on #Belgorod, whether #Russia can replace their losses, and what to do with the Ukrainian requests for more advanced weaponry. corporalfrisk.com/2022/04/03/a-u…
I could also shortly comment on the mass killings in #Bucha. This should not be a surprise for anyone by now, it isn't an accident, but it is how the Russian Army and the Soviet before that has operated consistently.
...which is found in this paper: iai.it/en/pubblicazio… . Yes, there's a bunch of caveats about it being a few years old and any estimate is bound to have some uncertainty, but if we assume it gives the correct order of magnitude...
Russia has so far, only counting confirmed losses, lost 9.2 % of their T-72B3 versions, 18.4 % of their T-80-fleet, and 4.8 % of their T-90! That's huge! Even if the number of operational tanks are off by 10-30 % that's staggering losses. One in ten modern T-72, one in five T-80!
The interesting things and missing link is the S-300V / SA-12. As @thewarzonewire notes there are *no* NATO-countries operating the system. The only operator making any kind of sense I would argue is Egypt, and that's a long shot. #S300Ven.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-300_mis…
Pic of yesterday's Russian incursion into Swedish air space close to #Gotland where Finnish and Swedish MoD were meeting at time to inspect an exercise. Good news is they aren't flying in tactical formation, but rather bunched up in a more peaceful formation. #FISE#turpo=#säkpol
Bad news is that that is still two Su-24 strike aircraft escorted by two Su-27 fighters knowingly violating the airspace of a sovereign state with the aim of pressuring them to change their foreign policy.
I suggest that we do not give in to international bullying.
*Major* plot twist to the story about Russian aircraft violating Swedish airspace a few weeks back. Reports are out that the two Su-24 carried nuclear weapons. #Su24#NuclearThreat#Russiatv4.se/artikel/6cNV5s…
64 aircraft, weaponry suitable for Finnish scenario, all gate checks passed, budget within framework (including annual costs below set limit of 254 MEUR).
Okay, time for another thread on everyone's favourite topic - the real cost of #F35 and can #Finland afford it in #HXhanke. The reason is that the Norwegian budget and Swiss acquisition costs are out, and they have caused quite a stir. 1/x #turpo=#säkpol
The Swiss number caused quite a stir, including talk about the aircraft having gone up 20% in cost since the decision was made. I don't quite get those figures, but an increase of 17% (5.07 Bn CHF to 5.95 Bn CHF). 2/x vbs.admin.ch/content/vbs-in…
A key detail here is that the exchange rate of USD to CHF has grown somewhat worse for the Swiss since February when the original figures came in, so I get an increase in USD of 13%. Still bad, but not quite on par with the dreaded 20% figure. 3/x