Yesterday, #Russian sources released intel that #Ukraine was planning a large offensive of 32 BTGs (~20k men) in the #Kherson region. UA's supply lines here are much shorter & stronger than in Donbass & RU's air superiority much less. It seems to have started in the last 3 hours.
Being able to push back Russia east across the Dnieper would be a great achievement by UA forces. On the other hand, even making Russia divert forces from the Donbass to hold the line would be helpful to #Ukraine. Since they have so much trouble getting men & supplies to the east
and in fact so many units now that refuse to fight in the east, this tactically would make sense for Ukraine. The only suspicion comes from the announcement yesterday by Russian sources. If it indeed it was a leaked secret, than the Russians have a heads up, but it seems UA
launched the offensive anyways. It may have moved up the timeline and launched today due to the leak yesterday. On the other hand, if rather than a revelation, it was an intentional leak by UA, then the offensive may be a ruse, intended to divert RU forces from the east without
having to commit or endanger much around #Kherson. We will see. In theory, a #Ukrainian push in the region should be possible because the ground is very flat (poor for defense, good for offense), and UA forces here outnumber RU forces by a large factor.
On the other hand, #Kherson is a large city under RU hands for a long while, and it is supplied by rail from Crimea & Donetsk ports as well by rail directly from Russia. The front line has been stable for quite a while and RU forces have had time to dig in. Additionally there are
a couple of rivers that need to be crossed by UA if it advances solely from the west (and not simultaneously from the north as it should). UA has not wielded thus far any field units that can actually maneuver and advance in the open against determined RU resistance.
More so, its best field units are either gone or stuck barely holding the line in the east. Could these newly raised "32 BTGs" be of a quality enough to do so? If so (undoubtedly wielding newly supplied western weapons), that would be quite an achievement. Beyond that even if the
UA forces could advance in the open and seize towns and villages from RU (when it really wants to defend them), it is another story to take a large city such as Kherson in urban combat. We have seen how difficult it has been for RU forces to capture large urban centers.
Ukraine has shown no ability thus far to do that during this war. In Kherson there is a significant amount of pro Russian support, and being supplied by rail (as long as the bridges stand), it would take a massive force to capture it. If he Russians chose to defend it, it would
also entail the destruction of much of the city. Will the western media accuse UA of war crimes in that situation as they do RU (of course not) when UA choses to defend cities? In summary, a large offensive is indeed on its way, with heavy artillery the opening salvo.
Speculation on my part is that UA will not make much of an advance here if any. They may get nearer to Kherson in certain places but will not be able to capture the city. They may however, succeed in their effort to divert RU forces from the east to shore up the front here
The risk they run, is showing that these newly formed and inexperienced formations, despite their numerical superiority, suffer heavily in open assaults or even refuse to (or are incapable of) even perform them. In short, the ability or inability of UA forces to significantly
advance on Kherson will be very telling about the situation going forward in this war. It will in part answer the question, that whether with time and western support, Ukraine is able to raise, train, field and supply field forces able to push the Russian army back.
Even if at first, only in the west, a positive answer to this question would change the known strategic situation (I don't mean what the news media says) very significantly. So we shall see.
Here we have it folks (suggest reading the entire prev thread for context). As I speculated, the #Ukrainian forces, with or without permission, withdrew from the #Svitlodarsk front, with fortifications that had held for 8 years. The city is in #Russian hands. Geolocated here.
This previously overlooked southern salient of #Popasna, rather than the northern one, was discussed earlier in this thread and in deed has fallen much faster, due to its inherent danger (to UA forces) and greater tactical vulnerability. By withdrawing,
the #Ukrainian forces avoided certain encirclement and another mass surrender event. The two important cities, the dam and its power plant however are now in Russian hands. Was the UA withdrawal call correct? Well here is reported collaboration of the UA General Staff:
Speaking of the difficulty of blowing up dams (& bridges on top of them) & whether #Ukraine would cause such flooding & havoc on its own settlements, I guess we have the answer. #Ukrainian forces attempted to blow up the Vuhlehirske dam on the #Luhan / Lugan river. Geolocated blw
Destroying the dam would have caused great damage and likely death in #Svitlodarsk & surrounding settlements. This was done to slow down the Russian advance as the UA front here is collapsing. As we discussed earlier, Svitlodarsk & Myronivksyi were in danger of being cut off.
From the southeast, these cities were protected with entrenchments such as these two facing the RU forces (& these are just what existed before the war). This important front & cities could be taken by RU forces by an advance on their rear to cut the E40
One of the most puzzling reports of the war thus far: For days now we have heard about a #Ukrainian bridgehead east of the river. We keep hearing UA has captured #Zarichne & #Metalivka. Also that they are holding Verkhnia Pysarivka on the way to strategic #Vovchansk.
This is wishful reporting (on their part). There is no bridge and in my view, no bridgehead either.
New Sat images confirm for us, as of May 23 and as I suspected, that there is no bridge anywhere. The bridge at Staryi Saltiv is still down. There is no bridge anywhere near the captured villages in the wide (dammed) part of the river. Neither is there one further north.
Please note that is also possible, that the shelling at #Kitneve is #Russian counterbattery fire, or strikes at command centers/supply hubs. As some of you pointed out, it may be UA held. Additionally a short word about the bridges.
Why haven't the bridges across the #Dnieper been hit? By either side? For example, why doesn't Ukraine hit the bridges at Kherson. Without them, certainly Russian forces could not hold out on the west bank for long. In the same manner, with even greater capabilities to do so, why
doesn't Russia hit the bridges spanning the river across the whole country. While western Ukraine is open to the world - true it is cut off from the Black Sea directly but through its western border with Poland, Romania etc it's wide open by road & rail - eastern Ukraine if
The #Russian counterattack in #Kharkhov aims to cut off Ukrainian troops that advanced too far north and east from the city. It is aiming for the Kharkhov - Staryi Saltiv road (T2014) and to retake a town around Cherkaksi and/or Ruski Tyshky, trapping UA forces north of that all
the way to Lyptsi. The reason this is possible is because there is a dense forest on the west flank of the Kharkhov - Lyptsi road. The troops could be fully or semi trapped because of this as there are no major, even secondary roads through the forest. Whether troop encirclements
Note the Russian shelling so far south of the front line as of yesterday. Two days ago the front was even further north, as Ternova & Rubizhne were captured by Russia in the beginning of this counteroffensive. The front is sparse with units and RU had been tactically withdrawing.
No time for a full update on the northern #Popasna front & salient. However, note that light RU forces, perhaps airborne troops, are advancing along my preferred previously quoted route. After #Popasna's fall, I had indicated that though #Bakhmut is the obvious target, terrain,
fortification and conditions dictated a more creative #Russian advance. The road northwards was open to advance, the key target #Vrubivka, & westwards the attack needed to be on the north side of the entrenchments on the Popasna - Bakhmut road, perhaps along the railway line,
towards Soledar. This is exactly what is developing thus far. Taking my previous image, have added red rectangles to indicate the latest #Russian advances aligning with the preferred routes I had indicated. Since the Russian attempt to cross the Siverskyi Donets is either stalled