1/7 On #defence and #security policy choices in the #IndoPacific :
I recently produced research assessing how 12 nations are aligning, looking at defence spending, arms imports, military exercises, intel sharing, and force presence agreements.
3/7 A statistical analysis on trends in stocks of imported armaments shows most countries with a break (a change) around the year 2014 - this is consistent with threat perceptions towards #China going up around 2012.
4/7 It gets interesting with data on multinational military exercises - since around 2012, military exercises involving U.S. Allies in the region begin to attract new partner nations, and exercise scenarios orient more towards high intensity warfare.
5/7 Similarly with Force Presence Agreements (Status of Forces / Visiting Forces / Reciprocal Access), some interesting developments post 2012, notably involving #Japan - with #Australia and most recently the #UK
6/7 And at the same time, total defence spending in the region hasn't gone through large shifts if measured as a percentage of GDP - that was the initial research puzzle. But pulling in additional indicators helps make sense of the regional picture.
7/7 The paper is published with the journal Defence and Peace Economics and is available Open Access.
1-11
Interesting logic. But UNSCR 1701 of August 2006 (yes, 18 years ago) was never implemented as concerns the obligations on Hezbollah, on the sponsors of Hezbollah, or on the hapless Lebanese government, which doesn't have de facto sovereignty precisely because of Hezbollah.
2-11
After UNSCR 1701 was adopted, it's fair to say that Israel was attacked from southern Lebanon an absurdly large number of times.
Quite the ceasefire implementation. Bravo UNIFIL!
3-11
Here's a list of strikes against Israel from southern Lebanon just in the month of October 2023, which kicked off just after Israel had been attacked by Hamas in the south, of course.
1-10
True, the Third World War started in 2022.
For American colleagues to reflect: historians generally accept that WWII started on 1 September 1939, two years before the U.S. became a belligerent. And that's a European view. One could argue for July 1937 (Japan invades China).
2-10
The fact that very few Western commentators, let alone governments, currently label current events as a World War doesn't mean we're not in one right this minute, at least in the early phases of it.
3-10
The fact that the United States is not at war is certainly nice for the United States, and Biden types can pat themselves on the back for avoiding war. But that hardly means the war isn't already there. Burning, devouring, destroying, more and more.
1-6 Veteran French diplomat G. Araud absolutely nails the Elon Musk problem in just one sentence.
In my experience it's not rare for highly competent people from other walks of life to think they understand matters of state policy - foreign or domestic - but to fail to do so.
2-6 It isn't rare to find people who refuse to understand that such matters need to be studied in their own right and that experienced professionals have a significant edge over them, thanks to their direct experience.
3-6 There is also the opposite phenomenon: there are amateurs who merely follow the news but somehow really get it and have very good judgment.
(But there are also many people who do that who have awful judgment, tbh.)
If you invade a part of Russia, Putin doesn't do anything.
Ukraine has proven it. They're in the Kursk Oblast.
So much for Moscow having "red lines".
I'll go further. I don't believe the concept of "red line" applies especially well to Russian state behaviour.
1-13
The notion of "red lines" is a very American way of thinking. American foreign policy discourse often features that expression. But how often does it appear in the foreign policy discourse of other countries? Has anyone ever checked?
2-13
At a very generic level, of course, both states and individuals have limits beyond which events will lead to a reaction. So it's not a bad concept per se. But making it central to a wide set of strategic considerations is excessive.
1-13
People who know how to think understood very quickly on October 7, at the latest on October 8, that the Hamas attack was from every perspective an act of war that needed to be responded to by going to war against Hamas with the aim of destroying it.
2-13
People who know how to think also remembered that Hamas was the state power and the de facto armed forces of Gaza. Hence, Israel had suffered an armed attack from the de facto country of Gaza.
3-13
People who know how to think knew that, given the political technology of Hamas & company to embed deliberately in built-up areas with civilians, Israel was going to kill a lot of Hamas, and also a lot of civilians. And that it would be partly lawful, but probably...
1-11
Disagree. It is plausible that the Supreme Leader of Iran knew, from 3 Oct. 2023, that something big was going to happen - but not necessarily when.
It is perfectly possible to meet in person and tell top-level people of a plan, and no foreign intel service will find out.
2-11
Another problem with the post is that it somewhat misquotes the Haaretz article: the journalist doesn't claim Tehran didn't know about the attack, he claims Tehran didn't know the specific date.
3-11
Another good reason for believing that Tehran had advance knowledge is that Hamas would have to be insane NOT to tell its chief sponsor of a very major operation ahead, an operation so large that it would logically be tantamount to an act of war.