1. Macron’s presidential coalition (Ensemble!) came out on top and remains the largest parliamentary force in parliament, BUT lost its absolute majority
2. This leaves us with unprecedented degree of fragmentation and division in the National Assembly, with both the left wing coalition and the far right largely over-performing and squeezing the centre.
3. Macron political power as we know is set to change, but
its sense of direction – towards the right or the left – will depend on the government coalition he will be forced to form.
This is no usual exercise in France 🇫🇷
4. Two options open to Macron:
First, to form a coalition : the most natural ally is the French conservative party, but also the left-wing coalition, being already split in different political groups, may become an interlocutor
5. Second, Macron might contemplate dissolving the new national assembly and call for an early election.
This might backfire but it’s the kind of gambles Macron likes
6. Marine Le Pen’s party is now the largest opposition party in parliament, thus becoming part of the political mainstream as demonstrated by fall of French front republican
7. Marine Le Pen already claims the presidency of the Finance Commission, which, as of 2009, has to be assigned to an opposition MP. Expect for more requests to come…
8. 🇪🇺 While Macron remain formally in charge of foreign and EU policy, his EU stance will have to reflect that approx 50% of MPs are eurosceptics (or at least not aligned to his vision)
‼️ The EU Commission paves the way for #Ukraine to gain (conditional) candidate status in record time‼️
Yet that recognition of candidate status may be more symbolic than structural: it may never lead to full membership.
Here’s why 🧵
Today is a moment of truth one for Ukraine, which has invested so much of its political future on a closer relationship with Europe.
There’s political momentum to have #EUCO uniting behind the recognition of candidate status
Despite the lack of a fast track procedure, the EU Commission delivered in record time a positive opinion on 🇺🇦 swift submission to candidate status, in unprecedented conditions (candidate country is at war)
1 If you belong to those who expected #CoFoE to magically deliver a re-opening of the Treaty, you may be disappointed. No majority exists to endorse EP’s demand. That might never materialize. Wait for June #EUCO but it might not be the point project-syndicate.org/commentary/con…
2 If instead you valued #CoFoE as an open-ended (not outcome-bound) process, you may be satisfied. Not only a permanent mechanism of citizen deliberation in EU decision-making is foreseen, but that can be done without treaty change. But there’s more.
2 Originally promised by @vonderleyen in the aftermath of her rocambolesque appointment, the Conference is the first attempt at institutional reform since 2007.
It didn’t look promising in its early days, but the context has changed.
3 Amid lack of clear majority among Member States & disagreements among EU institutions, #CoFoE was postponed to May 9, 2021 by invoking the pandemic as the official excuse for the delay
This turned out to be a bless as led to redesigning it from scratch socialeurope.eu/releasing-euro…
2. We’ve browsed all 178, and classified them into 4 categories:
1. Recs not requiring new action (23)
2. Recs entailing new action by MS (21)
3. Recs entailing new action by EU (113)
4. Recs entailing Treaty change (21) #cofoe
3. Among the 21 recs requiring Treaty Change, they call for transfer of new competences in:
🧵 Over the last 6 months, 800 randomly-selected EU citizens came up with 178 recommendations addressed to EU leaders
How many of them require Treaty change to become a reality?
(Spoiler: just a few)
A 🧵based on empirical work done @VillaVigoni
Credits to students #CoFoE
1. As the end of #CoFoE approaches (May 9), the question arises as to whether/how the EU will/should respond.
What form that response should take?
As we expect that response to be conditioned by the nature of recs proposed, here's a preliminary break out of the 178 recs.
2. We’ve browsed all 178 recs from the 4 Citizens' Panels, and classified them into 4 categories:
1. Recs not requiring new action (23)
2. Recs entailing new action by MS (21)
3. Recs entailing new action by EU (113)
4. Recs entailing Treaty change (21)
Let’s be frank: What Ukraine needs is not full EU membership (unrealistic today), but the prospect of greater access to the EU market, and that beyond the Association Agreement which underperformed.
1. Ukraine's future into the EU should go beyond the narrow opposition:
Full membership vs Association Agreement
Neither of them would do justice to the emergency circumstances characterizing #Ukraine️' s demand nor the country's needs
2. The Association Agreement with the European Union - which originally triggered the Revolution and permanent war since 2014 - never delivered on its commercial promises with the EU benefiting more than Ukraine