We have discussed this salient, and its likely encirclement for a long time. The #Lysychansk salient is now operationally encircled, that is significant resupply and reinforcement is no longer possible. Units may still run the gauntlet & attempt to flee. Reports indicate the oil
refinery is in #Russian hands, and that the Siverskyi Donets river has indeed been been forced with #Pryvilia already in RU hands as #Ukrainian forces withdrew. Nearly 2 months ago we discussed at the fall of Popasna, the clear danger to the salient & the likely Russian routes of
The key junctions & settlements have been clear. This image reposted from the May 8th thread. Vrubivka recently fell, triggering the collapse of the Hirske Zolote section
& now the Lysychansk oil refinery & its road junction is in Russian hands. This will lead to the collapse of the rest of the salient. Borrowing again from the May 8th thread, the Russian advance was along the intelligent (& predictable though not obvious routes). Only the indigo
(dark blueish) route, our least likely from the start, did not progress very significantly. Ae we discussed in that thread, it ran into the teeth of formidable fortifications. Reportedly it was Wagner units that still advanced along its first legs but the T-0513 highway, the
Bakhmut - Siversk road, has not been reached. I note that these were not the obvious routes, once again referencing the May 8th thread (& the DPA map), the most obvious path should not be and was not taken. Once Popasna fell the Ukrainians did succeed in delaying the encirclement
by successfully stopping the Russian attempts at forcing the river from the north. What was meant to be pincers linking up & surrounding the salient, turned into a grinding & much longer push from the south alone. Successful Ukrainian holding of the railways lines around Zolote &
Novoluhanske, Semyhiria & the power plant for a long time prevented Popasna from being properly rail supplied, a requirement if it was going to project enough strength to push all the way north to the Siverskyi Donets. There are worse plans, the UA forces put up a stubborn and
commendable defense. This is especially true of the troops on the ground, who as those familiar with my posts know, in my opinion are often abused if not betrayed by those in higher command & control of the UA armed forces and gov't. The #Russian troops doggedly threw themselves
at these brave men in strong prepared fortifications, and without the critical northern pincer (though it helped as a continued threat), overcame strong odds to finish the long hook from the south. #Ukrainian forces have seen how difficult offensive advance is. They have really
never achieved it in a significant way against strongly defended Russian positions. Even now, the much awaited UA offensive in Kherson, though well supplied, at the end of the long RU supply lines, facing RU positions that are relatively thinly manned, & nowhere near as fortified
nor entrenched as UA #Donbas positions are, have achieved little to no territorial gains. Even on open ground devoid of defensive features and facing RU troops significantly outnumbered. We have seen time and again the defensive power that high ground, forests, dense industrial
areas and well prepared fortifications (not to mention large urban centers) afford the defender & how UA forces have used these intensely to their advantage. Despite this, the RU forces advance. Despite this, the UA forces do not and cannot thus far, even in the flat dry terrain
of the Kherson oblast and the small villages that dot it. Back to the front in question here, what can we expect next? Russia has learned the price of overly narrow fronts of advance by spearheads alone. We can expect for Verkhnomianka at least (if not Verkhnokamianske as well)
to be secured shortly. Zolotarivka will be attacked but if stiffly defended, we may see it bypassed. Bilohorivka will be attacked from several directions. If it falls, the cauldron will be complete & hermetic.
Of course we may see RU troops, in a race against the withdrawing UA
forces to link up forces from the north and south at the T-1302 highway first, and bypass the capture of the well defended Bilohorivka first. In either case, Bilohorivka is likely to be attacked quite soon. It will be then on to Siversk, and much will depend on what kind of
strength UA has been able to impose on the Bakhmut Siversk line. This type of chaotic withdrawals are difficult to stop and terrible for morale, my speculation is that it will not hold for very long. Then the more interesting question will be the Slovyansk - Kramatorsk -
Kostiantynivka line, where I suggested UA troops should withdraw to in an orderly fashion months ago. UA has played for time, rather than for military victories or the lives of its men. It has done that thinking that all it needed was time, for the West to come to its aid and be
its salvation. I believe it has badly misread and misunderstood the West in its current form.
Finally what about the reduction of the cauldron itself? I believe it will hold out longer than the Hirske - Zolote section which collapsed as soon as it was surrounded, but not for
very long either. Though the troops are far more numerous, are in stronger positions including holding a large city (Lysychansk), and include quality units including foreigners & nationalist units (some of which recently withdrew to Lysychansk from Severodonetsk), several factors
point to a fast reduction.
1. Many UA units feel betrayed and/or abandoned within the cauldron. They have seen mass surrenders of their comrades before (even of Azov!), and will be much more likely engage in them as well. We have discussed this earlier at the fall of Azovstal.
2. Lysychansk does not have any massive high density industrial area like Mariupol or even Severodonetsk. It does have smaller industrial areas and a couple of very dense residential areas that could afford efficient defense.
3. The UA forces within the cauldron will not believe
promises from Kiev that anyone is coming to save them, break the siege or evacuate them. The defense of Lysychansk is now held by a myriad of UA armed forces elements. No strong single element, such as the Azov regiment at Mariupol, will hold influence, command & coercive power.
The elements that are there, will have seen too many other units, and too many officers flee outside the cauldron and leave them within it. The Russians are aware of all of these factors and will exploit them. The surrenders will not be long in coming. The question will be if
once again we are told by the "experts" in the western media that they are fake and staged, if the #Ukrainian soldiers are not wearing their ceremonial uniforms upon capture and after months of battle.
As an interesting note to the previous thread, please note that the #Russian footage shows us #Ukrainian troops approaching the river crossing by civilian vehicles. It is possible that #Ukraine thought that this crossing was unknown to Russia for these many weeks (unlikely).
Therefore it resorted to what it believed to be highly covert tactics to keep it unknown. While use of civilian vehicles for this purpose is (perhaps arguably) against the Geneva Conventions, specifically prohibited as an act of Perfidy, & hence war crime; it is something else
as well. Something one would think ought to disturb #Ukraine even more so. This type of behavior clearly endangers civilian lives, specifically those of Ukrainian citizens which the regime at #Kiev claims to care deeply about. While perfidy is an offense against your adversary in
Additional events on this front and the underreported forest fights on the flanks of #Izium, the vital Russian supply hub & gateway south through the Kharkhov oblast forest belt. Video, reportedly from around Zalyman has emerged from #Russian sources. Shows a #Ukrainian pontoon
crossing, a boat & personnel hit by RU forces. Despite the source's claim, I have tentatively geolocated it to an area southeast of Chepil, the UA stronghold in the area. The area is a good crossing point for UA forces for several reasons. Firstly, it is far from the Russian main
forces around Izium. However, though it is not as far as the far flank (where we may expect all the crossings) around Protopopivka & Zahorodnje, it lies in a continuous dense forest extending far to the east & towards Izium, all the way to Ivanivka. This is perfect terrain for UA
Quick update on this front. Thermal activity shows us the #Russian forces continue to press northwards into the refinery and along both its (eastern & western) flanks. We have some large fires breaking out. #Ukrainian resistance is still stiff there (as in most industrial areas
well suited for defense. There is defense from the high grounds in the north around Zolotarivka and we can expect more of it around Bilohorivka. Additionally there are some strong strikes around Pryvillia, yesterday and as recently as 4 hours ago near an existing river crossing.
This may indicate a Russian crossing attempt here or simply the tactical and strategic threat of one to maintain troops in the area pinned down and within the rapidly closing salient. There are plenty of reports however of Ukrainian forces, specifically the best units, fleeing to
Nearly 20 days later we have additional movement on this "speculative" front. Long and difficult artillery battles have finally left the Vesele to Balakilia line secure, across the forest belt south to the Siverskyi Donets river. As we expected, along the rail line there has been
RU expansion of this front westward towards Andriivka. Then a few days ago reports emerged of Russia securing #Nortsivka north of the forest on the western flank of #Izium, which continues to be a place of constant & under-reported battles.
to many only a move to help control the forest area from this base. Apparently however it was the first move in an attempt to encircle the whole forest sector from the west. This is what I speculated could happen though I thought this drive might come from the north around Bairak
Satellite imagery recent as June 27 shows us the intense battles going on around the Lysychansk oil refinery (Verkhnokamyanka) and along the T-1302 highway (the Bakhmut - Lysychansk road). South of the refinery. most of the activity is west of the road, corresponding to the
#Russian momentum and advance westwards and northwards towards the river. There are intense strikes a far as the outskirts of Verkhnokamyanske (on the way to Siversk) & east of Sprine along the ridge. We see indications of Topolivka already overrun & action moving north of it.
Even in Berestove the activity is on its western outskirts, indicating Russia might be gaining control of the town. Though there are rumors and reports of a Russian river crossing from the north, sat imagery still do not show us evidence of it. Several older crossings remain
which surrounded it within the larger encircling operation. This included drama with civilians with the plant as well as foreign fighters. We did not cover it much since many others were and I believe the more critical story is the wider encirclement happening, rather than the
specific capture of Azotal or even all Severodonetsk. The northern, larger and more important, sector of the salient remains. We discussed what we could expect here: