- Consumption: -12.2% yoy;
- RUS pipe imports: -48% yoy (inc. RUS LNG imports -42%);
- Local Production: +0.6% (Groningen could increase EU production by 10% alone within weeks);
- LNG imports: +70%.
- Net storage build: 45bcm!
- ITA, FRA, GER, POL or CZE have done a great job saving gas to fill salt cavities et al "whatever it takes style".
- UK cannot b/c it lacks storage;
- EE struggles to access more flows;
- EU covers 51 of 180 winter days (<2 months).
So it needs flows!
3/n
Put differently, the EU now lost 180bcm (on 470) of annulised RUS gas! Storage 100% filled won't be enough without SAVING gas.
Subj to weather, the EU needs to save up to 20%, some countries more, some less (ESP/PT does not need savings).
Hence, it did not come as a surprise to us that Nord Stream 1 flows have stopped yesterday too (Yamal and Brotherhood - ironic name, isn't it - flows aready ceases to exist). These are the facts, the rest is noise.
8/n
More precisely, we predicted this back in July and explained its potential consequences for the European gas market and its economy at some length in an interview below on Real Vision.
VVP reduced flows by the exact same amout as EU increased LNG (42bcm YTD) and finally cut it to zero. Consequently, the EU will have to import 200bcm of LNG in 2023 to compensate the loss if consumption remains 12% reduced yoy. Can it?
Anyway, we explained what can improve and improving it does.
We identified 150bcm (!) of #LNG regasification terminal or FSRU projects, of which 20bcm are under construction for delivery in Q4 22 or Q1 23 & another 130bcm soon to be started - worldclass!
The European electricity crisis is deepens as it proves hard to save gas.
1) π«π· had to reduce nuclear output further due to high river temp (u can cool the reactor, but cannot let water back into the river to protect wildlife).
Result: Nuclear output (in MWh) collapses.
1/n
As I explained in the past days, π«π· has Europe's 2nd largest grid and was an exporter for as long as we can measure it. Not anymore.
European electricity prices are spiking for all major economies except for Spain. But also Spanish consumers pay 3x more compared with only May 2021.
2/n
In fact, most European power prices are 12-15x higher than they were in 2015. Needless to say, the European industry will go into a deep recession at these prices.
Starting June 2nd, Cu collapsed 29% in less than six weeks. How often did that happen?
Answer: not often! In past 25y Cu crashed only 8x >7% in a single week as in one week this June (stat below) & only 29x >5% (2x per week in June & July 2022).
Big quantamentel signals!
2/n
How is that possible, when global reported inventories (LME; Comex; Shanghai) are below their 10-year average? Aren't commodities priced on inventories?
Chart: Global Cu inventory (reported by exchanges); Source: Bloomberg 3/n
Here is the news that does not yet get the coverage it deserves in the international media, given its relevance for global oil markets: #Russia is currently not shipping #Kazakhstan oil.
Kazakhstan produces 1.8mbpd in 2022 of which 0.4mbpd is consumed domestically.
Up to 1.4mbpd is exported, about 1.2mbpd through Russia via the 1,500km long Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to international markets and given its oil is basically landlocked.
2/n
CPC loads at the "CPC Terminal" in the Black Sea which is usually summarised as part of Novorossiysk exports.
The first shipments left in Oct 2001. Since, it exported 767mt (733kbpd) & was regularly expanded as Kazakhstan brought new fields such as the Kashagan online.
Not a believer in geopolitical coincidence. Take natgas. In 2022, flows reduced exactly by the amount the EU managed to increase LNG imp (24bcm). The better than expected storage fills in the EU may made the Kremlin decide to slow deliveries down by 12bcm (NS1).
Here is the EU storage fill in %. It's on track to be 80% filled by August which would likely reduce some risk premium for the winter of TTF. That is unlikely in the best interest of the Kremlin while the war continues.