Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Sep 9 25 tweets 10 min read
Throughout the Russian invasion of #Ukraine, I have watched and written about Russian #strategy in the war. In this thread, given ongoing Ukrainian offensives, I examine whether Russia has ceded the initiative to Ukraine. 1/25 🧵
2/ Since 24 February, Russian #strategy has evolved continuously. Putin’s Plan A, seven months ago, was for a lightening military operation conducted on multiple fronts to shock the Ukrainian military and government into submission and do it before the west could help.
3/ The plucky, courageous Ukrainians called their bluff and defeated the Russians in the north. And in the northeast. And rallied international support for military, humanitarian and economic support.
4/ Therefore, Putin, Lavrov and their military chiefs cobbled together an alternative theory of victory for #Ukraine. They better prioritised their military operations, and eschewed concurrent, multi-front offensives. They also improved air-land integration.
5/ Russia focussed its combat power on an eastern offensive, led by artillery. They went on the defensive in the south. This was accompanied by missile strikes – as well ‘energy warfare’ against Europe and drawing out the war to test western patience. bbc.com/news/world-eur…
6/ For a while, the Russians also drew Ukraine into a battle of attrition in the east. This was not how #Ukraine wanted to fight. It prefers to fight smart and strategically, using what I have described as a ‘strategy of corrosion’. But it all started to change in July.
7/ In July, introduction of #HIMARS, Russian losses in the east, and tactical realignments of Ukraine’s defensive scheme, allowed Ukraine to extract itself from the attrition battle in the east. Concurrently, the Ukrainians began attacks in #Kherson.
8/ In August I wrote how I thought the initiative was shifting from the Russians to the Ukrainians. The essence of seizing the initiative is gaining a position of advantage relative to an enemy and denying the enemy their objectives. abc.net.au/news/2022-08-0…
9/ Despite the courage of Ukraine’s defenders, Russian Army forces had until then retained the ability to conduct offensive thrusts at a time & place of their choosing.
10/ But the evolving situation on the ground around this time was changing the dynamic between invader and defender. The Ukrainians were almost at the point where they might be able to dictate where the fighting will occur.
11/ This week has seen shifts in Ukrainian momentum. Their campaign for the south has achieved the liberation of several towns, and the taking of ground. Importantly, it may have trapped thousands of Russians west of the Dnipro. thedrive.com/the-war-zone/u…
12/ And in the past day or so, a Ukrainian combined arms offensive in the northeast has seen advances deep into Russian held territory. While ambiguity abounds, the strategic initiative in this war may have shifted to the Ukrainians in the last few days.
13/ After seven months of vicious and desperate fighting, future historians may see this as an important turning point. It means the Ukrainians not only get to fight how & where they want, but their soldiers fight knowing the Russians are on the back foot. president.gov.ua/en/news/zagalo…
14/ Once battlefield momentum is generated, success tends to lead to success – if that momentum can be well shaped and continuously exploited. Clearly, much shaping, good leadership and support is still required. But success on the battlefield can be infectious.
15/ The Russians, while holding the initiative, have largely been unable to generate tactical (or operational) momentum. Bad leadership & support, poor battlefield integration, lack of reinforcements, early tactical defeats – and a bad overall strategy – have denied them this.
16/ For Russia, losing the initiative is another disaster on top of an invasion that that has been catastrophic for the Ukrainian people & corrosive for the Russian military. It is hard to see them regaining the initiative, short of a wholesale mobilisation of their nation.
17/ Now that the Russians may only be able to respond to Ukrainians offensives, morale and tactical effectiveness may very quickly decline. Added to the challenge is the attacks by partisans in the south against Russian soldiers, officials and transport infrastructure.
18/ The Ukrainians are generating an operational tempo that is dislocating Russian plans and forcing them to even more carefully prioritise airpower, logistics and reinforcements. If they maintain this tempo, Ukraine will ensure Russian decisions are made on old, irrelevant info.
19/ Given their current operations, and the political statements from President Zelensky, the seizure of Crimea is definitely in play. While this may or may not be a 2022 objective, the Russians must now plan as if it is one of Ukraine’s objectives before ‘war termination’.
20/ Military forces under pressure – especially those that are isolated or surrounded like those west of the Dnipro - can collapse catastrophically in the absence of excellent leadership. And, Russian military leadership in this war has not been a model for others to emulate.
21/ The combination of pressure on multiple fronts, limitations on reinforcements, the Ukrainian advantage of interior lines, western support, and clever tactics and leadership means the Russians are now under significant psychological pressure at all levels.
22/ With Russian battlefield and operational failures, challenges in manpower, and shortfalls in munitions and other equipment, as well as Putin’s failing economic and energy coercion, the Russians will be challenged to produce a new ‘theory of victory’.
washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/…
23/ And if images of large numbers of retreating and captured Russian troops emerge in the coming days or weeks, it may be a strategic calamity for President Putin. His narratives about the greatness of Russia, and the effectiveness of its wonder weapons, will lay in ruins.
24/ Ukraine probably now has the initiative as well as tactical and operational momentum going into the winter. The war is far from over, but Ukrainian battlefield success will be a boost to Ukrainian morale, and highlights that the west needs to continue support to Ukraine. End.

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More from @WarintheFuture

Sep 11
The last 48 hours have seen some stunning battlefield developments in #Ukraine. Ukrainian operations in the northeast continue to exploit its penetration of Russian defences. 1/18 🧵 Image
2/ There is much that remains unclear about these offensives. But #Ukraine clearly achieved surprise against the Russians in the #Kharkiv region. Deception has been central to all Ukrainian preparations for this phase of the war. ImageImage
3/ That it was able to exploit this opportunity indicates that Ukraine had an excellent plan to deceive Russian overhead collection assets as well as their tactical reconnaissance and surveillance.
Read 18 tweets
Sep 10
The last 48 hours have seen quite a lot happening in #Ukraine. While the southern offensive continues, the Ukrainian operations around Kharkiv have achieved a significant penetration of Russian defences on the Kupiansk-Izium axis. What might this mean? 1/25 Image
2/ I would caveat that much remains unclear about these offensives. And, as every military leader knows, first reports can be wrong! But, there is sufficient information - without compromising operational security - to draw initial conclusions about operations around #Kharkiv.
3/ It is clear that the Ukrainians have achieved surprise against the Russians in the #Kharkiv region. The Ukrainians attacked what appears to have been a thinly defended area and have achieved a significant penetration into Russian rear areas. Image
Read 25 tweets
Sep 8
Notwithstanding operational security needs (and possibly some deception) this is a superb example of a strategic assessment from the commander of #Ukraine’s armed forces. 1/10 ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/356…
2/ It is clear, compelling and demonstrates a deep understating of both the art and science of war. It also shows a shrewd appreciation of the information environment and the imperative to exploit it cleverly.
3/ The articulation of probable enemy objectives, using ‘centre of gravity analysis’ is an important statement of the threat capabilities. It also includes worst case planning by not discounting Russian tactical nuclear weapons.
Read 10 tweets
Sep 5
In the past week, the Ukrainian southern campaign has continued to develop. Operational security has been tight (logically), so official word on progress has been minimal. In this thread, I pose open questions about the campaign, knowing we won’t have answers for a while. 1/19 🧵
2/ That said, there is very good coverage from people I respect. Folks like @shashj @MarkHertling @KofmanMichael @RALee85 @PhillipsPOBrien @TheStudyofWar @IAPonomarenko and others provide useful and often complementary strategic perspectives on this campaign, and the broader war.
3/ Others such as @War_Mapper @DefMon3 @Militarylandnet @WarMonitor3 @Nrg8000 @JominiW provide good operational and tactical mapping and insights.
Read 19 tweets
Sep 1
It is impossible for a #military institution to anticipate every eventuality in war. There are too many scenarios to accurately predict pre-war and wartime events. Adaptation is vital, and we have seen it throughout the war in #Ukraine. 1/25 🧵
2/ Because of this, a key virtue for military organizations in war must be a learning culture and an adaptability to unexpected events, as described in my recent @EngelsbergIdeas article. engelsbergideas.com/essays/how-ukr…
3/ The exploration of adaptation has resulted in the development of concepts that underpin understanding of how adaptation occurs and how it can be applied. In military literature, the best-known adaptive cycle is Colonel John Boyd’s OODA (observe-orient-decide-act) loop.
Read 25 tweets
Aug 31
The situation with the Ukrainian #offensive in the south remains unclear. That said, we know enough about both sides - and from the history of such operations - to propose a few areas that are likely to determine success or failure in the coming weeks. 1/23 🧵 (Art: Rado Javor)
2/ The political dimensions of this offensive are as important as the military ones. For Zelensky, it is key to his meeting his promise to take back the south but it is also an area that is of great economic importance to #Ukraine.
3/ For Putin, after the failures of #Kyiv and Kharkiv, losing the south would be a significant blow (but probably not fatal to his regime).
Read 24 tweets

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