As is becoming routine for these interventions, Sweden invokes both its "right" to intervene under art 63 of the Statute and the nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (though first to cite Judge Cançado Trindade's sep op in the Whaling case order). 2/
For its personal touch, Sweden invokes itself being a "a keen proponent of a rules-based world order", finding that "it is necessary for it to intervene in this case, in order to place its interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Convention". 3/
On the substance of its intervention, Sweden cites arts I-III, VIII, IX as provisions that it will give its construction (seems to be typo in citing art III as provision defining genocide, rather than art II). 5/
In interpreting the provisions themselves, Sweden starts with art IX. Like others, Sweden addresses the more preliminary question whether art 63 intervention can extend to issues of jurisdiction, emphasising that the Statute and Rules contain nothing to preclude this. 6/
It addresses whether jurisdiction extends to negative declarations and (abusive) actions in applying Convention, answering affirmatively but perhaps in more detail than other interveners to-date, referring to ICJ's jurisprudence and doing a complete art 31(1) #VCLT analysis.7/
Sweden makes an intriguing statement when analysing ordinary meaning of art IX, by way of example. Noting that disputes under art IX can arise when one state alleges another committed genocide, it states that if ICJ "is not satisfied that there were any acts of genocide... 9/
...actually committed by the respondent State, it may decline jurisdiction, even prima facie".
However, in addition to perhaps undermining Ukraine's case, fn suggests conflation of prima facie jurisdiction for provisional measures with jurisdiction for adjudicating merits. 10/
Another point which doesn't seem to have been made before, in attempt to reinforce argument that jurisdiction extends to making "non-action" findings, Sweden refers to ICJ's previous recognition that jurisdiction extends to claims of failing to prevent and punish genocide. 11/
Again going further than the other interveners, Sweden considers Russia's argument in its 7 March communication that its invasion is based on self-defence under art 51 UN Charter and its implications for whether there exists a dispute regarding the Genocide Convention. 12/
Even before answering this question, in a footnote, Sweden alludes to a potential contradiction with Russia's contention, in the form of a speech by Putin annexed to the same communication which speaks of preventing and punishing genocide in Ukraine. 13/
Sweden (correctly) notes that the denial of a dispute does not ipso facto demonstrate its absence.
Going further, in a footnote, Sweden raises the possibility that the conflict of views between the parties on the existence of a dispute could give rise to jurisdiction. 14/
There are issues with the (half-hearted?) argument. First, it is difficult to reconcile with case in previous footnote (π²πvπ¬π§) that dispute must "in principle" exist before Court seised (though strictly speaking that goes to ICJ Statute, not interpretation of Convention). 15/
Second, a dispute over whether there is a dispute is still not a dispute on the interpretation, application or fulfilment of Convention; ie, it does not itself evidence a conflict of views over whether Ukraine committed genocide. 16/
Sweden then discusses issues relating to the merits, and divides between three matters (though third matter essentially reinforces its analysis on the first): the obligation to prevent and punish genocide, the definition of genocide and recourse to UN organs. 17/
Like π±π»π±πΉπ³πΏπ¬π§πΊπΈ (to varying degrees), Sweden does a rundown of the Convention provisions relating to prevention and punishment to frame in more concrete detail how obligation is to be fulfilled. 19/
Where it goes further than others (though referenced by π±π»), Sweden expands on @UN_HRC June 2020 resolution on prevention of genocide and the best practices listed therein. 20/
All this leads to Sweden's conclusion that a state cannot rely on its obligation to prevent genocide if it has not done sufficiently assessed whether genocide is occurring, and its prevention must also be in conformity with aims of UN Charter. 21/
Like π±π»π±πΉπ¬π§, Sweden also briefly considers the obligation to punish genocide, emphasising that punishment of genocide is to have recourse criminal law mechanisms, rather than other coercive methods. 22/
Like π¬π§πΊπΈ, Sweden then somewhat ventures into defining genocide, though primarily underlining ICJ's previous jurisprudence on the subject.
Before concluding Sweden returns to issue of prevention, underlining Convention's preference for collective measures pursuant to art VIII.23/
In conclusion, Sweden's declaration makes for an interesting read. It analyses perspectives which received less attention from other interveners. It makes some interesting arguments, though at times these are perhaps too creative. 24/
However the bottom line of the constructions it offers are quite uncontroversial: the existence of jurisdiction for non-violations, framing how the obligation of prevention and punishment is to be fulfilled and underlining the narrow definition of genocide. 25/25
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In its opening remarks, the #US follows the trend of other states by invoking its right of intervention under art 63, but also underlining the erga omnes partes nature of the Genocide Convention obligations. 2/
For its personal touch, US underlines its involvement in developing the Convention and pointing to its past invocation of art VIII regarding Darfur (recourse to UN organs) and its support [yes, I know] for tribunals prosecuting genocide and other crimes. 3/
Perhaps the most conspicuous part of Germany's declaration is that it seeks solely to give its construction on article IX of the Genocide Convention (the compromissory clause), unlike π±π»π±πΉπ³πΏπ¬π§ which offered interpretations for several provisions and relating to the merits. 2/
Now, by reserving "right to submit further arguments as to the scope ratione materiae" if declaration deemed admissible, Germany would presumably address the interpretation of the Convention's substantive provisions. However, this doesn't really feature in present declaration. 3/
Text of the #UK's declaration of intervention in #Ukraine v #Russia, pursuant to article 63 of the #ICJ Statute, now available on the Court's website: icj-cij.org/public/files/cβ¦
Some observations.πͺ‘ 1/20 (it's the longest declaration yet...)
As preliminary matter, UK is first intervener to refer to ICJ's recent The Gambia v Myanmar judgment, such as in underlining its erga omnes partes legal interest (though tbf, π±π» submitted its declaration the day before judgment and π±πΉ on the day). 2/
UK summarily addresses issue of capacity to intervene on jurisdictional matters, but is seemingly first intervener to consider different scenarios on how case may procedurally progress: either one-stage-case where it will address both issues of jurisdiction and merits... 3/
A few observations on #Latvia's and #Lithuania's respective declarations of intervention in the #ICJ's #Ukraine v #Russia case, under article 63 of the ICJ Statute and on the basis of them being parties to the Genocide Convention. 1/15πͺ‘
While art 63 of the Statute enshrines the right to intervene, art 82 of the ICJ's Rules stipulates the form and content of a declaration to intervene. Art 83 thus compelled the two states to address important issues of procedure and substance which arise in the case. 2/
While the declarations of the two neighbouring states were submitted just a day apart and are supportive of Ukraine's case, they are quite different in their form, place emphasis on different issues and at times make different arguments (though not really contradictory). 3/
Interesting analysis from Marko Milanovic, but Iβm afraid Iβm less optimistic than he is regarding #Ukraineβs prospects against #Russia for receiving some kind of (legal) relief at the #ICJ in the form of provisional measures. 1/9
There are essentially three tests which must be met to receive provisional measures: prima facie jurisdiction; plausibility of rights and link between them and measures requested; and risk of irreparable prejudice and urgency (most recently: icj-cij.org/public/files/cβ¦). 2/
As many have pointed out, the #GenocideConvention compromissory clause provides the consent of the parties to the #ICJβs jurisdiction, the two states no longer having reservations thereto. However, prima facie jurisdiction must also relate to the alleged rights claimed. 3/