Unless you think ppl avoiding their military call-ups are tourists then #Russia's #PartialMobilization doesn't really change much with regard to the #visaban.
There are, however, ongoing issues to consider that the #EU & its member states should address promptly.
A🧵/1
The proposed '#visaban', which has now been implemented de facto by several #EU states (which border #Russia) was intended to stop Russian *tourists* from entering the Schengen zone. There are very good reasons for this - as I outlined here /2
And those reasons for the #visaban for *tourists* still stand: 1. To support #Ukraine & shorten the war 2. To bolster #EU states' security & resilience 3. To use our power to stand up for our democracies /3 bylinetimes.com/2022/08/30/eu-…
Europeans should recognise that to win our conflict with Russia we need to unleash the full arsenal of democracy.
One tool in that arsenal is withdrawing the privilege of tourist travel to Russians & several EU states have done just that
/4 schengenvisainfo.com/news/baltic-st…
🇳🇱🇨🇿🇧🇪are among those that stopped issuing Type-C Short Term visas (the main type used for tourism.
I did a short explainer on the different visa types here:
🇪🇪🇱🇻🇱🇹🇵🇱 recently closed their borders to Russians with Type C visas from other EU states
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They are entitled to do this under the Schengen Borders Code (Art 6.1e) if they see a threat to the 'internal security' or 'international relations' of any EU state.
Yet, as the Latvian authorities noted they will continue to process (& admit) other types of visa (holders) /6
:"visa applications will be accepted only from family members of the nationals of 🇱🇻, family members of nationals of the EU/EEA, or🇨🇭[AND]
*visa applications lodged by those applying for humanitarian purposes will also be accepted." schengenvisainfo.com/news/baltic-st…
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This situation leaves open
- humanitarian routes into eg Latvia (& other EU states, as holders of humanitarian visas from other states will be allowed in).
- emigration routes (ie not for ST eg, tourist travel but for Longer-term relocation).
- ST travel via plane from e.g.🇹🇷 /8
So it is not true that the EU's borders are completely closed to Russians, even if it is now (justly) more difficult for them to get in b/c of the flight ban & closure of borders for ST travel by nearly all neighbouring EU states.
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Holders of Long-Term work or residence permits (which are nationally managed not via the Schengen system) will also still be admitted via these routes.
National authorities of each EU state can still process & approve these types of longer term permits tho some choose not to.
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So why are people claiming the #partialmobilization changes the game on the #visaban?
-the argument is mainly that those wishing to flee Russia to avoid getting called up to the military should be able to do so.
-They could do so via humanitarian or LT emigration routes BUT
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Opponents of the ban claim that this is too lengthy & complex.
- & although we should be extra careful in screening anyone coming from #Russia at the moment, they do have a point while national systems operate as they do.
- However, the solution is not to scrap the #visaban
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Rather, the problem is national authorities not getting their act together and issuing humanitarian visas nor providing sufficient LT emigration routes.
It is up to the #EU member states to do this (which they easily could) not leaving the burden on border states🇫🇮🇱🇹🇪🇪🇱🇻🇵🇱
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As I've argued before, there is also a case for revisiting discussions on a Schengen wide humanitarian visa, something that EU states decided against in 2017.
But for now, it is up to the EU states who want to help Russians leave to issue them with the proper visas or permits
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Wilfully abusing the ST visa category & passing the buck to border states is not ok.
Some states will not want to issue visas for this purpose - as @kajakallas said Estonia does not see valid grounds not - but others can if they wish & holders of these visas will be admitted
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So why would EU states want to give give humanitarian visas to those feeling military service?
A key argument made by many advocates of this move is that letting such Russians in to the #EU will deprive Putin of soldiers to fight in #Ukraine.
I'm sceptical on how many 🇷🇺will
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do this (& sceptical about the effectiveness of mobilisation) but even if few Russians actually choose to leave rather than fight, I can see the logic of the argument.
Again however, this could - & should - be managed via humanitarian & emigration routes not ST visas.
Why?
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The same logic applies as for the ST #visaban. Any🇷🇺s who genuinely wish to oppose Russia (in its current form) & support & want to contribute to Western democracies should be welcomed. That means voting with their feet & committing to our societies, not flitting in & out /18
Neither democracy nor freedom come for free & we can't allow Russians to parasitically abuse or undermine our system at a time when their country is butchering Ukrainians, engaged in hostile activity against EU states & the wider West - & threatens us all.🇷🇺s need to choose. /19
Much like for the 'Russian opposition', those who wish to avoid military service should leave Russia & settle in EU. This will help encourage a brain drain & allow for opposition in diaspora communities who can form networks & build actually liberal/progressive RU politics
/20
Not everyone will agree that this is the best way to bring change in #Russia but, as I've emphasised before, that is not our primary concern. We must focus on helping #Ukraine win as fast as possible & on protecting & rejuvenating our own societies. /21
Even if corroding & degrading the current Russian state-society nexus are desirable in time, containing & isolating Russia are ST priorities. We should use the tools & routes we have to help Russians who oppose Putin & who don't want to fight #Ukraine to leave & resettle 4 LT /22
This requires careful screening & if they pass this process & want to relocate they should be given a chance to show if & how they can contribute to our societies.
While undergoing consulate screening they could also eg, wait in countries where they don't need a visa (eg🇹🇷)
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It means that the countries who want to help Russians escape must get their act together & speed up their issuing of humanitarian visas or residence & work permits.
It's THEIR responsibility. /END
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It’s wrong to describe the #visaban as creating a new Iron Curtain &, while history matters, it hasn’t determined which countries want to block to or allow Russian tourists into the Schengen zone (as eg 🇳🇱🇩🇰 show with their support & 🇭🇺 with its opposition). 2/4
Similarly, throwing around outdated East-West distinctions on attitudes to #Russia & war (contradicted by eg🇬🇧) doesn’t help anyone except #Putin- it makes history determinative, falsely divides us & questions CEE’s place in the ‘West’ 3/4
Don't be confused & don't get get sold short
❌this is not a #visaban on Russian tourists ❌
➡️So what did EU Foreign Ministers agree in Prague?
➡️How does it relate to the #visabanforrussians?
➡️What does it mean for EU, Ukraine & Russia?
(Spoiler - trouble ahead)
Short 🧵
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EU Foreign Ministers meeting in Prague stopped short of agreeing to implement a #visaban on Russian tourists.
Instead they cancelled the 'Visa Facilitation Agreement' with #Russia that had been in place since 2006.
So what was this facilitation agreement?
/2
The visa facilitation agreement was a way the EU made it EASIER for Russians, including tourists, to get Schengen short stay Type C Visas. It reduced or eliminated their costs & speeded up processing or reduced requirements for certain kinds of visitors.
No longer ... but ...
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No chance. #Ukraine provides the real example of positive change via P2P engagement & exposure. BUT ignoring tourist visas (for now), we should be very open to *emigration* from this cohort. Let the brain drain commence & let them vote with their feet if they really oppose Putin.
No one should get to live parasitically from our democracy going back & forth while merely claiming to oppose. Gotta commit. What happens in #Russia is Secondary to support for #Ukraine & what happens in #EU states when considering the #visaban.
#visaban is not about change in #Russia- that’s not happening anytime soon & only a crushing defeat has a chance of spurring it on. Change through exposure has failed in this case & should be put on hold until circumstances change.
This week (30-31/08) EU Foreign Ministers meet in #Prague where they'll discussion the #visaban.
I've worked on issues relating to visas, borders & EU foreign & security policy for 2 decades.
Here's what you need to know
- & why you should SUPPORT the #visabanforrussians
🧵/1
You can lobby your government to support this - including on Twitter.
No one (sensible) is talking about banning all Russians from EU states. For which visas would be affected see here
@rynkrynk Since I worked for the EU in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution I felt that the country hadn’t been given a fair shot, and was being used for EU interests (actually a self-defeating move that led to a lose-lose situation), which ultimately led me to resign from my job & 1/2
@rynkrynk to try to understand how & why this came to be. (Via academic research). The more I knew the more I saw how most Ukrainians, against the odds, wanted & strove to improve their lives & their country. I tried to find ways to support that process & advised on visa liberalisation
@rynkrynk I used my research to inform that process, which remains something I’m really happy to have done. More recently (as I’ve written in a number of places) Ukraine has shown other Europeans what it means to stand up for democracy & self determination, for freedom & human rights
Three standout points on #Ukraine and #Russia in this excellent piece by @AVindman in Foreign Affairs that are also highly relevant for #Germany's Foreign Policy establishment.
1. 'If Ukrainian democracy is going to prevail, U.S. [German] foreign policymakers must finally prioritize dealing with #Ukraine as it is rather than #Russia as they would like it to be.'
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2.'By freeing itself from its Russocentrism, Washington [Berlin] will also be better able to engage with and listen to its partners in Eastern and northern Europe, which have greater proximity to and more clarity on national security threats from Russia.'
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