This is an astonishing & frustrating update on military, financial & humanitarian aid to Ukraine by @kielinstitute in € billion: „The U.S. is now committing nearly twice [!] as much as all EU countries and institutions combined“ 👉 app.23degrees.io/view/5V9AdDpw1…#ukrainesupporttracker
„…This is a meagre showing for the bigger European countries, especially since many of their pledges are arriving in Ukraine with long delays. The low volume of new commitments in the summer now appears to be continuing systematically“ from @kielinstitute
The US is leading the war effort, and Europeans - or better to say: Western Europeans - are leaning in. This is problematic on some many levels, not least with a view to the US midterm elections. The US continues to invest heavily, and EUropeans are falling more and more behind.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
At the outset of the war, both sides hashed out a set of invisible rules—unspoken but nonetheless real. They include Russia’s acceptance of allied heavy-weapons deliveries and intelligence support for Ukraine, but not the use of Western troops.
And they include Western states’ grudging acceptance of Russian conventional warfare within Ukraine’s borders (eager as these countries are to see Moscow defeated), as long as the conflict does not lead to the use of weapons of mass destruction.
Has Germany done enough to prevent the return of spheres of influence in Europe? And what happened to Germany's historical responsibility with the war in Ukraine? Here are some thoughts for the new issue of @TWQgw - Thread 🧵👇And first 50 copies are free! tandfonline.com/eprint/MMQDBN2…
1) Russia’s actions stand opposed to everything Germany had learned from its history both pre- and post-1945. Pre-1945, Germany subjugated large parts of Europe into a German sphere of occupation. Post-1945, the Eastern part of GER was absorbed into a Soviet
sphere of influence
2) Due to this twofold past—imposing spheres of influence and being exposed to spheres of influence—GER is deeply skeptical of spheres. And yet, Berlin was reluctant to deter Russia from its growing imperial ambitions with all its available means in the years before the invasion
Two weeks after our initial article What If Russia Wins?, @mkimmage and I think through the opposite scenario: What If Russia Loses? for @ForeignAffairs - "They created a desert and called it peace" (Tacitus) but then the question becomes: what now?foreignaffairs.com/guest-pass/red… (1/9)
Putin has made a strategic blunder by invading Ukraine and he will be unable to win this war on his preferred terms. Perhaps he can cobble together a puppet government with Kyiv as its capital, a Vichy Ukraine. Perhaps he can muster the support required from a secret police (2/9)
As in Belarus. In reality, it is a model only on paper. A Russified Ukraine might exist as an administrative fantasy in Moscow, and governments are capable of acting on their administrative fantasies. But it will not work in practice, owing to Ukraine’s size and history. (3/9)
If Russia achieves its political aims in Ukraine by military means, Europe will not be what it was before the war. Not only will U.S. primacy in Europe have been qualified; any sense that the EU or NATO can ensure peace on the continent will be the artifact of a lost age. (2/11)
Security in Europe will have to be reduced to defending the core members of the EU and NATO. Everyone outside the clubs will stand alone. Under a perceived siege by Russia, the EU and NATO will no longer have the capacity for ambitious policies beyond their own borders. (3/11)
(2/5) Four issues will be critical in determining Germany’s ability to partner with the #US in leadership: security policy, the #Russia & #China test cases (Nord Stream & more), public opinion on foreign policy & the makeup of the governing coalition after this fall’s elections.
(3/5) Germany will have to navigate disagreements with the US, while keeping Europe together and going through its own election period, the most significant one in a decade-and-a-half. At the same time, uncertainty about the future of transatlantic relations after Biden remains.
1) THREAD: What to expect if the #US 🇺🇸withdraws from #NATO? At the Körber #PolicyGame, we discussed this scenario w/ high-level officials and experts in coop w/ @IISS_org - here are the summarized results for the Twitterati community: (have mercy, it’s my first thread!)
2) We wanted to know: How would Europeans react in such a situation?What are interests and red lines? Thus, we invited a 🇫🇷, 🇩🇪, 🇵🇱,🇬🇧, and 🇺🇸 team to play our scenario. Crisis in the #South, Crisis in the #East - were #Europeans able to get their act together w/out the 🇺🇸? 💪 🇪🇺
3) The short answer is: willing yes ❕but able❔ First, most teams focused on reversing a #US withdrawal from #NATO by all possible means, offering the 🇺🇸concessions that were unthinkable before - from #trade to #energy. But what if that doesn’t help? 🤔