A longer thread 🧵 on the question of #Putin and the possible use of #nuclearweapons: During his Valdai-speech, Vladimir Putin dedicated a substantial time to convince the world that Russia is not ready to use nuclear weapons. 1/
He said that Russia is not interested in using a “dirty bomb”: “it makes no sense for us, neither politically nor militarily”. 2/
He also made it clear that Russia does not plan to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power, except in cases prescribed in the Russian Military Doctrine. 3/
The logical question arises: How can we understand Putin’s nuclear rhetoric in general? 4/
One minute he is rattling off about nuclear weapons, creating an absolutely clear feeling of readiness to use them tomorrow, the next minute he is convincing everyone around him that there is no such thing, and it cannot happen. 5/
To understand this logic, we outline three main theses: The real position of Russia in accordance with its military logic, public rhetoric, and games. 6/
📌 First, the real position of Russia in accordance with its military logic. 7/
The position on the use of nuclear weapons in the context of the war in Ukraine is as it follows: it is possible in the case of “aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons”, which would “endanger the existence of the state”. 8/
The problem here is that no one understands how the Russian leadership would interpret the “threat to the existence of the state”. 9/
If we assume that the current war against Ukraine is existential, and losing the war is a threat to the existence of the state (Putin has explicitly said so), then one can conclude that Russia will use nuclear weapons if there is no other military way to turn the war in its favor
That means, Russia will use nuclear weapons if there is a risk of a Ukrainian victory – the complete return to the territorial borders as of before 24th February, not to mention Crimea. 11/
📌 Second, public rhetoric. Putin’s rhetoric consists of two blocks of meaning, which he often uses separately, giving the impression that they contradict each other. 12/
The first block (the basic attitude) is that Russia does not want to use nuclear weapons, it does not benefit from using them. The second block is that it will use nuclear weapons under the conditions described in the military doctrine (see above). 13/
These two blocks of meaning do not contradict each other, but the emphasis of one of them forms a different impression: either as an attempt to deescalate, or as a threat. 14/
Just as, for example, if you ask Putin if he wants to continue the war in Ukraine, he will answer of course not, Russia is a peaceful country. 15/
But if you ask why it does, he will say that otherwise a war would have been waged against Russia. It is the same here. It does not intend to use nuclear weapons, but it will if it must. 16/
📌 Third, games. Putin’s verbal games with external audiences consists of balancing the blocks of meaning as described above. And how it works was already clearly visible. 17/
When Putin thinks that the military situation in Ukraine is more or less under control, he uses the basic setup/the basic block – saying that Russia does not want and will not use nuclear weapons. 18/
The threat comes into play when Putin has the feeling Ukraine is overstepping its limits, and the West needs a “shake-up”, a shock (as Ukraine is a tool of the West). This was the case in April, and it was the case in the end of September. Every time Russia retreated. 19/
If tomorrow Ukraine conducts a successful counter-offensive and swiftly removes Russian troops from significant territory, the nuclear threats will return. 20/
Therefore one should not treat Putin’s words based on the idea that he is changing his position, but based on an assessment of his subjective sense of the state of affairs in Ukraine. If he uses a basic “anti-nuclear” attitude, he believes that everything is relatively fine. 21/
If he starts saber-rattling, it’s an attempt to scare the West into a situation where it feels that Ukraine has “gone too far”. This all speaks only about his feelings, but not of any real practical plans to use nuclear weapons. 22/
They will remain in force if Russia feels that it is losing the war. It is very important that Putin’s understanding of the word “losing” will be entirely different from that of the West. 23/
Finally, there is another important plot affecting Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric. Putin’s speech is very similar to what he said during the accession ceremony of the Ukrainian regions. 24/
But this is new: Putin began to actively invest in the “anti-American” global world, deciding that this moment had long been and it was time to raise “non-Western” (in the value sense) countries to fight American globalism. 25/
Look how much enthusiasm and joy he had when he spoke: “what we are doing is very attractive to so many countries and people around the world!” And this is an extremely important context that is a deterrent to Russian nuclear, threatening rhetoric. 26/
Putin really wants to be liked, wants to be a positive hero fighting for global justice. Putin believes that there is a large-scale ideological war between the “Western world” and Russia for the minds of “neutral countries”, and that Russia is winning this war. 27/
And in this fight he feels very uncomfortable as a monster, rattling with nuclear weapons. This makes him fight the demonization of Russia’s image. Part of this demonization is nuclear blackmail. Hence Putin’s current, anti-nuclear rhetoric at Valdai. 28/
But this has nothing to do with any real military intentions/plans for Ukraine. Putin today hopes that it will not come to a worst-case scenario. 29/
For him, Russia can afford to not win for a certain time, but it cannot afford to lose. And if it comes down to that, to a loss, he will use nuclear weapons, because he will have no other option to not lose. End/
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