#Russian force generation efforts combined with Western sanctions are having long-term damaging effects on the Russian economy, as ISW has previously forecasted.
2/ Financial experts told @Reuters that the Kremlin will face a budget deficit that will “drain Moscow’s reserves to their lowest level in years” due to projected decreases in energy revenue, sanctions, and the cost of Russian mobilization. reuters.com/world/europe/u…
3/ One expert predicted that payouts to mobilized men including social benefits may cost the #Kremlin between 900 billion rubles and three trillion rubles (around $14.6-$32.4 billion) in the next six months.
The number does not account for payouts to other servicemen such as BARS (Combat Army Reserve), volunteer battalions, & the long-term commitment to veterans' payments to contract servicemen, volunteers, non-military specialists who moved to occupied territories, & proxy fighters.
4/ @TheStudyofWar previously estimated that one volunteer battalion of 400 servicemen costs #Russia at least $1.2 million per month excluding enlistment bonuses and special payments for military achievements.
5/ The #Kremlin is continuing to rely heavily on financially incentivizing Russians to fight in #Ukraine, which will likely continue to strain the Russian economy for decades.
6/ Russian officials have been promising salaries to volunteers and mobilized men that are more than twice the average Russian civilian salary before and during Russia’s full-scale invasion of #Ukraine.
7/ #The Kremlin has been attempting to deflect part of the cost of the force generation effort onto Russian federal subjects but will likely need to tap into the federal budget more heavily soon.
8/ The #Kremlin is already facing challenges in delivering promised compensation, challenges that are increasing social tensions within Russian society.
9/ #Putin’s calls for a competitive Russian military industry are divorced from the reality of Russian supply chain and defense industrial base issues. isw.pub/UkrWar110222
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The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is likely continuing mobilization efforts covertly under the guise of forming volunteer units as of November 3. /1 isw.pub/UkrWar110322
#Russian forces are continuing to withdraw some elements from northwestern #Kherson Oblast, but it is still unclear if Russian forces will fight for Kherson City.
2/ #Kherson City occupation deputy Kirill Stremousov stated on November 3 that #Russian forces “will most likely leave for the left (eastern) bank” of the #Dnipro River.
3/ ISW has observed that #Russian forces are continuing to prepare fallback positions on the left bank of the #Dnipro River while continuing to set up defensive positions northwest of Kherson City and transporting additional mobilized forces there, despite Stremousov’s statement.
Russian officials announced that occupation authorities began integrating the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) into the jurisdiction of Russian nuclear power plant operator Rosenergoatom on November 2. isw.pub/UkrWar110222
2/ Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko claimed that ZNPP personnel who are “critical for the work of the ZNPP” signed contracts with Rosenergoatom and that Russian authorities are exploring the creation of a security zone around the ZNPP.
3/ Ukraine’s Energoatom stated on October 28 that only 100 of the 6,700 Ukrainian personnel remaining at the ZNPP plant have signed new contracts with the Russian energy agency Rosatom (out of 11,000 personnel before February 24).
New: @TheStudyofWar has developed an interactive 🗺️ & timeline tracking verified Ukrainian partisan attacks. ISW will update this map as additional attacks are confirmed.
Key takeaways from our assessment follow in a brief🧵.
1. Effective Ukrainian partisan attacks are forcing the Kremlin to divert resources away from frontline operations to help secure rear areas, degrading Russia’s ability to defend against ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives, let alone conduct their own offensive operations.
2. Poor Russian operational security has enabled Ukrainian partisan attacks. Increasing manpower shortages are likely degrading Russian forces’ ability to effectively secure Russian rear areas against partisan attacks and simultaneously defend against Ukrainian counteroffensives.
#Wagner financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin continued his efforts to increase his status among Russian elites and his presence in St. Petersburg by attacking local officials and announcing the creation of a PMC Wagner Center in St. Petersburg on October 31. isw.pub/UkrWar103122
2/ #Prigozhin reportedly requested on October 31 that the Russian Prosecutor General’s office open a criminal investigation into the “fact” that St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov organized a “criminal community” in St. Petersburg.
3/ #Prigozhin is likely using his criticism of Beglov and other St. Petersburg politicians to enhance his own reputation—and his campaign may be working.
The Russian partial mobilization of reservists just completed strongly suggests that #Putin intends to keep fighting into 2023 rather than expecting to secure some sort of ceasefire or to escalate in a way that could end the war on his terms. isw.pub/UkrWar103022
2/ #Putin has paid a very high domestic price for this mobilization effort in the flight of hundreds of thousands of Russians to other countries, unprecedented protests, and equally unprecedented criticisms of the performance of the Russian military and the Russian government.
3/ This price makes sense if #Putin intends to keep fighting and recognizes the need to get reinforcements to #Ukraine right now in order to hold his positions long enough for fresh conscripts to arrive and turn the tide in his favor, as he might think.