Thread by @osint_east

The Battle for Kherson

What is known, what is not known, and how the next few weeks could shape the war for the next six months.

#ukrainerussianwar #kherson #ukraine #russia

PART ONE — "Shaping the Field"

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The fall of Kherson was a significant #Russian military and political victory. Kherson is critical to Russian maximalist aims; its claims of Russian cultural repatriation in Ukraine; and is central to the #Novorossiya concept (contemporarily the Transnistrian land bridge).

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The capture of Kherson (city and ex-urban areas) by March 2 illustrated two key features of the Kherson AO:

1) Russia's capacity to penetrate fronts rapidly with motorized & mechanized elements.

2) Ukraine's partial and over-extended defensive capabilities in the region.

3/

The defense of Kherson was fluid. Ukrainian counterattacks quickly faltered. They were chaotic and disjointed and partly composed of hastily-assembled volunteer forces—some of whom had no training. Kherson fell just 120 hours after the invasion began.

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This flagging defense was, in part, a consequence of the simultaneous defense of #Odesa. The threat of amphibious landings along 135km of coastline critically undermined Ukraine's response capacity in Kherson, in addition to likely command failings.

h/t @wartranslated

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https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1523442724778962947

The absence of Ukrainian maneuver capabilities necessitated advance by marginal gains. By mid-April the LOC stabilized south and east of Mykolaiv as Ukraine repositioned elements of the 80th, 28th & 60th brigades (approx.) amid swelling ranks of volunteers.

map: @JominiW

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Weeks later the LOC remained largely static. RAF 58th & 49th CAAs, and 7th GALD continued pressure west via the E58, and northeast along the T-22-07 and T-04-03 (primary GLOCs). These advances largely exhausted themselves, and without any substantive breakouts.

map: @JominiW

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AFU conducted limited counter-offensives at the LOC, which had stabilized at the Inhulets River, and the Zasillia-Pokrovs'ke-Oleksandrivka axis. Russian echelons positioned along two (possibly three) lines of defense with the LOC approx. 90km (by road) from river crossings.

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Through July, both AFU and RAF elements traded only limited gains across the LOC, with both suffering high loss-rates in soldiers and materiel. Ukraine especially pushed available echelons into highly-contested areas, maily though attempts to secure perilous bridgeheads.

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A salient feature of the Kherson AO has been intensive attritional battles along an expansive front—not unlike that seen in the Donetsk and Luhansk AO where neither side has capacity for sustained breakout, even as they are resupplied. This played out for six months.

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However, a drawn-out operation is in Ukraine's interest, in part because frontal assaults are:

1) high-cost endeavors
2) dependent on favorable ground conditions
3) high-loss cost comes with political risk.

11/

To compensate, Ukraine has conducted methodical strikes on the #Antonovsky bridge, #Kakhovka HPP causeways, employing #HIMARS to attrit Russian supplies. This placed gradual, then immediate strain on already over-extended Russian forces.

h/t: @bayraktar_1love

12/

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1562714354557997058

Russian countermeasures were haphazard, with forced resupply by ferry or barge—a temporal and capacity limitation felt directly by forces furthest from supply points, especially those along the LOC.

Regardless, both forces remained largely locked-in-place.

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PART TWO — "At the Edge of Bank"

The battle for Kherson is a fulcrum in the war. Its possible recapture represents an enormous military and political victory for Ukraine. Conversely, its loss by Russia would be an inescapable setback.

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Since 2014, Vladimir Putin has expressed the notional value of capturing swaths of eastern and southern Ukraine—a remarrying of the Ukrainian eastern industrial heartland and Black Sea coast with Russia proper. February's escalation was a further step toward realizing this.

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Kherson's role is thus now more than military objective—it is central to the identity of the Russian invasion project, being the only regional capital captured since Feb. 24, and the furthest east Russia has held its advance.

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atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainea…

To lose Kherson undermines a principal element of the Russian invasion narrative and severely complicates the justification for the invasion, and subsequent reasons for its setbacks. Placing undue expectations on command may exacerbate any setback.

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https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1582652127381716992

In the past three weeks Russia has resorted to numerous, simultaneous mis- and dis-information campaigns, and likely compensate for the internal confusion that presides over command decision-making as they determine whether to attempt a hold on the city—or not.

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While it is possible the command decision may have already been made, the value of the city remaining in Russian hands likely remains of critical debate among Russian commanders, and among the units potentially left behind.

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https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1588203897629319169

Should Russia attempt to hold the city (albeit with a significantly reduced force) it has, in theory, the advantage of urban defense, dramatically-reduced supply lines, and total artillery coverage and accompanying aerial reconnaissance.

20/

A Russian presence can force a long-term urban engagement as it reconstitutes east of the Dnieper, leaving open the possibility of future ops. in the southern AO.

@SpencerGuard would note that any urban engagement would be extremely costly for both forces, and civilians.

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Ukraine is thus unlikely to attempt a frontal assault on the city (or even prolonged siege) due to the military and political costs. The strategy of attriting Russian supply and forces incrementally will remain, with opportunistic assaults where Russian lines are thinnest.

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If Ukraine were to capture the city it would face the likely consequences of its victory. Russia could find recourse by saturating the city and its environs with artillery fire—perhaps indefinitely—placing incredible strain on Ukraine's ability to administer the city.

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Above all, both Russia and Ukraine must prepare for managing the military and political outcomes of the battle. These will be so significant as to inform the tempo of operations throughout the winter, as Russian mobilized forces grow, and Ukraine repositions forces north.

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A factor of a Ukranian victory would be the impetus to push harder along existing fronts, capitalizing on the exposed faults of the Russian campaign. Whether these would be successful remains an open question: @WarintheFuture explores the potential of the winter ahead.

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https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1585018258729897984

Above all, a Russian defeat may signal the end of its operations west of the Dnieper, and further erode its narrative aims of the war. The concept of a southern land bridge would be lost—perhaps forever—the ramifications of which remain unknown, but are likely enormous.

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