Thread by @_Jack_Daw

What options of action does #Ukraine have to resist #Russia|s war of aggression and fully restore its territorial integrity? (Published in German beforehand) A 🧵

A few days ago I ventured an approximation of what Russian warfare in the #Ukraine war might look like in the coming months (in German, however, you might use google translation)

https://twitter.com/_Jack_Daw/status/1587903688106020864

1⃣ I currently see three theoretical options of action for Ukraine. (1) Ukraine seeks a negotiated settlement. At latest, however, the recent annexations by Russia, however, have finally removed any breeding ground for this option

https://twitter.com/SabFis3/status/1588956349727375361

2⃣ (2) Ukraine continues the two current offensive operations in #Kherson and #Kharkiv/#Luhansk, but otherwise behaves defensively and tries to exploit the advantages of the internal defence line to maximum effect.

3⃣ A milestone would be the Russian withdrawal from Kherson west of the Dnipro. The indications of such an event are becoming more and more frequent, just one example:

https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1588924419002740736

.

4⃣ We will have to wait and see whether and to what extent the consequences will reach the Kremlin. However, the former cannot be ruled out if one takes into account the internal Kremlin infightings already noted elsewhere. understandingwar.org

5⃣ In competition with the army (Shoigu, Putin), the hardliners (the so-called siloviki among the siloviki) have have made their mark and established themselves. Prigozhin with Wagner and Kadyrov are central figures and publicly criticise the military.

6⃣ Another milestone would be the Ukrainian breakthrough along the Kreminna → Svatove line towards Starobilsk. Currently, however, no indications of an imminent breakthrough can be extracted, see relevant mil-bloggers e.g @DefMon3, @AndrewPerpetua.

7⃣ (3) As another option, Ukraine would take up further offensives in addition to these operations, such as towards Melitopol or Mariupol, as is widely suspected in the information space and with good reasons.

8⃣ However, being able to feed the needs of further offensives at all will inevitably be under the constraints of the availability of appropriate resources. In addition, an assessment of feasibility will also depend on an assessment of the strength of the opponent.

9⃣ In particular, the choice of a distinct location for a further offensive will probably depend on Ukraine's local assessment of the strength of the Russian army.

1⃣0⃣ Should a decision be made on the Ukr. side to launch another offensive, but two locations with similarly assessed chances of success have been identified, another criterion would be added: the potential impact on the power structure in the Kremlin

1⃣1⃣ In a nutshell: #Wagner and the reg. army are not evenly distributed, but show clear clusters in their spatial distribution. For example, Wagner currently operates mainly in the #Bakhmut area and is the main force there, see Mil. blogger and ISW reports.

1⃣2⃣ This opens up tactical possibilities for Ukraine under the above-mentioned conditions: If Wagner is attacked successfully, the hardliners around Wagner could come under pressure in the internal Kremlin competition (possibly with backlash on the local battle intensity).

1⃣3⃣ The reverse reading also works: defeats of the Russian regular army would weaken Shoigu|s/Putin|s position (again possibly with backlash on the local battle intensity).

1⃣4⃣ Certainly, Ukraine has an interest in avoiding the hardliners as profiteers from the battlefield fighting. Accordingly, Ukraine will factor considerations of this into its decisions. Under certain circumstances, even to the point of delaying/avoid its own offensive.

1⃣5⃣ The irony is that Putin could be temporarily "propped up" in this way. At the latest since the events surrounding the grain agreement as a result of the Ukrainian attack on the #BlackSeaFleet in #Sevastopol, he may be seen as a lame duck.

https://twitter.com/patriot_singles/status/1587768885532557312

1⃣6⃣ In other words: Ukraine will try as far as it can to exert maximum influence on the direction in which ruZZia falls

1⃣7⃣ A fall in the opposite direction to the ultra-nationalist hardliners would also offer Russia itself the hope of overcoming the revisionist KGB/FSB autocracy and renewal. Without Ukrainian territory, and within whatever borders.

1⃣8⃣ But that's an issue of tomorrow, not today. End